































THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM

Thomas Bradley

Interviewed by Bernard Galm

Completed under the auspices  
of the  
Oral History Program  
University of California  
Los Angeles

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## INTRODUCTION

I appreciate the high honor of sharing with you some thoughts and feelings on this quite remarkable man, Mayor Tom Bradley.

This is more than the story of an individual. It is a recollection of a love affair that Tom Bradley has had with the city of Los Angeles since he arrived here in 1934 at the age of seven. It has been an affair of mutual sharing of concern, shared equally by him and the people of this city.

I first came to know him after he had risen to the rank of lieutenant in the Los Angeles Police Department--no small undertaking when one recalls that this was under the administration of William Parker, hardly known for his civil rights activities or philosophy.

It was then that many of us first learned of his singular ability to reconcile conflict and to accomplish quietly much for which others sought and received credit. It was not easy for him to push through an idea now readily accepted by everyone; namely, to have black and white officers occupying black and white police vehicles together.

When many of us determined to pool our resources to accomplish the election of the first black member to the city council, a meeting was called by community leaders at the Golden State Insurance Company auditorium to determine



if we could unite behind one candidate. When Tom rose to speak, everyone listened with some apprehension and not a little suspicion to this man whose background was that of a police officer. When he finished, it was clear that the community had found someone who could respond to need and provide leadership.

Some of us came to know him best in his first campaign for Mayor. At the same time, it was an unprecedented effort where single-handedly he turned away all the doubters. He met head-on all of the "this isn't the time", "we can't raise the money", "there aren't enough blacks in the City", et cetera. It was hard to know how really tough he is. He seemed to have an inner strength that communicated itself simply by his presence, not necessarily by words. He campaigned tirelessly. No worthwhile suggestion was turned aside. He raised more money by himself than any finance campaign committee could ever do, and he inspired a cross section of this community to join him in the impossible dream.

I can recall preparations for TV panel programs in that election when he said, "I won't take a position unless it's right."

Together with others I had occasion to meet with him and discuss certain issues and ideas on which he wanted our input. He normally opened the discussion by





suggesting the agenda items, and then he listened. He solicited views, exchanged ideas, and then thanked us generally without any indication as to any conclusion he might have reached. In short: he made up his own mind.

His political road has had bumps, and he has known success and adversity, as this book well demonstrates. The measure of the man has been how he has dealt with political defeat and personal problems. That characterization was best shown by a Paul Conrad drawing in the Los Angeles Times when he lost his race for governor in 1982. It is a Lincolnesque drawing of Tom with the caption, "I had a dream."

It has never been his style to complain. Those of us who have been privileged to know him may be quick to place responsibility for a political defeat on the issue of race or some other factor. But not Tom. He lets you know that the race is never over. It's as though he is still running track with miles to run before he rests.

It seems as though he's always had a title: officer -- sergeant -- lieutenant -- councilman -- mayor. But whatever authority came from those positions, it has never been exercised unreasonably or unfairly. For his is a style, a grace, and a dignity that rubs off on all who





know him. While everyone doesn't love him, no one hates him.

If there is a single purpose to his life, it has been his deep sense of loyalty. To his mother from whom he drew so much. To religious commitment and reverence for service and good deeds. To his family, whose personal difficulties sometimes brought him sorrow and despair. And to his friends, supporters, and, especially, his staff, whom he has never faulted, even when on occasion they should have been.

I and others on occasion have made recommendations to him to fire somebody or make some kind of a personnel change, views that are almost always ignored because it is impossible for him to fire anyone, even when a discharge seems warranted. His has been a staff of few changes with deep affection and service to him and what he wants for tomorrow for his beloved Los Angeles, for California, and the nation. They have a relationship with him that is special and defies comparison in the political world or in the private sector. They are free to express their views or undertake political activities even against candidates that he favors.

It's as though he has enlarged his family who share his love and compassion.

His appearance is deceiving, for he is at one and the



same time a simple and yet a very complex person. He doesn't smoke or drink--well, he did have a glass of wine at my wedding. He's not given to profanity. Rarely voices anger, but I must admit I once heard him call someone a son-of-a-bitch. But, consistent with his personality, he said it in private.

He is agonizingly neat, never needs a shave, and always wears a tie and jacket. I once asked him about this, and his answer was quite simple. That's how he likes to look, and that's how he likes to dress.

Future generations should be able to recognize his election as the Mayor of Los Angeles with a small minority of black citizens as a significant development in the American political mosaic. A community of about 85 percent white people said, "We want you to lead us." He went quickly from being the black Mayor to being the Mayor who was black. As the struggle for racial equality moves from the legislature and courthouse to the ballot box, his efforts, victories, and defeats will stand not for what is difficult, but for what is possible. For that, we are grateful.

Jack Tenner  
Judge, Superior Court  
County of Los Angeles  
March 7, 1984





## INTERVIEW HISTORY

### INTERVIEWER:

Bernard Galm, director, Oral History Program. B.A., English, St. John's University, Minnesota, Fulbright Scholar, Free University, Berlin, Germany, 1957-58. Graduate study, School of Drama, Yale University, and Department of Theater Arts, UCLA.

### TIME AND SETTING OF INTERVIEW:

Place: Mayor's office, Los Angeles City Hall.

Dates: July 18, August 11, 25, September 6, 22, October 12, 1978; April 13, 1979.

Time of day, length of sessions, and total number of recording hours: Interview sessions were fitted into the mayor's full schedule and therefore took place at various times of day. Generally they lasted two hours. Sessions were often interrupted in order for the mayor to take important calls and attend to urgent office matters. Approximately nine and one-half hours of conversation were recorded.

Persons present during interviews: Bradley and Galm.

### CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW:

In preparation, the interviewer researched newspaper articles and studied biographical material and press releases supplied by the mayor's office. He also interviewed key members of Bradley's staff for possible insight into subjects that could be addressed in the interview. Maurice Weiner, former deputy mayor and chief of staff, was interviewed at length and gave much information on important issues that arose during Bradley's years as councilman and later as mayor. "Tom Bradley, Los Angeles's First Black Mayor," an unpublished dissertation by James Lee Robinson, Jr., provided important background on Bradley's political life.

Galm pursued a full biographical study within a chronological format. He began with a discussion of Tom Bradley's family background and early life and education in Los Angeles. The narrative continued with a review of assignments while a Los Angeles police officer, his retirement and brief career as a lawyer before assuming



his responsibilities as an elected city councilman. The interview then centered on his ten years on the city council and the major issues that faced that body. Special attention was given to his unsuccessful mayoral campaign of 1969 and the later victorious race in 1973. In the final sessions Bradley discussed important civic programs initiated during his first term and local and national events affecting his administration.

#### EDITING:

Editing was done by Rebecca Andrade, assistant editor, Oral History Program. She checked the verbatim transcript against the original tape recordings editing for punctuation, paragraphing, spelling, and verification of proper nouns. Words and phrases inserted by the editor have been bracketed. The final manuscript remains in the same order as the taped material.

In September 1980, the edited transcript, along with a list of queries and names requiring verification, was returned to Lisa Janti (Special assistant to the mayor), who coordinated the interview project in the mayor's office. The approved transcript was returned by Janti in December 1983. Bradley made few changes or deletions, but further verification of names was necessary.

Mitch Tuchman, principal editor, reviewed the manuscript before it was typed in final form. He discovered that Andrade's editing was not always faithful to the taped material, so he did an audit-review and made the necessary changes to assure the accuracy of the final manuscript. The index was compiled by Richard Smith, principal editor, and the front matter was prepared by program staff. The introduction was written by Jack Tenner.

#### SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:

The original audio tapes and edited transcript of the interview are in the University Archives and are available under the regulations governing the use of permanent, noncurrent records of the university. Interview records and research materials are on file in the office of the Oral History Program. A copy of the Robinson dissertation (see CONDUCT) is available in the University Research Library.





TAPE NUMBER: I, SIDE ONE

JULY 18, 1978

GALM: Mayor Bradley, we usually begin these oral history interviews by asking the interviewee where they were born and when.

BRADLEY: I was born in Calvert, Texas, December 29, 1917.

GALM: Could you tell me a little bit about your family background? How did the family come to Calvert, or to be in Calvert?

BRADLEY: My father [Lee Bradley] and mother [Crenna Hawkins Bradley] came to Calvert from, in one case, my father from North Carolina, then [went] on to Calvert at an early age. My mother came to Calvert as a child. They grew up there, raised part of their family, and then my father moved to Los Angeles in about 1922. He remained here for about a year and then came back to get the family, the rest of the family, and brought them as far as a place called Summerton, Arizona, which is just outside of Yuma, Arizona. My mother and the children spent another year there before coming on to Los Angeles.

GALM: Now, from some of the research that I've been doing, there was some indication that-- Did the family ever move to Dallas?

BRADLEY: Yes, only very briefly. It was kind of a stopover on the way to Summerton.



GALM: So there was no real period of residence that you recall?

BRADLEY: I don't recall the period when we lived in Dallas. I just know that we did move there very briefly prior to going on to Arizona.

GALM: So the family in Calvert included-- Were your mother's parents--did they live in Calvert also?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: And your father, did he have relatives there also?

BRADLEY: Yes, he did. Sisters. I believe that two of his sisters lived there at that time.

GALM: Are there any relatives from that period that come to mind? Grandparents or--

BRADLEY: I have a cousin by the name of Woods, Bertha Woods, who still lives there. There are perhaps thirty other relatives whom I had not remembered. I went back to Calvert in 1976, in September, and that was my first trip back since I left as a child. It was only at that time that I met some thirty relatives who were still living in the general area--some in Calvert, some as far away as Houston--who had come back just for a Tom Bradley Day that was celebrated in the town. /

GALM: So when the family moved to Los Angeles, there was just really the Lee Bradley family that came here, and not any of the others.





BRADLEY: That's correct.

GALM: Not any of the other relatives. Do you have any memories of the Calvert days? You were, of course, a wee tyke at the time.

BRADLEY: Yes. I have only the faintest recollection of those days. I remember the cotton fields where my mother and father worked. I remember what was in essence an old tin barn that was used as a commissary where all of the supplies for the family and those who lived on that plantation actually were acquired.

GALM: Your father was a sharecropper?

BRADLEY: Yes, that's correct.

GALM: Had his father [Tom Bradley] also been a sharecropper, then, back in North Carolina?

BRADLEY: No. His father had also come to Calvert, and he had rented some property. I guess he owned, not owned, but actually leased, several pieces of property which he farmed. I guess in each case, ultimately, that the farm or the property was lost because of the huge debts that always seemed to accumulate. As they would raise their crops, they would have to get credit, and the amount of money advanced to them always seemed to amount to more than their income at the end of the year. So they constantly found themselves falling deeper into the hole each year. It was one of the motivations for my father moving from Calvert. He felt that



that was a life which offered so little hope for him or his family that he wanted to get them out of Calvert, out of the oppressive social conditions, and out of the no-win economic conditions that existed there.

GALM: Of course, as a child of five it'd be difficult, but were you aware of the hardships that the family might have been experiencing at that time?

BRADLEY: No, I had no awareness of their difficulties.

GALM: How many children were in the family?

BRADLEY: At the time, there were three children who moved from Calvert. Ultimately, the others were born here.

GALM: Lawrence was your oldest brother?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Were you the second, then? ✓

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: And then Willa Mae?

BRADLEY: That's right. She was the third.

GALM: So were there four children, then, born in Los Angeles?

BRADLEY: No. Howard, my youngest brother, was born here.

GALM: And Alice?

BRADLEY: That's right. There were four of us when we came.

GALM: Did two children die, then, in infancy (because it always refers to seven children)?

BRADLEY: No. Actually, there were five children who died in infancy.



GALM: Oh. I know in an article that I think you wrote, you had mentioned an episode that had happened in Summerton when you decided to go out and help pick cotton. I wonder if you could just sort of retell that for the record.

BRADLEY: It was just prior to our leaving Summerton to come to Los Angeles. I had watched my family and other relatives picking cotton, and I wanted to see what it was like, so I went out to spend the entire day. I had one of the small cotton sacks. It seemed to me that I worked all day and still couldn't fill it. [laughter] I came away with my hands literally pockmarked with the holes and the cuts and bruises that came from the bolls of cotton that had dried and, of course, would stick you if you didn't know exactly how to pick cotton. I recall that during that day I was walking down one of the rows of cotton, and one of my cousins stopped me because just ahead of us was a rattlesnake all coiled and ready to strike. He took a hard boll of green cotton, threw, and hit the snake and killed it. So the combination of that snake [laughter] on that row of cotton and that hard day's work with less than twenty-five pounds of cotton having been picked was enough to impress me that was no life for me. I was delighted that that was at the tail end of our stay there and that I was going to get out and never





have to look back to another row of cotton.

GALM: Were there any other unpleasant memories of that time in Summerton? Or pleasant memories?

BRADLEY: I made some friendships that have lasted all of my life. There was a family by the name of Ellis that I came to know while living there and going to school there; we became fast friends. When we moved to California, one of the older members of the family [Tulsa Ellis] came with us and stayed with us. The rest of the family, the Ellis family, moved to Bakersfield. But we constantly stayed in touch with each other by correspondence and later began to visit each other. This was during my late teens. When I was in college, I recall driving up there very often to visit with them and they coming to Los Angeles. Ultimately, many of the members of that family moved to Los Angeles, and so we've maintained our relationship right down to the very present.

GALM: Where did the family live in Summerton?

BRADLEY: I could not describe for you exactly where it was. Summerton is such a small place that you either live in town [laughter] or you don't.

GALM: Did you live in town?

BRADLEY: It's just a small, rural, farming community.

GALM: Even smaller than Calvert?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes.



GALM: Calvert was a big town in comparison?

So you did arrive in Los Angeles. Where did the family take up residence at first?

BRADLEY: In what is called the West Temple area of the city. We moved to a number of places. I can recall living on Mountain View, on Alvarado, on Westlake--all within a matter of four blocks of each other. I don't recall all of the houses, but I know that we moved to a number of places, and those are the streets that I remember.

GALM: Does any house stand out more than another in your memory?

BRADLEY: Probably the house we lived in on Alvarado was the one that is clearest in my memory because it was there that we lived just prior to moving to East Fifty-third Street. I guess it must have been when I was in about the fourth grade. I can recall that site because I used to go back from time to time and still see the house sitting there. It had a lasting memory for me because now as I drive by there, it's right at the site where the Hollywood Freeway crosses Alvarado. That freeway actually wiped out the house.

GALM: So in those first years, what did your father do for work?

BRADLEY: When he came to Los Angeles, he worked as a cook, as a waiter, as a railroad porter. He worked at odd





. jobs. He did everything and anything that he could to  
earn a living. I recall that he travelled on boats,  
passenger ships, that moved up and down the Pacific Coast,  
from Washington down as far as Mexico.

GALM: Did that mean that he was away from home a great deal?

BRADLEY: Yes, he was away from home most of the time.

GALM: Do you have memories, then, or very few memories of him?

BRADLEY: I have strong memories of my father. He was a man who loved his children, and I can recall the great joy that we always felt when he would come back to town. He always brought us some goodies off the boat. Or, as he would come into port, he would get stalks of bananas or fruits or whatever else he could find that was being unloaded from other boats that came into the harbor, and he would bring these home to us. So we would always look forward to his return from one of these trips.

He was a man who had little in the way of formal education. Both my mother and father had little formal training. My father had about a fifth-grade education, and my mother only slightly less than that. And while they didn't have any real formal training, they appreciated the value of education. I recall from the very time that I can remember, they constantly pounded into my head the need



to get a good education. The appreciation for education was something very strong in their minds; they felt that if I were to achieve any degree of success or happiness in life, it was going to come as a result of good, solid education. They often talked of my becoming a doctor. In those days when you dreamt of getting a medical training, nobody ever figured out how it was going to be done. They just knew that they wanted me to go to college, they wanted me to get a good education, and the question of how that was to be accomplished was never a matter of any discussion. I suppose that none of us thought of facing up to that almost impossible hurdle.

GALM: But that was quite a dream for them to have.

BRADLEY: Yes. I guess the education came easily for me. I did well in school from the very earliest stages in my career. I loved to read, I loved to study, and I often spent a lot of time alone. When the rest of the kids would be playing, they could find me huddled off on the steps somewhere reading a book or in my room, either preparing my homework or just indulging in some reading for pleasure. They, I guess, spotted in me an inclination that they wanted to nurture, and that was a desire to work hard, to study hard, and some natural talent in that direction. So I think, more than the rest of the children in the family, they sort of concentrated on me in terms of



prodding and inspiring me to want good education, first of all, and then pounding into me the determination to overcome whatever obstacles came my way.

GALM: Were there any teachers or other individuals in those early years--I'm talking about, say, the elementary school years--that were encouraging you to read and to expand your knowledge?

BRADLEY: Yes. Well, there were two incidents that I guess stand out in the very early stages of my elementary career. One of them is related to my first exposure to racial prejudice. We lived in a mixed community; people of all different races lived there. While there was a pretty good sprinkling of blacks that lived there, they were not the majority, certainly far from even approaching the majority of that community. So our schools were well integrated. Our playmates: we just naturally gravitated toward whoever had the same interest or who enjoyed playing with you.

One of my close friends at that time was a boy by the name of Billy. (I don't even recall Billy's last name now.) I remember that we were inseparable, both in school and, then, as we played. We lived about four doors from each other on Alvarado. One day at school Billy broke the sad news to me that his parents told him that he was not to play with me any longer. That was a matter of some shock





to me and a puzzlement. I couldn't understand why, and I asked him. He told me that his parents said that he was not to play with the colored children on that block. I suppose up to that point race had never been a matter of conversation in our home. Racial prejudice certainly existed. My parents knew it, and I suppose that in a <sup>what do.</sup> subliminal way we were aware of it. But up to that point, it had never become so dramatic in terms of my awareness until Billy made this statement. Well, it turned out that until Billy's family moved away, though we would not be seen together on the street near his home, we continued our inseparability at school. We were both good students, and it was that kind of interest that sort of brought us together and kept us together.

The other dramatic memory that I have of elementary school, and this was a school called Rosemont Elementary School. (Incidentally, the first elementary school that I attended when I came to Los Angeles was Union Avenue School.) Well, when we moved to Alavarado and I went to Rosemont, I can remember that there was a teacher [Mrs. Cox] who gave me a lot of attention. She tried to encourage me to read. She would recommend books for me to read. She would occasionally bring clothing to give to me because we were very poor and and very often did not have adequate clothing to wear to school. She would continue to sort



of shower me with things that I needed. Without getting into specifics about the attention, the special attention which she showed me, she just demonstrated the kind of love and concern for a student whom she had identified as having certain special potential. It was out of that kind of attention that I believe I had my first awareness of someone outside of my family unit who had displayed some concern, special concern, for my welfare and for my future. Thus began a process that continued for the rest of my school career at each level in school. Each school, there was always one special teacher who, over and above the rest, seemed to give that kind of special attention. I suppose it was that kind of special attention that encouraged me, that inspired me to work hard, study hard, and to reach for what to most people would seem like impossible goals.

The same thing happened when I was in junior high school. I recall that one of my teachers suggested-- When I was preparing my program for the eighth and ninth grade in junior high school, I had to make a choice between academic or industrial courses. When I said I wanted to take an academic course, because I knew that that would be necessary in order to go to college, this counselor said to me, "Don't waste your time. You'll just break your heart. You're doomed to be denied that



opportunity to go to college. You ought to prepare yourself for a job. Take some studies that are going to lead you to manual labor because that's about as much as you're going to be able to hope for." I don't suppose that this was any sense of prejudice or an expression of discrimination. It was a reality as far as that counselor was concerned, and I suppose that the counselor was trying to avoid heartbreak for me. But it was the determination, the decision made long ago that I was going to college no matter what, and the fact that my parents had instilled that in me so firmly that nobody could have shaken me [that] prompted me to disregard that advice. It was, again, another teacher who sort of encouraged me, who saw some potential and wanted to develop it, and encouraged me to take the academic course and to go on to high school and then to college.

GALM: Was the counselor a white counselor?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes. There were no blacks teaching at that time. [laughter]

GALM: I see. Do you recall the name of the woman at Rosemont Elementary School?

BRADLEY: No, I don't remember her name. I could probably get her name. There's a fellow that I went to elementary school with by the name of Charles Scott who, I think, remembers the teacher's name. We both knew her.





GALM: Was your mother then working during that period that you were living on Alvarado? Was she also then working?

BRADLEY: Yes. My mother was a domestic worker. She worked for different people. She would work generally one day a week for a different family. This work took her to various parts of the city, and she got up early every morning to take off for work, leaving the children in the family to sort of fend <sup>live.</sup> for themselves. I think that this was, first of all, a kind of strengthening and healthy discipline for us because we learned to take care of ourselves and to handle the chores around the house, all the way from cleaning to washing and ironing and everything else that was required, because there was no adult there to do it for us. So we had to learn to do it.

Secondly, I later came to appreciate what a sacrifice my mother had to make in order to make a living for the family. She was not at home, except in the evenings. She would come home from work every day, obviously very tired from long duties in somebody else's house or kitchen, come home to prepare a meal both that night and something that might be used for us the following day.

There was little time for the kind of quiet conversation that the average family, middle-class family, would take for granted. It was a family which at best could be



called one living in poverty. But there was kind of an enriching spirit which she brought to the family, and her whole philosophy was living out the Golden Rule. There wasn't a mean bone in her body. She just loved everybody and tried to teach us to love and respect other people. That philosophy, sort of lived out on a day-to-day basis, certainly influenced me and, I think, the rest of the members of our family.

GALM: What parts of town would she be going to during this period?

BRADLEY: I recall one of the families lived on North Normandie, the 100 block of North Normandie. One of the families lived on 2323 South Grand Avenue; I even remember the address to this day. Another family lived in the Hollywood area; the address I don't recall. But these for the most part were the same families. Occasionally there was a new family that she worked for, but basically they were the same ones that she worked for for many years. In fact, I just had a visit from a woman my mother worked for for eighteen years. She recently wrote to me from Colton, California, where she now lives, and came by to visit me this morning. These were more than just families for whom she worked. They became closely identified with her and her struggles and with her children. From time to time, as I grew up and even after my mother no longer



worked for them, I would visit with them. In the case of one of the families that lived on Grand Avenue, I even went over and helped my mother and did a little work there. It was because of that relationship and that work that I came to attend Polytechnic High School, which was just a few blocks away.

GALM: You mentioned that Rosemont was quite racially integrated. Was that also true of the area in which you lived?

BRADLEY: Yes..

GALM: On Alvarado?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Of course, now it's a Mexican-American area. What was the makeup of that area then?

BRADLEY: It was predominantly Caucasian. There was a small pocket of blacks who lived in that general community at that time. There's still I suppose you'd call it a sprinkling of blacks who still live there, many of them the old families, the original families, from the West Temple area.

GALM: Now, was your family situation much different than, say, the family situation of other friends, other black friends?

BRADLEY: Not that much different.

GALM: Was the father often away from home taking jobs?





BRADLEY: No. There were a few whose parents worked as railroad porters or might have been engaged in something that would take them away, but very few of them. Most of them had parents who lived at home with them and who had jobs somewhere in town.

GALM: You mentioned that you were doing quite a bit of reading at this time. What were you reading?

BRADLEY: Everything that I could get my hands on, all the way from Western paperback novels to Dickens--just a whole variety of things. I loved to read, so whatever I could get my hands on I did.

GALM: Anything in particular that might have had a strong effect on you that you can recall?

BRADLEY: No, I don't recall any particular single book or single author that had any special effect.

GALM: So then, some of the other elementary schools, the Hooper Avenue: at what period was that?

BRADLEY: When we moved from the West Temple area, we moved to Fifty-third and Long Beach, and I attended Hooper Avenue School, which was Fifty-second and Hooper. That was, I suppose, the fourth grade. I suppose we lived there for about a year and a half. From there, we moved to Newton Street, and I attended school at Twentieth Street Elementary School.

GALM: What prompted these moves?



BRADLEY: I never asked my parents, but as I look back on it, I think that it may have been some moves because we moved very often. Some of them may have been out of necessity, inability to pay the rent, therefore having to move on. I really cannot think of any other logical reason, because the housing was all of poor quality. And as we moved, we really weren't improving our housing conditions, and we weren't moving that far away. So, while I didn't ask the question, I assume that it could have been related to financial reasons.

GALM: Because you mentioned that there seemed to be a great stability in the people, those jobs that [your mother] had, in the people that she worked for.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: So it doesn't seem to be prompted by getting any closer to a work source.

BRADLEY: No, no, it certainly was not at all related to where she was working, because she didn't get any closer to them. [laughter]

GALM: You attended Lafayette Junior High School, at least that is what I have--

BRADLEY: Yes, that's right.

GALM: --in the information. How do you recall this experience, the junior high school years?

BRADLEY: Lafayette, again, was an integrated school with



a pretty good cross section of racial groups attending. The minority groups were Asian, Mexican-American, and blacks. The recollection is not as clear as I'd like at this moment, but I would say that it was pretty well divided among those three major ethnic groups. Of course, there was a good cross section of whites who attended the school as well.

One of the strongest impressions that I have of my years at Lafayette was the talent of the minority students who attended there--among Japanese students, for example, some of the brightest young people that I'd ever met. Most of them seemed to be excellent students. Few of them had any plans or any hopes of going on to college. Some of them did, but this is not the tradition. Many of them were directed into various kinds of commercial ventures, all the way from running small stores, neighborhood stores, to working as gardeners or getting into some kind of civil service position as secretaries or clerical people.

I always thought at that time that this was a terrible waste of human resources, that people who had great talent, great ability, had no outlet, no real possibility, nothing to encourage them to make full use of their potential. This was also quite true of the black students who attended there. As I think back, I can recall a great





talent that they had as musicians, as entertainers, and most of that talent was wasted because very few of them pursued any of their potential opportunities. I occasionally see two or three who, because of their own determination and just incredible genius, did overcome the obstacles and the discouragement that they faced. [They] either became musicians or got involved in the entertainment industry. One is a producer-director now in the motion picture industry. But so many of them had natural talents, either as athletes or as entertainers or in some other capacity--some had wonderful minds--because of the oppressive conditions under which they lived and because of the lack of inspiration or encouragement, they lost their ambition, if they even had it, simply turned to the most menial kinds of jobs that were available or turned to drugs or crime.

I look back on many that I used to run, play with on the school grounds and over the years saw them become the residents of our jails and prisons. Ultimately, many of them died at an early age, victims of drug abuse or alcohol abuse or some other maladjustment. My overall impression, as I look about me and think about how few blacks held positions in any of the professions--there were literally a handful of doctors and lawyers, practically no teachers, this is an incredible thing as I look back



on it now--practically no blacks working as teachers in the entire school system, no librarians-- Well, there was one librarian, Miriam Matthews, that I remember. She was the only black who served in this capacity in the whole city of Los Angeles. So there was literally no role model that any of us could look to for encouragement or inspiration. And so it took unbelievable will and determination on the part of those who were able to rise above their environment or their circumstances and first of all have the ambition to do something better in life, to prepare for something better in life, or to finally overcome those obstacles and achieve some success in one capacity or another. So I think Lafayette served as the point of greatest awareness of the denial, the deprivation that blacks experienced in our society.

GALM: Those of you who did have dreams and did have ambition, did you in any way sort of group together to give each other moral support?

BRADLEY: No, I don't think there was any special association. At that point in our lives we pretty much went to the same places. [We had] limited sources of recreation, and so we all went to the same places, or we played on the streets together. There was no grouping, no natural identity with people who were in the same category in terms of interests or ambition or anything of that nature.



GALM: [As] a young person like yourself at that time, were you ever held up to ridicule by other students, you know, for being so ambitious?

BRADLEY: No, no. I don't recall anybody ever making light of someone who had special ambition or had special dreams. I don't suppose it really occurred to most that this was a hopeless kind of situation.

GALM: So then from Lafayette you went on to Polytechnic.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Was there any choice on that?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes. It was during the junior high school period that I recognized certain athletic talents which I had. I was a good runner, good in most athletic activities. I was a pretty good football player, so I decided that I would use the athletic ability as a means of getting a scholarship to college.





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GALM: Mayor Bradley, you were talking about discovering your athletic talent.

BRADLEY: I made the decision that, not only my own livelihood for the incidentals which I required and some financial assistance to the family that came from delivering newspapers, that I had to make a choice: that if I were going to go out for high school athletics, I would no longer be able to deliver papers. I worked for the old Los Angeles Record, and I delivered papers to the downtown area. My route covered from, roughly, Wall Street all the way to Figueroa, from about Second Street to Eighth Street.

GALM: Was it the Record or was it the Daily News, the newspaper that you delivered?

BRADLEY: It was the Record. Trying to recall: the Daily News, as I recall, was on Pico and Los Angeles, or thereabouts.

GALM: The reason I bring this up is because most of the biographical references say the Daily News, and this would be a way of really correcting it for the record.

BRADLEY: Oh, yes. The Record was located at Sixth and Wall Street, and the Daily News was located at Pico and Los Angeles. So it was the Record.

GALM: OK.



BRADLEY: I broached that issue with my mother. I told her that I had made a decision that I wanted to go out for football and it would require that I give up my job. She had never seen a football game. She didn't even know the details of what I was talking about. But because I told her that it was important, that I thought it was going to be the means of getting a scholarship to go to college, that was all she needed to know. She just indicated that the family would make that additional sacrifice and we would find the money somehow to make up for that loss that would result because I was no longer earning any money as a delivery boy. In all of the years that I attended high school and ran on the track team and played football, she never got a chance to see a single game or a single track meet because she was always working every day, trying to make it possible for me to stay in school. But it was that fateful decision that, I think, made the difference in my life, because it was through both track and football that I came to the attention of UCLA coaches, and they recruited me for UCLA. I got a scholarship and ultimately was able to attend school.

Poly High represented a great deal to me. First of all, I made a choice between going to the neighborhood school, which was Jefferson High. I lived at that time on Fifteenth Street near Hooper Avenue. And by virtue of the



area in which I lived, I should have gone to Jefferson. At that time a number of the young fellows that I associated with were either demonstrating, in my mind, a lack of ambition, or in some cases they were beginning to get into some trouble with the law, and I just felt that it would be healthier and better for me to break off that kind of regular association by going to a different school. Since my mother worked just three blocks from Poly High, I was able to use that address and to work there periodically and thereby have a logical excuse for transferring, getting a permit to attend a school out of the district where I lived.

Again, I think that was a decision that had a strong impact on my life because it was out of new associations, meeting new friends, and living in a slightly different environment that gave it a different direction to my life.

Jefferson at that point was still an integrated school, but the minority population was in the majority at that time and growing faster every day. Poly High, on the other hand, was an integrated school, perhaps the most cosmopolitan school in the city. The student body of about fifteen hundred, about a hundred of these were black, a pretty good mixture of Asians and Mexican-Americans, but the overwhelming majority was white. So it was in this setting that I came





to know a number of people, some of whom have become life-long friends. It was in that setting that I began to develop certain leadership qualities that I suppose blossomed and grew over the years.

Again, it was a situation in which one particular teacher sort of stood out. In this case, the man's name was [Frederick] York. He was a chemistry and science teacher, and he seemed to identify something special in me over and above my athletic talents, because those talents by that time had become quite apparent. I was the leading athlete on the campus; I was the top track man and football player. So those talents were naturally observable by all. But Mr. York recognized the academic talents which I had, and he encouraged me and helped me in every way possible.

At Poly, while there were no serious racial conflicts, there was just an understood pattern that had developed there, and that blacks did not have access to the extra-curricular activities--the service clubs, the knights, the various service organizations--that every other student could take for granted. The YMCA had clubs from the high school called High Ys. Blacks could not belong to the downtown YMCA or the metropolitan Y, where all of the whites attended, so we had to establish a separate High Y at the Twenty-eighth Street YMCA, which was in the heart of the



black community. In order to do so, we had to have a faculty sponsor, and Mr. York was generous enough to take his time and provide us that kind of faculty direction.

It was out of that kind of leadership that, once again, it became apparent to me that there were people in the world who really cared about other human beings without regard to race or color. It sort of implanted in me a tolerance for people who may be different by virtue of racial or religious or cultural background. I began, I suppose, what was to become a whole pattern in my life in the field of human relations: working with and trying to serve as a mediating force among people of different backgrounds. Whenever there was a problem on campus which was related to some racial tension or related to a difference between groups that had sort of been pitted against each other, either on the basis of gang identification or racial identification, I was called upon to sort of bring them together to resolve the differences. The principal and vice-principals also began to call upon me for these kinds of services. So bit by bit, I began taking on additional leadership responsibilities.

Finally, one day I decided I would run for the presidency of the Boys League. This was an unheard-of thing, for a black to do in a predominantly white school, where, even though there were no strong racial overtones on



campus, it was just an understood pattern that these things were off limits to minorities. Well, I ran against a fellow football player, and there was a subtle kind of campaign in that election in which they would remind the white students that whoever was Boys League president was going to have to represent the school with the downtown business interests, and that that person was going to have to be dressed presentably. There was just the insinuation that Tom Bradley didn't have the necessary wardrobe to do this. And they were right. [laughter] I didn't have a suit of clothes to my name. I borrowed my brother's whenever the occasion called for me to wear a suit. I was clean and neat, but I had so few clothes that it was a race to clean one set of clothes to get ready for the next time they'd have to be worn. I just didn't have adequate clothing.

GALM: I suppose you were still growing at this period too.

BRADLEY: Yes. I had already reached my maximum height at that time, not my maximum weight. But I had grown to the point where the ordinary stores just didn't have clothes to fit me to begin with. My brother was a little larger, a little heavier than I, so that whatever clothing of his that I wore always was baggy on me. It was a little bit too big. But this was my first exposure to a negative kind of campaign, and in that case I overcame that obstacle.





And because of my own identity on campus and popularity, I won that election.

I had another experience that was something of a surprise to me: no black had ever become a member of one of the honor societies, the Ephebian; and it was based upon leadership and scholarship. You had to be recommended by the faculty, and the top 10 percent of the class, the graduating class, were designated for this honor. So when that selection was made, and I was announced, it came as quite a shock to me. But it was, I think, the real blow that broke the whole pattern of racial discrimination in terms of service organizations on campus, because thereafter they just sort of disappeared, and blacks then became members of the various organizations, all the way from the service clubs to the special language clubs. Any kind of activity on campus then became open to any student on campus.

GALM: In these efforts, like for the Boys League presidency, were you able to mount any type of campaign to counter the other campaign? Or was it rather low key--

BRADLEY: It was a low-keyed kind of campaign. I at no point made any effort to counter this whispering campaign that went on. I thought then that either I would be elected on my ability and on the leadership qualities which I'd demonstrated or I wouldn't be, and that's the way it turned out.



GALM: Was there any examples of discrimination in the athletic department?

BRADLEY: None. I suppose the only incident that I can recall was some name-calling that occurred in the football game with Fremont High School, but that was of no consequence. It was something, you know, in the heat of the conflict, and some racial epithets called out by some of the opposing players. But aside from that, there was no evidence of racial discrimination, either on campus in terms of athletics or in the competition with other schools all over the city.

GALM: So it was during this period that you, then, became outstanding as a track star. You ran the 440-yard dash, had the city record in that.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: And [you were named] football all-city tackle. Do you recall who came to you from UCLA?

BRADLEY: Yes. There was a quarter-miler from UCLA by the name of Jimmy LuValle, who was one of the national and international stars in track. He was also a brilliant student; he was a straight-A student in chemistry when he was at Poly. That incidentally is where he attended school. He was also a brilliant Phi Beta Kappa student at UCLA. He's now teaching at Stanford University. After leaving UCLA, he went on to work for [Eastman] Kodak



Company back east, in New York. So I lost touch with him for many years. I recently learned that he's up at Stanford now.

GALM: So he came and--

BRADLEY: It didn't take any persuasion. I suppose that the first school that approached me was going to get me. [laughter] I was just that anxious to be able to go to college by way of a scholarship. So when LuValle approached me and urged me to come to UCLA and indicated that they would be willing to help with books and a job on campus, this was an automatic yes. So I came out and [was] interviewed by the coaches and made the decision to enter UCLA.

GALM: During your UCLA days, did you commute from home?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes. My first year I commuted by bus. I guess I started that next year riding with one or two of the other students who were attending school. After a year and a half at UCLA, I saved enough money to buy my own Model A Ford, so I then became the person who transported a number of students who lived in the general neighborhood out to UCLA.

GALM: You, of course, had come to UCLA on an athletic scholarship. But what was your career goal?

BRADLEY: At that point, I had in the back of my mind my parents' desire that I become a doctor. But I did not have a strong inclination in that direction; I didn't have any





particular interest in the field. I thought that I wanted to be a teacher, and so that became my career goal. I don't recall the point at which I gave up what my parents wanted me to be. Teaching just became something that I thought I'd like to do.

GALM: So there was not even a beginning of premed studies?

BRADLEY: No.

GALM: You had mentioned that there weren't any black teachers in the Los Angeles system. Was it the fact that there was discrimination at the hiring level, or was it also at the training level?

BRADLEY: There was discrimination at the hiring level. There were very few jobs in any professional category available to blacks. Bit by bit, they began to break into the teaching profession, but that was slow in developing. I guess it was not until the forties that it really began to open up.

GALM: Who were some of the [UCLA] professors that you came in contact with that you recall?

BRADLEY: I suppose that carrying on this pattern of inspirational figures who popped up in my life at every level of my educational career, the person at UCLA who had that kind of influence on me was not a teacher. She was the director of the University Religious Conference, Adaline Guenther. It was during the course of my work in



the [UCLA] Botanical Gardens, in my on-campus job, that I came across the Religious Conference Building. It sort of piqued my curiosity. It was at the edge of the campus, a beautiful structure, but somewhat isolated. I began to make inquiries about what went on in that building. I became sufficiently curious that I wandered in one day to see for myself and met Grandma, [as] she was called by all of us. Once again, that spark just sort of set off this spontaneous relationship between us. She not only described for me the work of the religious conference [but] I served on the student board, came to know a number of other students. One of them I recall very well was Gil [Gilbert A.] Harrison, who was one of the outstanding students on campus and very active in the religious conference. So it was out of that early experience and the kind of moral force which Adaline Guenther served in my life that this whole pattern, that was encouraged and nurtured by my mother in terms of religious and ethical standards and motivation, was sort of opened up anew by my association with Adaline Guenther.

GALM: Was Tom [St. Clair] Evans still a part of the conference at that time when you were--

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Had you much contact with him, or was it more with Adaline Guenther?



BRADLEY: It was primarily with Adaline Guenther.

GALM: What quality was it, do you think, that made her so successful with so many students? You have mentioned some.

BRADLEY: She had a way of identifying in each of these students certain special qualities. She would probe for things that you didn't even know existed in you. She tried to encourage each of these positive qualities. I guess she had a desire to know more about blacks and their culture, their background, their motivation, their hopes and aspirations and up to that time had not really had a student with whom she had identified sufficiently that she thought she was getting this kind of enrichment that she wanted in her life. I guess it was that mutual exchange that took place, you know, the many conversations that we had, and her probing into my motivations, my desires, just showing an interest in me as a person that sort of brought us together in the first place. But I would say that with each of these students, she just had the ability to latch on, so to speak, to feel almost a part of your own personality. You felt that of all of the people in the world, she was interested in you, and she could do this almost to the exclusion of everything else around her and every other person around her, so that you just felt that kind of close kinship. And then by virtue of her interest in you as an individual, you became attached to others who



were attached to her, and we all became sort of a great family unit.

GALM: You mentioned Gil Harrison. Was that a friendship that really developed through the conference?

BRADLEY: That's how we first met. That's how our friendship developed. It was not a close friendship, because Gil was, I guess, about in his senior year when I was first affiliated with the conference. We sort of got separated, didn't see each other for many years. It was 1969, when I was running for mayor, that we finally came in contact again. On one of my trips to Washington, he threw a party for me and raised some money to help win the campaign. We had seen each other several times since then, prior to Adaline Guenther's] death.

GALM: Are there any other friendships that came either out of the conference or UCLA days that have continued to be important aspects in your later career?

BRADLEY: Primarily members of the track team. We had a close affiliation. We were more than just fellow athletes sort of united because of our common activities; we were really more like a family. This was the period when the discrimination against athletes, college athletes, really was being exposed. Some of the schools with which UCLA had an affiliation did not permit blacks to compete on the same teams. And UCLA administration made the decision that no





school that would discriminate against its athletes could any longer compete in athletics with us. I think that sort of set the standard across the country, and then it became a matter of course for other universities. We would travel to some cities where they would not accommodate us in a hotel or a restaurant. And other members of our team would say, "Well, we can't stay there." There were about five blacks who were on the track team at that time. They would say, "If they can't stay, we can't stay." It just became that much of a common spirit among the members of that team. UCLA, I think, of all the major universities in the country, probably set standards for equality of opportunity and a demand for equal treatment of its athletes that ultimately became a matter of practice all over the country.

GALM: Was that coming down from certain individuals in the athletic department, or was it more of a general spirit?

BRADLEY: I cannot recall a single individual who enunciated that kind of principle. It just seemed to be a part of the whole milieu of the UCLA athletic department. It was more spontaneous than something which became a mission for a single individual.

GALM: What about professors? Did you have any close relationships with the professors?

BRADLEY: No. On that campus, it was so huge compared to



every other educational experience I had that there was no real opportunity, at least in my career there, to closely identify with a particular professor. So I didn't have that kind of typical relationship which had developed in other schools. So it was the off-campus experience with Adaline Guenther that sort of substituted for that.

GALM: You mentioned that you were on student board. What year did you come onto student board? Was it your last year?

BRADLEY: That must have been about 1939.

GALM: That was an appointed-- How were the student board members selected?

BRADLEY: I think that Adaline Guenther just selected you. [laughter] I don't remember anybody voting on me.

GALM: I was trying to remember. I did interview Adaline Guenther, and I was trying to remember just what-- I know she had strong influence on the members who served on it because she wanted to get a cross section of the campus population in leadership and other areas.

I see that you were a member of Kappa--

BRADLEY: Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity. And there was a group called the Bruin Club, made up of the black members on campus. Again, I think there were perhaps 100 or 125 blacks who attended UCLA at that time. We just sort of gravitated towards each other, and this social group



developed out of that need for a kind of on-campus outlet for the black students.

GALM: Did most of the blacks commute?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: It was a commuter campus, more or less.

BRADLEY: Yes, yes. I don't know of any blacks who lived directly on campus. There was one black athlete, Tom Berkeley, who lived near campus, but there was nobody that lived in the dorms or fraternity houses.

GALM: You had the on-campus job. Were you also working off campus or during the summers to support your education?

BRADLEY: The first year I was there, I worked during the summer in off-campus jobs: construction crew, at a produce market. Where else did I work?

I guess the second summer I worked at a tire factory, a used-tire yard, where they were collecting and scrapping old tires and selling them; and they also handled all kinds of scrap iron. I didn't work very long at that job. That was another one of those experiences in my life. I worked three days loading scrap iron that was going to Japan, and after wearing out six pairs of gloves and putting blisters on both my hands, I realized that hard labor like that just wasn't the kind of thing that I wanted to do all my life.  
[laughter]

I was trying to recall--there were a number of





students on the UCLA campus in addition to the athletes that I came to have lasting friendships with. But probably the strongest friendships were with the athletes, and some of those friendships have continued right up to the present time.

GALM: Now, at some point you decided to leave UCLA to join the police force.

BRADLEY: Yes. I recall going with about three of my friends who were going to take an examination. I had no dream, no thought, of becoming a police officer, but I went along just to keep them company and took the examination for the police department. This was in the early part of the year. I recall that just before school started I got a call that I'd placed among the top candidates, that the first class that was to have been held in a matter of about four years was going to open, and I had qualified for that class. So I had to make a quick decision about whether I was going to go back to school and complete my undergraduate work or whether I would take this job and make some money and then continue my education. So I decided, after some thought, I would enter the police department. So in September, instead of starting back at UCLA, I went up to the [Los Angeles] Police Academy and became a police officer.

The determination that I would spend a couple of years



on the job and then go back to school, I guess, became sidetracked, because from the time I graduated from the police academy until the day I retired, I always had the most interesting and challenging assignments, and it became a great joy for me to work as a police officer.

I spent the first three days out of the police academy directing traffic at Sixth and Los Angeles, and that was I guess the worst of the assignments I was to have in twenty-one years. But by the third afternoon as I was ringing off duty, they told me I was to report the next day to Newton Street Division. Since this was a rare thing for the members of my police academy class to be given the opportunity to work a patrol division, I was delighted about it. I went to Newton Street where I worked radio car for about three months. Because of my interest in youth, the captain in charge of the juvenile division asked if I would be interested in working juvenile. This is an almost unheard of opportunity for someone so new on the job to be given a chance to work a plainclothes detail after so short a time on the job. So I went to work in the juvenile division.

GALM: In making this decision to join the police force, did you discuss this with anyone? Or was this a decision you made on your own?

BRADLEY: I discussed it with my girlfriend [Ethel Arnold]



who was later to become my wife. But it essentially was a judgment that I made for myself without approval or consultation.

GALM: Did you talk to Adaline Guenther about it at all?

BRADLEY: I recall that she was quite concerned. Perhaps the best way of describing it is to say that she was upset about it, because she thought that this was going to be a tragic waste of my talents. I recall that she had two major concerns in our long relationship. One of them was that I would either be drafted or would volunteer for the military service and that I would go off somewhere and be killed in the service. The other was that decision to enter the police department. I, of course, had made the decision by the time I talked with her about it.

[laughter] Perhaps if I had spoken with her first, she might have persuaded me otherwise.

GALM: Did the fact that you may have had marriage in mind affect your decision?

BRADLEY: Yes, I think it did. I think there's no question about the fact that this offered an opportunity for me to earn a pretty good living, because the police department payed better than any civil service job, any other job generally available to blacks at that time. [It] meant that I could earn enough money to marry and support a family. So I'm sure that was a very strong motivating influence in that decision.



GALM: Was there any type of racial quota that the LAPD was exercising at that time as far as entrance into the academy?

BRADLEY: In that class, I think it would be hard to say that there was evidence of the racial quota. There were four blacks in that class; there were about seventy-two men. I think it became evident to me and others that there was a quota system, and not too many were going to be qualified to enter any of the succeeding classes either. So very few blacks. There were probably, I think, at that time there were about 103 blacks on the job, and they came on very slowly thereafter. I guess there must have been, oh, perhaps no more than 150 by the time I retired twenty-one years later. So there was no official quota, but in the minds of most of us, we understood that there was an unofficial quota or limit on how many blacks could enter the department.

GALM: And were the blacks always very high scorers, then, on the applications?

BRADLEY: They had a number of devices for eliminating you. If you did well on the written, there was always the oral examination that could cut you down. It was very strong competition. My recollection is that there were five thousand who competed for the job at the time I took the exam. So there was strong competition in the first place.





So that in addition to the written examination, there was the oral examination, where you could be pared out. Next there was a physical examination. You had to run and compete in an obstacle course and a number of other athletic demonstrations. That didn't weed out too many, but there was the medical. There, I think, they were able to control the number of blacks who would enter the department. In fact, when I went for my medical exam, the doctor turned me down. He said, "You got a heart murmur." I had just recently competed in track, so I was in excellent condition. I appealed that decision and was able to get another examination and was able to get on the job. But it was that medical examination that was the ultimate means of keeping blacks out of the job.

GALM: Now, you received, then, another examination, was it still from a doctor on the police department payroll?

BRADLEY: The first doctor was on the police payroll. The other doctor to whom we had to go when there was an appeal lodged was at the receiving hospital. As I recall, there were three doctors over there who would conduct the appeals.

GALM: Did many black applicants who were turned down on the medical: did they appeal, or did they just accept it?

BRADLEY: I really don't know. I didn't check to see whether there was much in the way of an appeal.



GALM: Your assignment to a station was pretty much known in advance, wasn't it, to you? There were one or two stations a black officer was assigned.

BRADLEY: There was essentially one station, Newton Street. There was one black officer who worked at what was at that time the old Hollenbeck Station. He was an old-timer who'd been there many years, and so Scotty just sort of stayed. Nobody ever replaced him; he didn't move on to any other station. The other assignment that was available was working traffic, directing traffic, and this was generally in the downtown area. That was it. [laughter]

GALM: How did your mother accept this decision to go? Was it an acceptable answer to her dream?

BRADLEY: My mother had such total faith and confidence in me that she might discuss a decision, but she would never really argue with a decision that I made.



TAPE NUMBER: II, SIDE ONE

AUGUST 11, 1978

GALM: Mayor Bradley, last time when we finished the interview session, I had asked you what your mother's reaction to your decision to become a police officer was. You had stated that she had a tremendous respect for your judgment and, therefore, she seemed to think that it was a good decision or an OK decision. I know that she was an important figure in your early life and, I think, perhaps really your entire life. What were the characteristics that you felt were most important in influencing you?

BRADLEY: Perhaps I should expand just a little bit on this question of her faith in my judgment, because as long as I can remember, from the time I was in elementary school, because she did not have any real degree of formal education, she relied upon me as the person who could make the kind of decisions based upon any business dealings that she might have. So she would call upon me to examine any proposal that was made to her in which she was involved and ask for my opinion and my advice. And she, I would say almost without exception, followed that advice. This is true even when I was a teenager or of preteen age. She permitted me to take care of all her business matters, whether it was paying bills or reviewing contracts for the purchase of furniture or clothing or whatever. So having





developed that total reliance on my business judgment and my ability to advise her on so many matters, that same kind of faith and confidence held true throughout my life. Whatever the matter was, whenever she came to me, she accepted whatever advice I would give. I suppose that related closely to that decision to join the police department. That was what I wanted to do, and that was 100 percent all right with her. She never expressed any concern about my safety or about the nature of the work. This was just a matter of accepting almost on blind faith that if this was what I wanted to do, it must be all right.

She was a woman who was deeply religious. In my early youth, she would systematically gather us up on Sunday morning, all of the children in the family, and take us on the streetcar all the way across town from the West Temple area, where we first lived, over to Eighteenth and Paloma, where her church was located, and we went to church there. It wasn't just Sunday school, it was an all-day affair for us. We would go to Sunday school, then church, and then there were dinners at church after the services were over. Very often we would either stay there for the services in the evening or come back for services in the evening. So she was very close to the church, and it was out of that kind of religious ethic that many of the standards that



came to be a part of my life developed. I suppose that without any preaching, without any great detail about what she expected and wanted of her children in terms of their moral and ethical values, without calling it the Golden Rule, she lived that kind of life, and she always spelled out for us that she expected us to do the same thing: to treat our friends and fellows with respect, to do unto them as we would have them do unto us. I think that that was one of the soundest bits of training that I got in my entire life because it did carry over not only during my youth but for my entire life. I was always very grateful to her for that.

There were a couple of incidents in my life that I think demonstrate how strong was her fervor for the principle of honesty and integrity. When I was still a youngster in elementary school, there was a little, community grocery store en route from home to the elementary school where I attended. It was talked about on the school grounds and among my classmates about the fact that the merchant always left his candy convenient for someone to pick up a bar and slip out without paying for it. I joined some of my friends, observed how they did it, and I decided to try the same thing and did. Well, my mother knew that she had not given me money when I came home with candy and asked where I got it. Because she had



so firmly implanted in my mind and my conscience this whole thing about honesty, I would not and could not lie to her. So I told her the truth. Well, I got the thrashing of my life, and then the indignant treatment of being hauled off about two blocks from home to this store, where I had to confess to that grocery man that I had taken his candy. I can tell you, it never happened again. [laughter] It was, you know, one of those things that I think can be important in the life of a youngster: to sort of bring him up short and head him off in the right direction.

GALM: How old were you at the time?

BRADLEY: At that time I was probably ten or eleven years old.

There was another incident in which I was involved. This was later when I was perhaps thirteen. I was on my way home from my paper delivery route. There was a man in the neighborhood who was an eccentric and crabby kind of old man. He would not permit the children to even walk on the sidewalk when we passed his house. We decided we were going to get even with him for that kind of attitude and threw some rocks up on his porch. He chased us, followed me because I was the first to arrive home. I guess we were four, maybe five, of the boys in the group. He followed me to my home. Once again, this whole question of respect for others and especially your elders came through. And no



matter how I tried to justify what we had done, my mother wouldn't have any part of it. Once again, the kind of lecture that I got, this time without any physical punishment (though she was not at all reluctant to mete out that kind of a whipping) just again, having the reinforcement about what one is expected to do in terms of respect for other people was important in my life.

That happened a number of times because one lesson is not enough for a child; you've got to have it repeated over and over, and so it happened with me a number of times. But it was that kind of treatment and conduct that finally left that indelible impression on me that I attribute much of my own attitude in life to what she did to implant it in me.

GALM: Did the family have any religious observance in the home or was it mainly centered in the church?

BRADLEY: It was centered in the church. I suppose that the closest we came to any kind of religious activity in the home was the dutiful expression of prayers when we had our meals. But beyond that, nothing.

GALM: Now, you mentioned that she would come to you for advice. Were there times when you would go to her for advice?

BRADLEY: This was without coming to her. It was just a part of her pattern of talking to me about various things,





especially about the value of education. She constantly reminded me how she was denied an education because of circumstances under which she grew up, and the fact that, now that I lived in a city where free education was available to all and where the best in terms of school system was available, that I must take advantage of it and that I ought to prepare myself at an early age for a career, college training, with the benefits that that would bring.

GALM: Did she ever suggest the ministry, or did you ever consider it?

BRADLEY: No, never. She wanted me to be a doctor.

GALM: Now, you mentioned her church. Now, is that the New Hope Baptist Church?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: How did she come to select that church? Because it sounds like it wasn't necessarily a neighborhood church.

BRADLEY: It was not, and it was quite a distance for us to travel. I frankly don't know how she selected that church. I would guess that it was out of her personal friendship with other people who attended the church that she became attracted to it, because I knew that she had a number of friends who also went to that church, and some of them lived in our neighborhood.

GALM: Was it a large community church?



BRADLEY: It was large by the standards of the sizes of churches in the black community at that time. It's still one of the larger churches in the black community and one of the more prosperous black churches in Los Angeles.

GALM: Did the church function as an important social center in the black community at that time?

BRADLEY: Aside from the movie houses, the church was the center of social activity. It really was a central part of the lives of all of us who attended.

GALM: It was the church [where] you met your future wife?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: When was that?

BRADLEY: That was in, oh, about 1934, perhaps 1933. I was active in the Sunday school, and her father was the superintendent of the Sunday school. We became casual friends at first, and I knew her for quite a long time before we ever dated. We belonged to the same social clubs and were thrown into contact with each other because of our youth activities, both in church and in the community.

GALM: So you were dating at the time when you were at UCLA?

BRADLEY: Yes. I began dating her the last year that I was in high school, 1937, and continued dating through college and, then, married in 1941.

GALM: May 4, 1941?



BRADLEY: Yes. I was trying to calculate: it was something like maybe nine months after I started work on the police department.

GALM: Now, had she any career plans in mind before you decided to marry?

BRADLEY: She had gone to beauty school and had her own shop at the time that we were dating. This is when I was at UCLA and about the time that I went on the police department. So she was an independent business woman at the time that we got married.

GALM: What were the qualities that you think attracted you to her?

BRADLEY: One, her beauty and, secondly, her intelligence. She was clearly a leader and one of the principal forces in our youth activities in the church, and just sort of stood out from all the rest of the girls that I knew. In fact, while I knew many girls, she was the first that I actually dated as a full-fledged beau. After meeting her, there just wasn't any other woman in my life.

GALM: Were there other black students at UCLA? What would you think the proportion of men to women would have been in those days?

BRADLEY: There were about 100, perhaps 115 black students on the UCLA campus. The majority of them were women!





GALM: Oh, the majority were women.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: I'm trying to understand the reason for that. Would there be any reason?

BRADLEY: I suppose that one of the reasons was that the academic standards at UCLA were very high. Women just more easily were able to gain admission to UCLA than were the men. At that time the young blacks that I knew were eager to get a job as quickly as they could get out of high school as possible and marry and set up their families. The women, on the other hand, were more inclined to try to get some professional training and education, to get into teaching or social work or some other kind of profession as part of their careers. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: From your knowledge, did most of the women that you knew at UCLA, the black women who were pursuing professional careers, did they eventually go in to finish their professional work?

BRADLEY: Yes. Many of them became teachers, nurses, social workers.

GALM: So it was the fact that they made better grades in their high school years than perhaps the black males did.

BRADLEY: I would say that's one of the key factors.

GALM: After you were married, where did you take up residence, you and your wife?



BRADLEY: On Fifty-seventh Street. We lived next door to my father-in-law and mother-in-law.

GALM: And what business was he involved in?

BRADLEY: ✓He was a painting contractor.

GALM: Let's go back to your police work. You had mentioned that you first started out sort of three days as a traffic cop, and then you were in a radio car out at Newton Station, and then you went into the juvenile division. Who was the captain that-- Did he request that you be put into the juvenile division?

BRADLEY: Yes. I'm trying to recall who was the captain at that time. At the moment I don't recall. I think what attracted the juvenile commander to me and the other fellow from my class, a man by the name of Robert Green, was the fact that we did have the college training, that we were identified with youth work, and they were looking for young blacks on the job who filled those qualities. It was rather unusual because at that time you would generally have to put in five, six years in uniform before you got any kind of special assignment in plainclothes. And the timing was just right; there'd been a long spell between the time that any young men had been hired on the police department and the time when Bob Green and I came on. So, once again, it was a matter of luck, circumstances, that there was a need. We filled that particular set of




qualifications they were looking for, and we were selected.

GALM: Then what did your work entail?

BRADLEY: Investigation of juvenile activities, supervision of juveniles who were on what we would call an informal probation to juvenile officers, counseling with them.

Generally this was our activity. On my own time I volunteered to supervise a group of kids, most of whom were delinquents who had come under my direct supervision by having arrested them or having investigated cases in which they were involved. But some were just kids in the neighborhood around South Park. I began a year-round youth program--football, track--and began coaching them, and we set up a citywide competition.

This was a very interesting experience for me. I was able to get support and assistance from both USC and UCLA. We were able to get equipment. Coaches were willing to come over and help. Some of the prominent college athletes would come over and help us. And I would say that many of those youngsters were guided in a positive fashion by the work we did for them. It was very difficult thing for many of them because their almost entire relationship with their community was with other kids of their age who were school dropouts or who were involved with some kind of delinquent activity. And the pull between going with their natural associates, their friends who were in trouble or getting





into trouble, as opposed to a more constructive route for them, was sometimes rather tough. I think the fact that we offered a positive force in their lives meant that some of them, instead of going into a permanent pattern of crime activity, turned instead to more productive and constructive lives.

Many of those youngsters that I worked with who were delinquents had great potential. [They were] natural athletes, they were smart in terms of not necessarily in a formal academic sense but in terms of innate talent and instincts; they were above the average. Because of home circumstances, because of other factors in their lives,

many of them continued in their delinquent behavior and in later years I saw many of them wind up in prison, on drugs, some meeting early deaths. But it was rewarding to see so many of them who did turn out to be really good kids and made a success of their lives. I see them from time to time. Even now, they'll come up and thank me for the help that we were able to give them.

GALM: Now, did you involve fellow officers in this off-hours activity?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: You mentioned that you got coaches and so forth from USC and UCLA. But did the officers sort of form the rest of the complement?





BRADLEY: I was the only officer who gave almost full time to this activity. The others would come in on a periodic basis, perhaps for a single game or perhaps to come by the practice and give me a hand. But it was essentially my responsibility and my program.

GALM: Now, was it just football, or was it a full recreational program?

BRADLEY: For most of the year it was just football, but they did involve themselves in other athletic activities as well.

GALM: Had you been involved in much youth work before coming on the police force?

BRADLEY: No. Prior to coming on the police department, I was a full-time student. ]✓

GALM: You were at UCLA.

BRADLEY: Yes. So I didn't have much of an occasion to get into youth activities as such. I was also involved in youth activities at a number of the churches in the community, the YMCA, and playground groups. Wherever my natural work would take me, I became associated with those groups and with their activities.

GALM: There was, of course, UniCamp through the University Religious Conference. But you were not involved with UniCamp were you?

BRADLEY: No, I wasn't. My sole connection there was to



scout around town for prospective enrollees and to direct them there.

GALM: How long were you in the juvenile division?

BRADLEY: About five years.

GALM: And then what was your next assignment?

BRADLEY: After that I received a promotion to sergeant and went to work as a detective.

GALM: After five years being on force, was that considered an early promotion to sergeant?

BRADLEY: No. You had to be on at least two years before you could take the exam. So three to five years was considered an early promotion to the rank of sergeant.

GALM: So it was an exam coupled with your record?

BRADLEY: Well, it was solely on the basis of examination. There was a written and oral portion to the exam.

GALM: Did you have, then, any choice as to what you might be doing next, or was that strictly an assignment?

BRADLEY: Well, after I worked the detective bureau, again, for about four and a half to five years, I received a call from--I'm trying to recall. I think Jim Fisk was a lieutenant at that point; he was. He was working administrative vice [detail]. He was in search of someone who would serve as a squad leader and asked if I would come over and work in administrative vice. This unit had citywide responsibility for all kinds of vice activities.



It worked directly for the chief's office and was principally sort of a monitoring or housekeeping unit, to be sure that the divisional vice units were doing their job, that there was no corruption in those units. In other words, if someone thought that they could pay off a local division vice unit, they knew that administrative vice might swoop down on them from our headquarters. So it minimized the chance for that kind of corruption in the vice units. So that was our responsibility.

There were two assignments on the police department that I had up to that point said I wanted no part of: one was vice, and the other was motorcycle squad. So when I was first asked if I would be willing to take that assignment my first answer was no, I wanted no part of it. It was after some persuasion by Jim Fisk, who had been a classmate of mine, and I had some pretty strong indications that I would be assigned there even if I didn't want to go, that I finally willingly accepted the assignment. It turned out to be an exciting experience for me, and I worked at it for about four years.

It also gave me an opportunity to expand a reputation which I had begun to develop on the police department. The people on the street who were the ones with whom I dealt came to describe me as a hard man, a tough man, a good cop, but a fair one. As a consequence, many of the people that





I had arrested in my earlier days on the vice squad also became some of my strongest boosters when I ran for the city council.

It was an activity that offered a great variety and new challenge because I had never been involved in nor did I know anything about gambling or bookmaking or lottery. It was a matter of learning very quickly how these things operated, the very principles upon which they were based. I soon became an expert in the field. Not only was [I] called upon by our department but other law enforcement agencies, both to teach and to testify in court as an expert in the field. So it was a satisfying experience.

After four years, I felt that I had been there long enough and that I ought to move on to something new and different and made the request to be transferred to public information. It was a new detail. At that point it was principally a matter of providing information with the

[community weekly newspapers.] I saw a new opportunity for service in that division. So I proposed and began forming the first community relations program for the police department. In fact, it was the first in the country. At that time, I was working alone. There was later one additional officer assigned to the unit, principally serving the Mexican-American community. So Julio Gonzales and I became the city's community relations detail, and we covered the entire city.

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I worked with various human relations, intergroup relations activities and organizations in the city and affiliated with most of them. I recall at one time I was affiliated with about sixty different community-based organizations whose principal purpose was working in the field of race relations or community relations or intergroup relations. And out of that experience I established many of the contacts which later came to be my principal base of support, both when I ran for the city council and, later, when I ran for mayor, because this was a citywide network, and these were people who were activists in various community organizations. I had many contacts and just sort of reached into the entire city.

GALM: Whose support did you need to promote this program? Was it at the public information level, or did it go higher than that?

BRADLEY: Well, the captain in charge of the detail was a man by the name of Stanley Sheldon. When I described for him what I wanted to do, he thought it sounded like a good idea, but he got approval from the chief of police for whom we worked. We were directly assigned to the chief's office and so did have complete support from the very top.

GALM: Who was the chief at that time?

BRADLEY: That was Chief [William] Parker.

GALM: I'm trying to recall what Chief Parker's tenure was.



Was he chief when you came on the force?

BRADLEY: No. At that time Chief Arthur Hohman was the first permanent chief under whom I worked. Following him was Chief [Clemence] Horrall. Let's see, there was one other. There was Chief [W. Arthur] Worton, who was a marine general, who came on the department for perhaps two years and took over pending the examination from which Chief Parker was selected.

GALM: When you first entered the force, what was the reputation of the LAPD within the community? Within the larger community?

BRADLEY: In the larger community, when I came on the job, there had been a spell of about three years since the last new policeman had been appointed, because that was the period just following massive scandals of corruption, bribery, and graft that had taken place when the mayor [Frank Shaw] was removed from office. Many of the high-ranking police officers were removed or quit; so the department had reached a low point in its entire life in this city. With the passage of some three years or more between the appointment of the more recent officers and the examination which I took, there was a period which permitted a kind of a shift in community attitude toward the department. It was not a very favorable attitude, but at least the change had begun to take place and it was



becoming more a neutral kind of attitude, more tolerating the department than it was any respect for it.

I would say that that positive respect really did not begin to pick up until the beginning of Chief Parker's tenure, when, by virtue of strong standards which had begun to develop even under prior chiefs but certainly dramatically highlighted under Chief Parker, there was more respect for the department in terms of its professionalism, its integrity, and the effectiveness, the honesty of the membership of the department.

GALM: Were the mayors during this period able to influence much change within the department?

BRADLEY: The major change took place under Mayor [Fletcher] Bowron, who succeeded Mayor Shaw (who was literally run out of office because of the corruption and graft that was rampant in the city at that time). So Mayor Bowron was able to give good strong impetus for the city as a whole and the department incidentally, because, as is true in any major city, you cannot have massive graft and corruption in the city in one element. It sort of goes hand in hand. If there's corruption, you may look to the police department for the first evidence, but you also find it among the political leadership, and that was true in those days. Once the mayor, by virtue of the recall and reform of government, set new standards--the community





demanded new standards--it also followed that those new standards applied in the police department.

GALM: What about the attitude within the black community? Would it be different in any way than the larger community?

BRADLEY: Yes. I would say it would be different because there was a recognition that there existed in the department an unwritten policy with regard to discrimination. There were few assignments that blacks were permitted to take on. There was only one division in the city where you might expect to work, and that was Newton Street. There were a few who worked directing traffic. [tape recorder turned off]

There was, I would say, an unwritten policy with regard to assignments, to promotions. It was about the time that I came on the job that blacks were beginning to be assigned to radio car. It was just that oppressive in the department. Blacks had been excluded from the normal activities of the department, and it was literally a department of a double standard: one standard for blacks, one potential for assignments, and a totally different set of standards for whites. The department had not sought blacks for the job, and I would say there were probably 103 blacks on the entire department out of, at that time as I recall, something like 4,000 officers. No real evidence of promotions until the time I came on the job. At that point



two blacks had qualified on the examination for lieutenant. They were not even permitted to command the watch involving blacks and whites. They created a separate unit, what was called a black watch, a morning watch at Newton Street Division, and only black officers were assigned even though many whites wanted to work that detail, wanted to work those hours, and work for those lieutenants. But a whole new standard was put into operation. Ordinarily, one lieutenant and three sergeants would be on a particular watch. Here, they had two black lieutenants assigned in charge of that watch and no sergeants.

It was perhaps another two or three years before any blacks were appointed sergeant. It was at that point that things began to open up in terms of promotions, but then only by the dint of the qualifications and the abilities that the blacks had on the job, whose talents were such that they just could not be denied. No matter how poorly they were graded on the oral examinations, they did well enough on written exams that their total score would put them high enough on the list that they got an appointment.

That pattern continued, oh, I guess, until just shortly after I retired from the department in the early 1960s; it began to open up. More blacks were appointed as lieutenants and ultimately captains and now as commanders.

But the department had a reputation for not only



exercising a double standard as far as its employees were concerned but a double standard as far as the treatment of blacks in the city. [ So in the black community, there was a rather negative attitude about the department. It also was one of the things that had an impact on some who might consider applying for the job. It was something that I was determined that I wanted to go on the job to try to change that attitude, to change that image of the department and felt that even by my own single effort that some improvement might be made. I did not meet with the hostile attitude that some black officers felt when they lost their friends because they came on the job. But it was a very difficult period for blacks in law enforcement in this city.





TAPE NUMBER: II, SIDE TWO

AUGUST 11, 1978

BRADLEY: Blacks and whites were not permitted to work together on a team in a radio car. When I was promoted to lieutenant I can recall having said to my captain--and the message went to the chief--that, despite all of the pronouncements of the department about equality of opportunity, that nobody was going to believe it so long as there was segregation in the assignments of the officers. I wanted to try the integration of some of my men; some of them said they were willing and interested in working together. It made a lot more sense because, if you had two blacks who worked on a watch, as occurred in some instances, if one happened to be off on vacation or sick, the other was simply, you know, a fifth wheel. There was nothing for that officer to do because he couldn't work in the radio car with somebody else. It was very inefficient, to say the least.

I convinced the chief that I should be permitted to try this experiment with the officers on my watch. I indicated then that this experiment was going to meet with great difficulty because, until it was a policy on a citywide basis, those officers who were courageous enough to try it were going to be subjected to enormous pressure from their peers; and sure enough it happened. The work



sheets were put up perhaps a week before the month began, and even before these men had the chance to work together the first day in a radio car, they began to get calls and very sick kind of treatment and abuse from their fellow officers not only from our division in Wilshire but all over the city. It became such a nasty situation that the white officer who was involved in this particular unit came to me and asked if he could be relieved from that assignment.

I recall then saying to the captain that just as I had predicted the thing is not going to work until the chief is willing to make these assignments on a citywide basis. The chief was strong enough and influential enough that with a word it would happen. There was great speculation that there'd be great resistance. I said the chief has the kind of power--this was Chief Parker--so if he says it will happen, if there is clear indication he will not tolerate resistance, there won't be any resistance. Well, it was some time after that that-- This must have been 1960 when that happened. It wasn't until about 1963 or '64 that the chief finally got around to announcing the policy of nondiscrimination in the assignment of radio cars. And the first day it happened, there was some talk in roll call. People were saying that they would not work these assignments to which they'd been designated. And the chief



sent the word around to all of the captains that anybody who expressed that kind of resistance, they could be told that they could turn in their badges. There was not another peep out of anybody thereafter.

Now these kinds of integrated assignments are taken for granted. The assignment of blacks to other details did not begin to take place until the latter part of the sixties, and now that is a fact of life. Blacks can anticipate and seek assignments in just about any place in the department. But it was a long, bitter struggle. It was always very covert. Never did anybody formally and officially say, "This is the policy of the department: we will have a dual standard," or that "we will discriminate, whether in employment or promotion or assignment." But it was so clearly understood and accepted by all that there was no question about it.

I daresay that had there not been that kind of pattern of resistance and limited opportunity for advancement that I might very well have concentrated on taking promotional examinations, trying to rise to the highest rank possible in the police department. But I knew that the obstacles were so great that I did not see that it was worth the investment of time with so little promise of success. So I entered law school. After I passed the bar, I remained on the job until my retirement came along and then decided to



retire. I've had members of the department who said to me on many occasions that "It's too bad that the opportunities for promotion were limited for you, because you would have certainly risen to higher rank than lieutenant." But it was a fact of life.

GALM: You mentioned that you perhaps got your first assignment in juvenile division because you were a college-educated police officer. Now, was this unusual among the black officers, or was it also unusual among the white officers?

BRADLEY: It was unusual among all of the officers. There were very rare examples of college-trained men on the department at that time. That, of course, has changed dramatically in the years since I came on the job. Now many of them have college background and training.

GALM: What about morale then? There must have been a real problem in morale among black officers, or had they realized that this was the way it was and so--

BRADLEY: The black officers accepted this. Some lost their drive and their fire for performing at a standard of excellence or attempting to prepare for promotions. They just accepted their lot and decided that they would put in their twenty or twenty-five years, draw their pay and pension. The department did have one inducement that would attract some, and that was that it paid better than any civil service job in town.





GALM: Were there any opportunities for you to exert any influence in changing policy? I mean was there any room for militancy among the officers themselves?

BRADLEY: Well, I spoke out on many occasions. I would regularly report to the chief, through my captain, the state of affairs in the community, whether there was hostility or tension, whether there was expression of lack of respect for the department; all of these things I brought to their attention. I made a number of recommendations about things that I thought ought to be changed. I must say that very rarely were any of these things that dealt with race relations ever put into effect at that time; some came later.

But I did develop a reputation of being what they would call a troublemaker; anyone who had the courage and the guts to speak out against the status quo and against the injustice in the department was looked upon as a troublemaker. There were some who predicted I would not get a promotion to lieutenant because of being that outspoken.

I recall that I was involved in support of candidates for election in one case, a race in the city council. And because the candidate I was supporting had made some critical statements about the police--and here I was a police officer supporting him--they thought that was highly



improper, and I was called in, interviewed by the internal affairs office. There was an effort to intimidate me to withdraw from the campaign and to restrict my activities to less controversial matters. I inquired of the people who were interviewing me, "Was there any regulation on the book, any law that said I could not do these things?"

They said, "No, there isn't. It's just a matter of good sense."

And I said, "Well, until you show me a law that prohibits it, I will continue to be involved in politics, whether it's supporting a candidate or running for an office."

At that time I hadn't dreamed of running for an office, but I just wanted them to understand I was not going to be intimidated from performing what I thought was a legitimate activity.

I would say that because of this effort to influence change in the department and the difficulty of achieving success in that regard, I began to lose some of my enthusiasm for the work I was attempting to do. I think it was out of that experience that I just concentrated on my studies and prepared for the bar.

GALM: The public relations, or the community relations, job: did you model it after anything? You said it was unique across the country.



BRADLEY: There wasn't anything after which it could be modeled.

GALM: Was there anything in some other area of government that you could model it on, or was it just something that you saw as necessary?

BRADLEY: No. I saw it as something that was necessary. I tried to find out from other departments by inquiry as to whether or not anybody was doing anything in this field. Nobody was doing it. So I just sort of created the concept out of my own ideas and pushed forward on it.

GALM: When did you start getting involved in politics?

BRADLEY: I would say in the late forties, I first began to get involved, generally in assembly, congressional, senate, statewide elections.

GALM: When you were in college, were you involved with any clubs, political clubs?

BRADLEY: No.

GALM: So your first was the Democratic Club that you first got involved in?

BRADLEY: Yes, that's correct.

GALM: Now, how did that evolve, then, your political  
\*affiliations?

BRADLEY: It was strictly on a voluntary basis. I worked in supporting other candidates. I had at that point not dreamed of running for a political office.





While I was still on the police department, I recall that a group of businessmen called and asked if I would be willing to seek the city council position. A vacancy had developed, and they were willing to support me for that position if I were interested. I told them that I had to think about it a few days. I did; I gave it some thought for three or four days and finally decided that here was an opportunity for greater influence than I might experience either as a police lieutenant or as a lawyer, another opportunity for public service. So I decided to seek the appointment to the city council. We developed a campaign. I collected, along with my supporters, some seven thousand signatures. It was generally more than any candidate would receive in terms of votes if you were to run for the office. But after every effort that we made to get the appointment, another man, a man by the name of Joe Hollingsworth, got the appointment from the city council.

Because it was such an outrageous act on the part of the council to select a man who was not known, not identified in any kind of activity in the community, it was an affront to the people. The fact that I was rejected largely because I was black, there developed the groundswell of protest.

The community decided that instead of simply protesting and sitting quietly on our haunches, we would



start an immediate effort at recalling this councilman who had been appointed. We circulated petitions, developed an organization, raised several thousand dollars to put on the recall drive. After we turned in our signatures on petition forms that were used in the most recent recall effort, involving the late Mayor Bowron when he was seeking the recall of the former Mayor Shaw, when we turned in these petitions using that form, they found two remote provisions in the municipal code which disqualified the petition form and thereby all of the signatures on the petition. So our signatures were not counted, and the recall effort was thwarted.

GALM: Do you think that was a legitimate ruling, or were they clearly looking for a way to stop this?

BRADLEY: Oh, there was no question that they were looking for a way to stop this recall momentum. The city attorney and others here in city hall were part of the, I would call it, conspiratorial effort to find a way to stop it. We challenged it in court, and based upon the ruling of the judge, it obviously was a technical violation of the municipal code section. They were in rather remote parts of the municipal code, not at all easily identified and therefore impossible for anyone who is not sophisticated in preparation of a petition-- They could easily make a mistake, just as our people did.



But it, again, prompted new determination. That was in early 1962. When that happened, I decided that when the next election came around in the spring of 1963 that I was going to run for the office.

GALM: You had mentioned that some businessmen had come to you and suggested that you apply for this vacancy that had occurred. Who were these people? Do you recall?

BRADLEY: The man who called me was a fellow by the name of Cecil Murrell, and he was a real estate broker who had his office on Western Avenue. I had worked with them on a number of things, including a problem that they had with some of the prostitutes that were walking the street on Western, and we cleaned that up for them. I think it was out of that kind of experience and relationship that they decided they'd like to have me run.

GALM: That was during your vice days?

BRADLEY: No, it was actually when I was a lieutenant at Wilshire division.

GALM: But there were other candidates that were proposed for that vacancy, other black candidates--right?--that were competing.

BRADLEY: Yes, there were about thirteen, as I recall.

GALM: You had more signatures than any of the other--

BRADLEY: Yes. The others did not seek signatures on a petition in support of their candidacy. They used other



methods. Some got organizational endorsements or newspaper support or whatever. But I had decided that we would seek a popular kind of support and, therefore, circulated the petitions.

GALM: [George] Thomas was the man who was really the candidate that was then presented as sort of the black candidate to run against or to be considered by the city council.

BRADLEY: Yes, that's correct.

GALM: Was he then getting support from the newspaper people and so forth? What was his basis of support?

BRADLEY: I don't recall the exact nature of George's support. He was highly respected. He was the executive director of the Community Relations Conference of Southern California and had many friends in government. I would guess that his came largely from that source.

GALM: Would you say that you were one of the leading candidates among the thirteen?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: So, then, after the recall failed, and then when the 1963 council election came up, you decided to run?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Now, there was a nominating convention, wasn't there?

BRADLEY: That's right. One of the problems that blacks





had had in the past in running in a district which was only one-third black was that because of the number who ran, the black vote was always split. There was an effort to develop a community endorsing convention. It was the first time that it had been tried in Los Angeles. That convention had a condition that anybody who wanted to submit himself or herself for endorsement by the convention would have to agree that whoever won the endorsement of the convention would be the only candidate. I guess just about everybody who had expressed an interest did in fact submit themselves to that convention. It was very well organized, very well run, and I emerged as the nominee of the convention.

GALM: Where was that held, and who really organized that?

BRADLEY: I recall that at that time Reverend H. H.

[Hartford] Brookins was one of the organizers. Dr. H. Claude Hudson was another of the organizers. There were a number of other people involved. I don't now recall exactly who was the motivating force in that effort, but I recall those two men, Brookins and Hudson, as being two of the key leaders in the effort.

GALM: What was the democratic process? Was it just a vote of the delegates?

BRADLEY: Nominating speeches and remarks by the nominees and then the vote.



GALM: Who spoke for you? Do you recall?

BRADLEY: Do you know I can't even recall that far back?

GALM: So then you had the nomination in the black community.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: How did you go about setting up your campaign?

BRADLEY: Following that endorsement-- Incidentally, the other blacks who had attempted to get the endorsement decided not to run, they were true to their word. There was one candidate who had not been a part of that process who sought to run but eventually withdrew because he could not get any support. So it was a head-and-head battle between the incumbent who had been appointed, Joe Hollingsworth, and myself.

Our first effort was to find a campaign manager who had had some experience. This was not a very easy chore, because here was a novice to political campaigns seeking the office against all of the power forces in the community. Nobody really wanted to take on that kind of task. So we had a number of people that we approached who turned us down. Finally, I interviewed a woman by the name of Teddy Muller, who had run some campaigns in the past and was recognized as a very skillful campaign manager. She agreed to take on the assignment, and we were off and running.



It was difficult raising money, and we counted largely upon a grass-roots kind of volunteer effort to walk the streets and seek support. I put in quite a few hours myself. I'd usually start early in the morning. [At] six o'clock I'd be at different intersections greeting people as they would get on the buses. [I would] get on the front end of the bus and ride for a block and out the back end of the bus, passing out literature, running out into traffic passing out literature to the cars stopped at the signals. I recall one man saying, "Hey, I'm going to vote for you if you live through this campaign." [laughter] It was a very exciting kind of campaign. We kept building momentum and literally just outworked the incumbent and in the election defeated him by a two-to-one vote.

GALM: Of course, in that district the black voters were a minority.

BRADLEY: Yes. It was about one-third black at that time.

GALM: Do you recall what efforts you made to reach other areas of the district? Did you use a different strategy?

BRADLEY: No, just the same strategy, the same speeches, same statements, no matter where I went. It was a good district. I would say that the volunteer activity when I was working for other candidates came in handy because out of that series of contacts came many friends from other parts of the city who came into my campaign to help. We





were able to mount a campaign based upon the issues and to get that message across.

I recall one of the most satisfying experiences out of that campaign was a statement that was made to me on the day of the election. The radio reporters by then had begun to pick up some interest in the contest, and radio broadcasts were being made. And in the campaign headquarters there was a blind man who had been coming in on regular basis, working in the campaign. He heard one of these radio broadcasts, and he called me over and said that, "You know, despite all of the time that I have worked on this campaign, today was the first day that I knew you were black." That said a great deal to me because it was the way in which we had tried to run the campaign: not on the question of color, just on the basis of issues, of qualifications, and what I'd like to see done in the district.

GALM: What did you consider the issues in that campaign?

BRADLEY: It was largely community representation. We had experienced a series of council representatives who after the election never showed up again. We never saw them between elections, not involved in community services. There was a lack of services of almost every variety, whether it be street sweeping or lighting. There was a problem with schools, parks; recreation facilities were



inadequate. It was generally a community, a district, which had largely been abandoned by the elected leadership once they were placed in office. And so my principal pledge was to be visible, to be present, and to work with the people.

GALM: What about housing? Was that a big issue?

BRADLEY: Yes, housing was one of the issues that was mentioned in that campaign. My recollection is that we had something like ten or twelve different issues that were part of the platform.

GALM: Hollingsworth was a Republican, right?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Was it pretty well known to the electorate during the campaign that you were a Democrat?

BRADLEY: Yes. It was fairly well known that I was a Democrat. I don't recall that there was any strong partisan flavor to the election, not a Democrat versus the Republican. It was just a fact that I was identified because of my activities in the Democratic party.

GALM: Was there a large Jewish community in that district?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: You received strong support in that area?

BRADLEY: Yes, I did.

GALM: Who were some of the individuals who were connected with that campaign and continued working with you?



BRADLEY: Herschel Rosenthal, who is now a state assemblyman: he and his wife were among my early and strong supporters; Norman and Dorothy Martel, who lived in that community also; Frank Terry, who had actually served as a staff person for the recall effort, was also one of the key supporters in the election; Victor Nickerson, a real estate man, was active; Cecil Murrell. H. H. Brookins was a chairman of the campaign. He was the minister that I mentioned before.

GALM: Was he one of the strongest religious leaders?

BRADLEY: Yes. We had very strong community support from the churches in the district, but Brookins was the principal spokesperson for the campaign. He was the titular head of the campaign.

GALM: This, of course, came up because of that vacancy, and you did have your law degree. You planned to practice law, I assume.

BRADLEY: Yes. In fact I did practice for a couple of years after I retired from the police department.

GALM: Where did you set up headquarters there? How did you enter the profession?

BRADLEY: I started in the practice of law in affiliation with Charles Matthews. He had an office at Twenty-fifth and Central. We shortly thereafter moved our office to Crenshaw, 3600 block, and that's where I was located that



year, at the time I was elected to the city council. I retained my office even after I was a city councilman.

GALM: How long did you retain it?

BRADLEY: Probably four years, three or four years.

GALM: What type of law were you--

BRADLEY: General practice of law, principally civil practice. I had very few criminal cases.

GALM: What was the opportunity as far as the law was concerned for a black lawyer in those days?

BRADLEY: Black lawyers were doing very well at that point. So there was good promise for a lucrative and successful career. In fact, I recall when I indicated I was going to leave the law practice completely and give my full time to the public service and that I was going to run for mayor, I remember Charles Matthews just shaking his head and wondering what kind of thinking prompted me to do that, because he thought that I had a bright and promising future in the law. But it was just something that, satisfying as it was, I thought that public service was going to be more exciting and more satisfying to me. Money was not so much a matter of any great interest to me. By that time I had spent twenty-one years in the police department and never made any significant amount of money, so I had not become accustomed to [laughter] living in a lucrative manner. So money was not appealing.





GALM: I think Charles Matthews has been referred to as the dean of black lawyers.

BRADLEY: He is respected as one of the brightest lawyers ever to come along.

GALM: When did you first meet him or have contact? Do you recall?

BRADLEY: Oh, I guess I first met him as a youngster in high school. He was a deputy district attorney when I first saw him as a Boys Day assignment to the courts, where we were able to see the courts in action. I later got to know him personally after I was on the police department. He had also been a police commissioner, so it was in that context that I came to know him better. Then he invited me to begin my law career in his office.

GALM: And so you were there with him a year or two years?

BRADLEY: In actual practice, a couple of years. But I maintained my office there even though my practice was rather limited while I was on the city council. I spent another three to four years there in the office. Finally, when I had pretty much given up any kind of law practice, I moved my office to another firm's headquarters, Charles Lloyd and Mary Burrell and Henry Nelson. But by then I was no longer engaged in an active practice.

GALM: One other question I had that would be a little bit out of chronological context: there was, of course, the



war, World War II, in there. Now, were police officers automatically exempt from the draft?

BRADLEY: No, no. Some of them were given an exemption because of their police service. I recall having attempted to volunteer in both the air force and, being turned down, then in the coast guard, being turned down. I then decided I was just going to pursue my career. I then attempted to get a deferment based upon the police service. That was denied, and I was actually called. I received my induction notice. That came just about--I'm trying to--about 1942. It came at a time when my wife was pregnant with our first child [Lorraine]. I went to the draft board to see if I could get a deferment until the baby was born, and the chairman of the draft board asked me to come back in a week. In the interim, the Zoot Suit riots of the forties broke out, and I was handling some of the kids who were involved in those riots. This chairman of the draft board had a real estate office in the Watts area, and that office had been smashed by some of the vandals during the outbreak. He knew that I was working with juvenile and learned that I was handling some of these kids, and so he said, "Well, tear up your induction notice, and we'll postpone your induction for another thirty days." So I went home, tore up my induction notice, and waited for thirty days to pass while I handled these juveniles.



Thirty days went by, sixty days. Finally, about three months later, I got a new notice declaring me exempt.

[laughter] So I escaped the service altogether.

GALM: We're, of course, now looking back at those days of the Zoot Suit riots. Do you have any thoughts from this viewpoint, this perspective?

BRADLEY: Yes, I can recall those days rather vividly.

It was a rather unsettling experience because of the racial hostility that existed. [It started] with the servicemen who were involved, and then it spread to the larger community. It was directed primarily at Mexican-Americans, but it was not limited to them, because blacks also came in for some rather vicious treatment. In fact, some of the police officers were involved in what I thought was improper conduct. Their treatment of anyone who happened to be black or Mexican-American who happened to be wearing the clothes, the style--it was called the zoot suit, the narrow cuffs and the big knees--that was all that was necessary for that person to be the subject of rather vicious police handling.

I can recall [that] black members of the police department who were on their off-duty time were subjected to the same treatment, so it wasn't a matter of fiction or a matter of false allegation by the general public who happened to be targets of that kind of police abuse; I





got it first hand from some of my fellow black officers. So it was a very ugly period both for the community and, as far as I was concerned, for law enforcement.

GALM: How did the war play into it? Was it the fact that there were people coming from other parts of the country to Los Angeles, or was it just Los Angeles?

BRADLEY: Many of the servicemen were coming from the Long Beach-San Pedro area, where some of the induction centers were located or some of the places where they were assembled prior to being shipped off overseas. With this natural collection of servicemen there and the route of the old Pacific Electric red cars easily bringing them into the heart of Los Angeles, where they would go for entertainment in the downtown area, it just set up the natural opportunity for this conflict. When some of the servicemen were, in fact, attacked in the course of the conflict between some of the young kids who were involved, more of the servicemen sort of thronged into the heart of the city, on Main Street, for example. There the violent confrontation occurred. So it just simply grew, one incident built upon another.

GALM: What caused the real cooling off?

BRADLEY: As I recall, the servicemen were confined to their base. That was the thing that finally prevented the thing, or put an end to the incident.



TAPE NUMBER: III, SIDE ONE

AUGUST 25, 1978

GALM: Mayor Bradley, I'm going to ask you to backtrack a bit as we start this tape and to talk about the chiefs of police that you served under during your twenty-one years as a policeman, starting off with the first chief of police then up until Chief Parker at the time you resigned.

BRADLEY: ~~Arthur Hohman~~ became chief of police shortly after I was on the department, as I recall. He was one of the most brilliant police administrators that I can recall knowing or knowing about. He was a man who was twenty years or more ahead of his time? Innovative thinker, great visionary as a police administrator. Perhaps he was too visionary for the kind of practical approach that most law enforcement officers had been accustomed to in those days. For that reason, as I recall, he had great difficulty in putting across some of his programs and was not the most popular chief of police in the history of the department. But he certainly was a man who commanded respect. I know that the younger officers who came on the job at the time I did and shortly thereafter had great admiration for him and for his ideas.

GALM: When you speak of popularity do you mean among the men, or do you mean within the community?



BRADLEY: Among the men.

GALM: Did he have respect within the community as a chief?

BRADLEY: I would say that generally he had respect in the community. I cannot recall any incident in which he was held in disrespect or in ill repute by anyone in the community or any group or organization in the community.

GALM: And then the next chief after him--

BRADLEY: Chief C. [Clemence] B. Horrall assumed command [in 1941] after Chief Hohman, and he was one of the, what you might call, hard-nosed police types. He'd struggled up through the ranks, was looked upon as being more of a street-type-experience cop. Though his administration was not distinguished by any great innovative ideas, he did serve effectively in helping the department to recover from what had been an ugly period in the history of the department, the period of corruption and graft that had literally consumed the department in the 1930s and came to a head in 1937. I don't recall the exact circumstances, but there was some incident towards the end of his tenure in office in which some of the high-ranking officers were involved in some problems dealing with some of the gambling interests. I recall these were in the field of organized bookmaking establishments in the area. My recollection is that Chief Horrall left under slightly tarnished circumstances.



Taking his place [in 1949] on an interim basis, while the next permanent chief was chosen, came a marine corps general by the name of William Worton. Worton brought to the department a kind of marine discipline and attempted to right the ship, so to speak, because it had begun to suffer from some of the corrupt practices by some elements within the department under former Chief Horrall. Worton was a man who seemed to indicate he was interested in correcting any of the problems in the department. I recall that he would go around to the different divisions and meet with the officers, the rank and file, and ask them for their views, their ideas, their recommendations, their observations that they would propose for change. I don't know that he ever read any of those, but he at least went around and asked for them. When I say I don't know if he read them, I recall typing up about a four-page memorandum that I submitted to him containing a number of recommendations, and I never heard a word from him or anybody else on any one of those observations that I made. I don't know anybody else that got an answer either.

GALM: Do you recall what those recommendations were?

BRADLEY: They ranged across the board. They dealt primarily with the matter of community relations: the need ~~for the department to be more sensitive to community concerns, charges of improper police conduct.~~ They dealt





with the whole pattern of discrimination in the department and the changes that I thought needed to be made in that regard.

GALM: But he was brought in clearly from the outside as an interim chief?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Did they feel that in such a short time [1949-50] he could really have an influence?

BRADLEY: I suppose that, having brought the military discipline, there were some who believed that he could serve as a leveling influence while they were conducting examinations for the permanent chief. So he was conducting a holding action, and in that respect I suppose he did an adequate job. It would have been difficult for anyone coming in from outside who did not have long-term police experience to be very effective in making substantive, significant, long-term changes in the department. So I suppose that in that sense you couldn't say that he was a disappointment, because I don't know many people who thought he was going to be able to do much in that regard.

But he did at least begin to establish some new sense of discipline and improve the morale of the department and sort of set the tone for the next chief of police, who was William Parker, again, a man of brilliant intellect, an eloquent spokesman, tough disciplinarian, a man who,



perhaps more than any in my memory, helped to set a pattern of professional standards for the police department in this city as well as across the nation that had a lasting effect and impact. He sought to encourage all of the officers to look upon themselves as professionals and to raise their standards of education, their standards of discipline, their performance, to comport with those qualities and characteristics that he thought were necessary for professional law enforcement officers. He established new training techniques and new innovations as far as the assignment of personnel. He was very tough on productivity: he believed in getting the maximum effort for every dollar that was expended. I recall that he established the principle [that] he would not ask for more in his budget than he thought he needed or than he could spend. This was a different approach than many chiefs of police before and since him.

He established a new standard as far as promotions were concerned. Prior to that time, men who were on the top of the examination for promotion never knew whether they were going to get an appointment or not. They could be bypassed for someone who was a personal friend or a fair-haired boy in the department. Chief Parker changed that pattern. He said, "Whoever comes out on the top of the list ought to be appointed. He's gone through



that exercise and should expect to receive his appropriate recognition." And so the old pattern of skipping over the first or second man on the list to get to the third person who might be favored by the appointing authority came to an abrupt halt. There were perhaps two or three exceptions to that, but they were based upon well-established records which clearly indicated that the man in question was not equipped, not prepared, not of the quality that should get a promotion or should serve as a supervisor.

I recall that he finally took an action which I had suggested for a long time, that is, to begin the integration of the police department. It took a long time for him to act, but when he did he acted with authority and was decisive about it. From that point on, the old pattern of blacks and whites being separated in terms of their assignments came to an abrupt halt. The opportunities for assignments by blacks and other minorities was opened up, and they began to be assigned to many jobs in the department that heretofore had been beyond their reach.

He had some excellent programs in the field of community relations, and he had outstanding policies with regard to many issues affecting relationships between the police department and the community. But I must quickly point out that this was not always reflective of the man's true feelings, because in those unguarded moments, Chief





Parker, who was known to be a heavy drinker when he was in certain social situations, would speak his mind and would let down his guard. In those times, though I on no occasion ever heard or saw this kind of conduct, others who did have reported to me that he spoke in terms that reflected certain racial stereotypes that he maintained and certain hostilities to the very principle of equal opportunity for minority races. So he was a very complex and difficult man to analyze. He was an enigma. He was on the one hand precise and fair in his pronouncements, but in his practices, not always so.

GALM: But I sense that you have quite a bit of respect for him as a chief of police.

BRADLEY: As an administrator, in terms of his efforts to establish new standards that I thought were good for law enforcement, he was excellent.

GALM: Do you feel that a point was reached where he had outlived his usefulness as an administrator, that perhaps he should have resigned?

BRADLEY: Well, he was prone to make provocative statements that infuriated many people. He had a tendency to be pompous, and that alienated and antagonized many people. These are qualities that were just part of the man, and on occasion they came out. In the closing years of his tenure, he more and more tended to alienate large segments of the population.



GALM: Did not Mayor [Samuel] Yorty come in on his election as mayor with the promise that he would fire Chief Parker, if he were elected?

BRADLEY: Yes, and he appealed to the black community and the Mexican-American community on those terms, because there was rather strong animosity toward Chief Parker in both those communities because of certain abuses by law enforcement officers. In the early weeks of the Yorty administration, Yorty did, in fact, express some public criticism of Chief Parker and the department. This came to an abrupt end, and there were various reports about this. I suppose I ought not to discuss them in this particular setting because I did not see them; I cannot substantiate them. But I do know that Chief Parker had a confrontation with Mayor Yorty, and the mayor's statements of criticism very abruptly came to an end. Now, from that point on, anything that Parker wanted, he got.

GALM: I do know that he got an enlarged force. He got quite an increase in the number of recruits that went into the police academy shortly after 1963 or so.

BRADLEY: Yes, it's true that Chief Parker did secure a substantially enlarged department, and I am not critical of that. I think the fact is that that was justified. It was a department that was rather small in size. In terms of the number of policemen per thousand population, it was



probably the lowest in the country. It has always been a department that had a small staff compared with other major city departments. I think that the quality of its personnel has likewise been better than most major cities. So it made up in quality what it lacked in size. But there was a need for expansion, and Chief Parker started that expansionist movement in the department. So I think that that was appropriate. I don't criticize that at all. But Parker considered himself above criticism and would not tolerate it by anybody. I think that was one of his major faults.

GALM: Was that a fault unique to him as far as the chiefs that had preceded him and the other ones that we've talked about now?

BRADLEY: Chief Parker was considerably more outspoken. He was much more a public figure than any chief of police prior to his tenure that I can recall and, for that reason, had considerably more prestige and power and influence in the community than the prior chiefs of police had been able to attain.

GALM: Do you think that because of that strength he perhaps influenced the subsequent chiefs--

BRADLEY: Oh, I'm sure that--

GALM: --as far as style and--

BRADLEY: Well, I think that Chief [Edward] Davis is perhaps



a better example of how he used that prestige and that public identity in a fashion similar to Chief Parker.

I'm sure that having been one of his protégés, he learned that style from Chief Parker.

GALM: Well, we can talk about that later on again.

Perhaps we could talk about Yorty's election as mayor in 1961, because it is said that he did come in on the black vote. Would you agree with that?

BRADLEY: There's no question about that. He got very strong support from the black community based largely upon these promises that he made when he appeared in that community. The promises began to evaporate once he was in office.

GALM: Do you think it was strictly a political maneuver at that time?

BRADLEY: I'm not altogether sure. I really cannot question his sincerity at the time he made these statements. He was fairly new to the whole structure of city government, having served in the state legislature and in Congress, so he really had no real awareness of how local government functioned. Perhaps he could have thought he could do many of these things that he proposed to do when he was campaigning and later realized that he had limited power and authority and couldn't do some of them. But certainly this promise with regard to the police department was





something on which he reneged very quickly, and it was, I think, the result of his direct confrontation with Chief Parker.

GALM: Was there a strong anti-Poulson feeling in the black community?

BRADLEY: There was a feeling that Mayor [Norris] Poulson was not sensitive to, nor responsive to, the problems of the black community. There was fertile ground that could be plowed by any candidate, and Yorty made the best use of that.

GALM: Did you involve yourself at all in that campaign?

BRADLEY: No, I was not involved in that election campaign.

GALM: You had mentioned before we started taping that you had some reflections about your 1963 campaign that you would like to make part of the record.

BRADLEY: Yes. One addition that I want to be sure to make: when talking about those people who were active in that campaign and who had a significant role in the ultimate outcome, I would certainly want to include the name of a man by the name of Roland "Speedy" Curtis. Speedy Curtis was a former police colleague of mine, then later quit the department to go to USC full time. He was a very energetic and hardworking man, great personality, kind of a backslapping, outgoing personality that was very effective in the campaign. He was with me from early morning



until late at night. He never knew when to quit. As long as I would work, he would work. He was sort of the rah-rah force in the campaign and was, in a sense, the advance man. If I went out on the street to meet or shake hands with people, he would sort of whip up the excitement of the crowd and prepare for my entry into any particular situation. If I were approaching people at the bus stops in the early morning, it was he who went around circulating flyers and whipping up the chatter to get people's attention and then to bring me on to make the approach to them to support me. It was he and I who danced in and out of automobile traffic as the cars stopped at the various signals in the district, and we thrust our hands filled with our campaign material into those open automobile windows and dodged cars in a dangerous fashion at times so that some people thought that one or both of us might be killed in the process. [laughter] But Speedy was a very dynamic personality and not only worked in that campaign but after I was elected he was my first appointment as a field deputy.

GALM: How did he get his name, Speedy? At what point in his career?

BRADLEY: He always moved with speed. He always talked with speed. As far back as I can recall, that was his nickname. Whether he applied the name to himself or others [did], just



observing his conduct [I] thought it natural. It certainly fit.

GALM: Did your wife, Ethel, involve herself in the campaign much?

BRADLEY: She was active in the campaign primarily in the office or in various coffee programs that we had where she'd meet the women in their homes and in the social functions.

GALM: You mentioned that it was really a fine example of grass-roots effort, of volunteerism. Did you get much help outside of the Tenth, people coming in as volunteers outside of the district?

BRADLEY: Yes. There was quite a large contingent of people who were activists in the Democratic party club movement. There was a volunteer movement called the California Democratic Council. And because I had been active with that organization as president of one of the local clubs and active in the general statewide movement, many of the people that I met in my activities there came to help me when I ran for the council; and they came from all over the city of Los Angeles.

GALM: Had you been in on the ground floor as far as the CDC?

BRADLEY: Yes. From the early stages of the organization of CDC, I had been active.

*Wife's work,*





GALM: There doesn't seem to be anything like it since. And especially at that period, it was really a very energetic, influential group of people.

BRADLEY: I would say in its early stages it was most effective. There came a time during the rise of Jesse Unruh to the speakership when there was a direct confrontation between Jesse Unruh, the organized Democratic party, and the volunteer elements in the party. They were constantly at battle, supporting different candidates. There was almost a continuing shoot-out between them. That not only diminished the strength and the influence of CDC, I think it had a long-term detrimental effect on the party itself. So it was during that period that some of the enthusiasm, some of the influence was dissipated; and I don't think it ever recovered from that continuing warfare.

GALM: Do you think that the issues that CDC took stands on also helped to divide the membership?

BRADLEY: The fact that CDC took stands on progressive and liberal issues was the basis for the enthusiasm on the part of the people who identified with CDC. Though the organized party sometimes took exception to these, what they considered, far-out views, on most occasions we learned that four or five years later this became the official policy and platform not only of the party but of the country. So the



simple fact that CDC was involved in controversial issues was the heart of the reason for its being and, I think, the basis for its great influence in the early stages. It was on that basis that some of the differences with Speaker Unruh occurred. And it was on that basis that, I suppose, some members of the party did not affiliate or left the activities of the CDC.

GALM: Well, I was also thinking about Vietnam and how that might have acted as something that divided the membership.

BRADLEY: It divided the party in a sense, but it did not divide the membership of CDC. I would say that it would be an insignificant number of people who would leave CDC solely because CDC took strong issues on the war.

GALM: This is, of course, jumping ahead, but since we're talking about CDC: you were called upon at one point to handle a very difficult convention when there was a vote of confidence, or lack of confidence, in the president, Sy [Simon] Casady.

BRADLEY: Yes, and that was not the only occasion. It seemed that I would get called upon for that kind of role: to step in, to assume the chair, and to try to bring some unity and some rationality to the particular discussion that was under way at the time. This was really a very temporary kind of thing. Once I was able to get the convention quieted down and back on track again, I could go back to my



seat and relax and enjoy the convention. [laughter]

GALM: You brought down the temperature in the room.

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: Were you involved at all in the Committee for Representative Government?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Again, were you part of the initiating group or not?

BRADLEY: No. I was in on the early stages of the activity of that group, but I was not one of the principal leaders.

Wendell Green, as I recall; Donald Derricks: these are two of the principals that I now remember. It was a very active and diligent group of people who were concerned about representation at every level of government, whether it was the city council or state legislature, whatever. They were there pushing for better representation, more equality and opportunity for blacks. I recall one of the great efforts that was made to enlarge the opportunity for blacks to be elected to the California State Assembly. At that time we had I think--oh, we had two blacks who served in the state legislature. There was a push to double that number and then to expand it even more.

GALM: And they did play a role in trying to get a black appointment to the vacancy that the city council then gave to Hollingsworth.



BRADLEY: That's true, yes.

GALM: We had talked about the nominating convention.

Do you recall whether--and you, of course, came out as the  
eventual candidate--had it come down to being between you  
and Bishop Brookins?

BRADLEY: Not really. There was a motion made by Dr. H. Claude Hudson, as I recall, that Brookins be the nominee. That was a very spontaneous kind of action on the part of Claude Hudson, who had such strong feelings about the police department that he could not believe that anybody who had even been associated with the police department could fairly and justly represent the interests of the black community. It was on that basis alone that he opposed my nomination. He has since become one of my strongest supporters. But it was out of that concern that he sought an alternative candidate and nominated Brookins. Brookins, in fact, was one of the--I would say one of my mentors and one of the people working hardest for my interests and declined the nomination. That was the end of that effort.

GALM: Another irony out of that campaign is that you were endorsed by Mayor Yorty against Hollingsworth.

BRADLEY: Actually, it was not an endorsement. He was very careful about that. Through his lieutenants, through some of his staff people and supporters, he indicated





that he would like to see me elected. But he never came out publicly and endorsed me.

GALM: Do you think it would have been a benefit to you in the Tenth District?

BRADLEY: No. The only benefit that could have come from that kind of endorsement and public support would have been in the fund-raising area. He had sufficient contacts with people who had money that he could have generated some financial support. That didn't come. In fact, I got some help from some people who operated a billboard company, and I recall there was a \$500 contribution that came to put up some billboards for me. Yorty, through his emissaries, sent the word that he was responsible for my getting that contribution. I later learned that he had nothing to do with it. [laughter]

GALM: That was a rather--not just for you, but for the incumbents on city council--that was a rather rough campaign because Mayor Yorty had sort of pledged that he wanted to oust the incumbents if at all possible. Did you sense this as being part of the climate of that campaign?

BRADLEY: I'm trying to recall which of the candidates he was involved with. I know that he had already begun to have strong differences with the city council and was anxious to see some of them replaced. In the case of the



Tenth District, while he had some differences with Joe Hollingsworth, that was not enough to prompt him to lend his influence and his official prestige to the campaign. We did not get involved in the Yorty-council fight in my efforts; that was something that was really not an issue in my campaign.

GALM: Did Yorty not support the appointment of Hollingsworth to the vacancy?

BRADLEY: He simply went fishing. He had promised that he would support a black for that appointment and would use his influence with other members of the city council and did, in fact, make some comments to that effect to some of the members of the council. They finally told him that he ought to retreat, just stay out of the issue, because they were not going to appoint a black, that they were going to appoint someone else. It was at that point, during the final stages of the selection process, that Yorty just disappeared. And some used the phrase that he "went fishing."

GALM: So the appointment came, of course, through the city council. What other community powers do you think were involved in that appointment? Were there powers outside of the council district?

BRADLEY: I suppose that the so-called establishment was involved to some extent in terms of their influence to get



Hollingsworth, instead of a black, appointed. But they were not overt. They were not publicly identified with that effort.

GALM: I did notice that in the endorsements that the Los Angeles Times gave in that campaign that in no case did they support any of the black candidates. Had they thought that the time was not right yet for black representation?

BRADLEY: I think it was sometime after 1963, before the Times became the new Times, the kind of progressive newspaper that we now know it to be. Those were days in which that was not a strong motivating factor, the equal-opportunity issue.

GALM: Did the Times endorsements carry much weight, say, in your district?

BRADLEY: None.

GALM: None. Would it have been the local papers, the more local district papers or community papers?

BRADLEY: Community papers had a considerably stronger influence, and this began to become evident during Yorty's campaign. The Times was against him and for Poulson; so was all of the major media influence. But it was the community papers to which Yorty and his people had appealed. And it was that kind of local interest and local identification with the community newspapers that I think generated





strong support for Sam Yorty.

GALM: Well, you were elected, and then you had to set up an organization or a staff. You mentioned that you appointed Roland Curtis as your field deputy. Did you start with just one field deputy, or did you have two?

BRADLEY: I shortly thereafter appointed a man by the name of Warren Hollier and another deputy by the name of Maurice Weiner. These were the three who were part of my staff in the early stages of my tenure as a councilman.

GALM: Could you talk a little bit about the reasons for the appointment, say, of Hollier?

BRADLEY: Hollier was a political activist who had helped in my campaign, was a man who had good contacts, who had strong interest in day-to-day politics that would be involved, and had certain skills that I thought would be valuable. He had been a contractor, knew something about a number of matters that would be important in the district, and was very familiar with the district. That was the basis upon which he was appointed.

Maury Weiner was a man who not only had worked on the campaign but was very active in the Democratic political movement, the CDC movement, a man who was a very brilliant strategist, one who had great political savy, and who brought considerable skill to the office.

GALM: How large of a staff did you have, then, to start?



BRADLEY: Oh, it was three deputies.

GALM: Now, I know that Mr. Weiner came in in '65. You started out with the two, and then did you add a third, or was there a replacement?

BRADLEY: Well, as I recall I started with two, then I added Maury Weiner. I've forgotten the year. It seems to me it was perhaps a year, two years later that I appointed Masamori Kojima, because there was a very large Japanese population in the Tenth District, and I wanted someone who could relate to that particular community.

GALM: You had mentioned last time that past office-holders, or councilmen in the Tenth District, had gotten elected and then had sort of ignored the district after election day. How did you go about to create a different type of representative?

BRADLEY: I was constantly in the district at various functions. I had regular monthly meetings in the district where I would establish a location, either at a high school or junior high school or some public facility, and circulate the entire district and invite people to come, where they would hear a report from me on what was happening in city government, where they were invited to raise questions or complaints about public services. It turned out to be an excellent means of communication, and it was one which sort



of established the characteristic of an accessible public official that became valuable to me in the years that followed.

GALM: Was this something that other councilmen were doing?

BRADLEY: No. This was the first time to my knowledge and in the memory of anybody else around city hall that it had been done. Others later began to try the same kind of program.



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AUGUST 25, 1978

GALM: What were the problems in the community that you wanted to bring before the council?

BRADLEY: They ranged all the way from a lack of park and recreation facilities to a lack of street lighting. There were many sections of the community which had no streetlights, and by the time I left office, every section of my district had either installed new Electrolier streetlights, or the process had begun. One of the new approaches that I took was that, instead of following the practice that had been employed in the past where you would circulate a petition to get a majority of the property owners in that area to sign this petition asking for the installation of streetlights for which they must pay, I simply initiated the streetlighting assessment district on my own by a motion through the council. Many councilmen had feared that that would create a storm of protest in the community and would have a negative impact when they ran for election. It turned out that was one of the most popular things that could be done. Now it is routine. Almost every councilperson has followed that practice of starting their own streetlighting districts. The rubbish collection schedules, the maintenance and repair of sidewalks, tree trimming: all of these things were





matters in which I took an interest. [I] not only took the complaints from the citizens but I would routinely travel about the district looking for items that I would report on my own and get the departments to respond.

GALM: Would these be items that weren't so much of a private nature but more of a general nature or a community nature?

BRADLEY: I would say they would be matters of a community nature. In most cases, people simply had not complained about them or reported them because they didn't think anybody would care. It was more a matter of directing the department's attention to them and prodding them to take action.

GALM: Was there much balking at your efforts?

BRADLEY: No, not really. There was very good response whenever a councilperson would make a request. So it was almost unbelievable that it had not been a routine thing in the past. But the way in which most council representatives had worked was to simply wait for the complaints to come in by phone or letter or in person to refer them, have them taken care of. I solicited these kinds of complaints and looked for them on my own.

GALM: You, of course, were new to the council. Did you find it difficult to immerse yourself into the activities of the council?



BRADLEY: No. I think the experience on the police department was perhaps the most helpful thing that I can think of that prepared me for the work of the city council. I knew the operation of city government inside and out as a result of my police experience, so I knew where to go to get help; and that became easy, almost routine. The relationship with other members of the council, getting programs through the council, was something that was not difficult to accomplish. I got along well with my colleagues, aside from a few minor instances where they raised objection to my coming into their districts to look for myself at problems that were raised in public hearings or matters that were part of a council file. It had been a tradition that you took the word of a council representative. You didn't go into another district and involve yourself. I believed that that was my responsibility, to look for myself, to know for myself. So I did. Once they discovered that I was not going to follow the old gentleman's agreement and simply accept the word of other council people, that kind of negative reaction pretty quickly subsided, and they accepted as a fact that I was going to come and I was going to get involved and that I would often vote against their wishes based upon my own observations.

This, in fact, turned out to be one of the things that gained for me public support in many sections of



the city, because I would get involved in problems or projects outside of my district, and the people appreciated having a councilman come and look. If there was a zoning matter that was pending before the council, this was a new experience for them, to have a councilman from halfway across town come out and take a look. When there was a proposal to cut down a grove of trees and put in a storm drain, I was interested enough to travel all the way to the west end of the [San Fernando] Valley to look for myself. This was a new experience for them. When I would vote against a streetlighting project in an area where the people didn't want it, this was a new kind of conduct on the part of the councilman. But it established for me a kind of identity as one who would listen, who would respond to the community's concerns. As a result, though, when I first started that practice I had no idea I might some day run on a citywide basis, it became the basis of much of the community identity and support that led to my getting the kind of encouragement and support to ultimately run successfully for mayor.

GALM: You mentioned some of the areas in which you involved yourself in other areas of the city. Was there any key or initial issue that you took up that sort of convinced you that this is a practice that you wanted to continue?

BRADLEY: No. It's hard to identify any single incident.





I recall being invited to come to a meeting in another councilman's district, and I accepted it and went and spoke. The councilman who represented that area spoke to me about it and said that I had not sought his permission to come, and I told him I didn't think that I was required to get permission to go. That really was the first major confrontation that I had with another member of the council on that issue. He let me know pretty quickly that other members of the council resented it. I indicated pretty quickly that that was tough, that that was the way I saw my job. I was elected to serve all of the people and that I didn't think I had to get permission to go outside my district into another council district. Once it became obvious that I was not going to play by those rules, it became accepted; there was no further hostility or resistance to the idea. But it helped set a pattern that others have since practiced also.

GALM: So it really perhaps was an educating process for the entire council.

BRADLEY: Oh, there's no question about it. [laughter]

GALM: Well, I know that you did get involved in, as you mentioned, [the drive] to save the eucalyptus trees. That, of course, would be an example of what you're talking about. How did you become involved? Did people come to you, or did you just see it as something that you should involve yourself in?



BRADLEY: First of all, a group of people representing that area came to city hall, to a council meeting, to protest that particular project. Before it came to a vote I wanted to observe for myself what the actual situation was. So I went out there and had a chance to see. And I raised some questions. Finally we were able to prevent the cutting down of those trees, and we changed the alignment of the storm drain. But it took considerable amount of community protest to do it. But it was my on-site visit that generated the enthusiasm of the people. They finally thought that there was a chance that they could beat city hall on that issue, because here was somebody who was willing to join them as an ally. Ultimately we prevailed.

GALM: Did you then establish a--reputation might be too strong of a word--but at least an awareness within the general city community that here was a councilman that they could come to if they had a greivance?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes. That particular situation was at Orcutt [Ranch] Park. The same kind of thing happened up in Mulholland. I would go up, in that case, on a Saturday morning and meet with the residents and drive through and look for myself at where developers were planning to build a major development. And when I was convinced that it was wrong, I voted against it. That kind of word spreads fairly quickly to organized homeowner associations or



people who are activists in their community. So it became known throughout the city that they could come to me for help.

I recall when Councilman [L. E. "Tim"] Timberlake [of the Sixth District] was no longer in office, and there was a period of several months interim between the time he left office and the new councilperson was elected. The people would come to me even though it was not my district. I sort of served as their councilman on issues in which they had an interest or were concerned.

GALM: What about the quality of the council when you first went on it? Do you dare to make any evaluation of the individuals? I know there were some real veterans on the council.

BRADLEY: Yes. There were some old-timers on the council who, frankly, didn't work that hard; and there was no real demand for them to work very hard. They came, spent a couple of hours a day in council session, very often less than that. Because there were no great problems in their areas, that was about the sum and substance of the demands upon them. Many of them could carry on their own business activities. All of that has changed. Now it's a full-time responsibility. Not only are the problems such but the demands of the people have increased. I suppose it's a matter of greater awareness that they could expect and demand a higher level



of performance by their council people that has produced that kind of new attitude. So council representatives do now work full time, more than full time in fact.

There's a more progressive council today than there was when I was elected in 1963. It was a very conservative council in those years. They were largely influenced by the so-called establishment: whatever the organized business community wanted, that's what happened; that's what they got. But that has changed. I think it's been a healthy development. I think the caliber, the quality of services improved in these fifteen years. The nature, the makeup, the intelligence, and certainly the energy of the council representatives has steadily improved over those years.

GALM: We discussed earlier that the election of '63 epitomized a struggle between the mayor's office and the city council as to who was really running the city. Did that continue during those early years on the council?

BRADLEY: Yes. There was almost a daily battle between the council and Mayor Yorty. It seemed that at times he would prefer to have a battle and lose the issue than to work with the council, seek a compromise, and settle in an effective way the issue that came before the council. And that continued. Sometimes it was worse than others, but the whole pattern of confrontation, a battle between the mayor and the council, continued for the rest of the period that





Mayor Yorty was in office.

GALM: Do you see it as just being a grandstanding effort or was a personality-- Was it really a power struggle?

BRADLEY: It was a combination of personality conflict between him and members of the city council, a desire for more power on his part, but it also is considerably motivated, I think, by his desire to get publicity. He could be sure that he was going to get public exposure in the media when he had a confrontation with the members of the council. So it served to bring the public spotlight on him just because he was engaged in some battle with the council. Some people looked upon him as a fighter, a scrapper. They didn't understand that this was destructive and not productive. So I think that was in part some of his motivation.

GALM: In some of the efforts that you made in working for a broader constituency than your own, did that cause you problems in getting some of your own things through for your district?

BRADLEY: Never. I don't recall any instance in which that had a negative effect upon my effort to get a program passed.

GALM: Down in my notes I have that perhaps one of the benefits of the council viewing the city as a whole rather than by districts was the establishment of a Board of Grants Administration.



BRADLEY: This grew out of, one, a lack of direction and leadership by the mayor and a desire on the part of myself and some of the other leaders in the city council for us to establish a mechanism for getting more federal grants. So we proposed and created the Board of Grants. This turned out to be, in the early stages, a focus primarily on the more depressed, or disadvantaged, sections of the city, because that was the basis upon which many of these grants were based. The conditions, the terms for which they were allocated was related largely to disadvantaged communities. But in other cases, it was a citywide kind of improvement, and we were able to go after some of these federal subsidies based largely upon the interest of the city. So people had to begin focusing on priorities for the entire city, not just their districts.

GALM: In other words, the city seemed to be missing out on a lot of federal funding during that period.

BRADLEY: When I took office as mayor, for example, we were getting something like \$81 million a year from federal grants. We are now getting over \$700 million in federal grants. It was largely a matter of the lack of aggressiveness by the mayor and the city in those years, largely a matter of the antagonisms between Mayor Yorty and federal officials. He was literally despised in Washington. So even if he wanted to do something for the city, he couldn't



get anything done. So we changed that whole picture, and when I was elected mayor, I began aggressively seeking this kind of federal help. We dramatically increased the amount of federal subsidies, as I've just indicated. Now, this came for a variety of reasons, but it was largely a matter of the direction of the mayor, myself, in demonstrating our interest in these grants and the cooperative relationship which I was able to establish with the administration and with the Congress.

GALM: Something else that I think that you proposed as a councilperson was the Human Relations Commission. Is that true?

BRADLEY: Yes. When I first proposed it, it was not adopted by the council. There was rather strong resistance to the idea.

GALM: Would you know the year on that?

BRADLEY: Yes, this was in 1965, just shortly after the period of the Watts riots. It was strongly fought by many of the interests, and it failed, did not get adopted. It was later adopted. Let me correct that, because I think it was in 1964 that I first proposed this; it was before the Watts riots. It was after the Watts riots that it was finally adopted.

GALM: Then later on, though, I believe it was a city commission in which, then, the mayor made the appointments to the commission.





BRADLEY: The mayor made the appointments to the commission, named the staff director. It turned out to be nothing but a PR gimmick for the mayor. Instead of addressing the issues of interpersonal, intergroup relations, instead of working with other professionals in that field, it was a pure boondoggle. I then began to fight it and to seek to have the funds, budgetary funds, withheld. When I was on the city council, I didn't succeed in that effort, but I did after I was elected mayor.

GALM: And then you relied more upon a county agency?

BRADLEY: Yes. The county had a sizable staff. They had professional personnel, they had good skills, and they could provide a service. Now, had it been complemented by a similar kind of quality staff in the city, I think it had great potential. It could have done an outstanding job. But that simply was not the aim of the mayor. So it failed and, I think, failed miserably.

GALM: There was probably no control the council could have over that once it established it as a commission.

BRADLEY: That's right.

GALM: Nineteen sixty-three really saw perhaps the beginning of the civil rights movement, or there was strong activity in the state--the incidents in Mississippi and Alabama and so forth. What had been your participation in civil rights groups up to that point, up to the time that you



became a councilperson?

BRADLEY: I had worked with the Urban League and with the local branch of the NAACP. I worked with some of the church groups and with the civil rights organizations that had been developed here in Los Angeles. [I] marched in protest and marched on picket lines with them, seeking to gain better employment opportunities and better conditions all around.

GALM: What was the United Civil Rights Committee?

BRADLEY: It was the principal civil rights activist group that sort of brought together a coalition of all of the civil rights organizations. People who would not identify with the Urban League or the NAACP could identify with this group. In fact, it was probably more militant than either the Urban League or the local branch of the NAACP, which was somewhat splintered in its activities. It had a very aggressive program. It achieved some results, not nearly as much as had been its aim, but it was a catalyst for much of the change that took place in terms of job opportunities and housing and some of the other civil rights goals of this community.

GALM: Were you a member of that committee?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: When did that come into existence approximately?

BRADLEY: In the early sixties. I frankly don't recall



the exact date.

GALM: How long did it function then?

BRADLEY: Probably four, perhaps five years.

GALM: What was the reason for its demise?

BRADLEY: Splintering of interests, loss of enthusiasm by some of its members. There were many organizations, and they began pulling in different directions, each with their own major interests and major goals. So this effort at building a coalition began to dissipate and lose some of its drive and its effectiveness.

GALM: But for a period it really did serve as a coalescing force?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes, yes.

GALM: The Watts riots occurred in 1965. You were, of course, involved because matters were brought to the city council. Were you involved in any other way, as a conciliatory force during the riots, or not?

BRADLEY: No, no. During the course of the riots, it was a situation so volatile in nature that no single or organized voice of reason was going to prevail. It really took a massive effort by the military primarily, and law enforcement as well, to finally control the situation. Once that was under control, then the positive efforts at identifying the causes, offering programs to deal with those problems, whether it be employment or improved



education or better transportation, all of these things grew out of that effort.

As a member of the city council I was active in those efforts. One of the major confrontations that I had during that period was with Chief Parker, in which he, in my judgment, had made some rather flippant and unjustified remarks: one, about the cause and, two, about the role of different individuals or organizations associated with the civil rights movement at that time. I challenged him on these issues, and I was critical of the police department and some of the things that they had done or had failed to do. [I] made some recommendations about some of the procedures that I thought ought to be established to deal with the complaints lodged against the police for misconduct.

GALM: Do you mean during the riot or just after?

BRADLEY: This was after the riot.

GALM: No. I mean, complaints--

BRADLEY: Ongoing complaints of police abuse, not so much physical abuse, though that term police brutality often cropped up. It was more a matter of verbal abuse and attitude, discriminatory practices, a double standard of treatment of individuals in the black community that was at the heart of the strong hostility between a large segment of the community and the police. It was those





issues that I tried to address and tried to correct.

[I] made some recommendations for administrative changes in the police department, to try to deal with them.

Some of them they accepted. They enlarged their police-community relations program. They tried some new techniques that were helpful. But the principal one of sort of--I've forgotten the exact military term--an authority that would be independent of the traditional investigatory agencies within the department that could look into, on a fair and impartial basis, any complaint made by the public.

GALM: An ombudsman?

BRADLEY: No, it wasn't an ombudsman.

GALM: That's not a military term.

BRADLEY: No. This was a military term, something like solicitor general, but not just that term. ✓

GALM: Had you seen something building within the community prior to the riots?

BRADLEY: Yes. I spoke out about that issue and made the prediction--oh, it must have been the spring of 1965--that this growing hostility and friction between the police department and a large segment of the black community could result in a major confrontation. I, of course, had no idea it was going to reach the proportions that it did. But I recall being criticized by Chief



Parker for making such a statement. Another councilman, Billy Mills, made a similar series of statements to that effect. But it was because we were out in the community, we were sensing this kind of hostility growing, and we tried to call attention to it at that early stage. I wouldn't say nobody was listening, but not many were listening, and certainly no action was being taken to take corrective steps.

GALM: Do you think that you were able to get across through the media your perceptions of what was happening or what could happen?

BRADLEY: No. No.

GALM: I know in recent weeks there's been some criticism that people are talking out again too much--

BRADLEY: Yes. [laughter]

GALM: --irresponsibly.

BRADLEY: I just hope we don't make the same mistake again, a feeling that some who are trying to honestly assess where we are at a given point in history are looked upon as agitators instead of prophets and having their advice followed.

GALM: Do you think that there is--you evidently do--perhaps a feeling that there were some of the same elements present prior to the Watts riots as there are today?

BRADLEY: Yes. The extent or the degree of that hostility



today is far less than it was in 1965, but there are still occasions when it is apparent. My concern is that it really doesn't take a long series of these incidents to spark some kind of violent confrontation. It only takes one, as it did in the case of the two brothers who were stopped by highway patrol officers, and it sparked a whole explosion.

GALM: You had mentioned that Billy Mills had also spoken out about the conditions. Were the black members of the city council: did you, then, try to work together as a force within the council to perhaps educate the council as to the problems and the conditions in the South Central [district]?

BRADLEY: We spoke about these issues, and there was no concerted program because there was no concerted support for the issues that we were raising. So we really were not able to get any kind of sustained action or reaction to what we saw happening.

GALM: I know that you questioned at least some of the police handling of the situation. Did it go beyond that, voicing a--did you lodge a complaint?

BRADLEY: I made various motions, and we'd hold public hearings about various incidents. There was almost an adamant resistance by the police department, and the members of the council were so reticent to get into a situation of



of fighting the police department that you couldn't get two or three votes on any issue of that kind.

GALM: Something else that you involved yourself in was consumerist problems. You tried to--well, you were successful, weren't you?--to establish a Consumer Affairs Bureau.

BRADLEY: I saw the need for the establishment of a consumer affairs department. When I first proposed it, once again the council was not willing to set up such an agency. After a period of a few months the issue arose again. This time, because a new program of federal funds had been made available, I was able to direct that source of money to this program. So I was simultaneously joined by another member of the council, Bob Wilkinson, who came in with support for the idea, and it was on the basis of that effort that we finally got the department created.

GALM: Something else that seems to have been a stance that you had taken during your years on the council, and that was attempts at consolidation of agencies. Do you recall some of the different areas in which you tried to accomplish consolidation?

BRADLEY: There were so many areas of duplication and inefficiency and waste between our own city agencies, city and country agencies, that the field was just wide open for that kind of corrective change. So I constantly called





it to the attention of members of the council, and it was difficult, nearly impossible, to get any action. It was not until I was elected mayor that I was finally able to get that movement started. It took us almost two years to effect the first merger of city and county agencies, and that was in the field of the maintenance and operation of the beaches; and we finally accomplished that. The committee which I established made some other recommendations, some of which have now been shifted to a formal city-county commission [Mayors Advisory Committee on City-County Consolidation] on city-county merger; so the effort is continuing.

GALM: Was this an effort that could only have been accomplished by a mayor working through the city council, or could it have come through the city council?

BRADLEY: It requires the action of the city council in any event; the mayor working alone could not mandate this. It takes administrative code changes, so it required action.

GALM: Was the climate then such that the county and the city were two separate governments?

BRADLEY: There were certain vested interests that were protected by both city and county, neither side willing to give up its jurisdiction or its authority, and that made it difficult. That's the reason it took so long just to launch that merger. It resulted in us saving over \$1



million a year for the city. This took almost two years to accomplish that.

GALM: Well, there are some other areas too that maybe we can talk about, then, later on when we talk about your years as a mayor, because I think you attempted it in the health department.

BRADLEY: The health department merger actually took place while I was still on the city council. My recollection is that that was in the early stages of my service on the council. I was not the leader of that movement. That was one of those situations that was fairly apparent, the benefits that could come from it. As I recall, Councilman [Ernani] Bernardi led that fight.

GALM: Someone has suggested that perhaps you had an informal alliance with Ernani--

BRADLEY: Ernani Bernardi?

GALM: Right.

BRADLEY: No. Councilman Bernardi and I were seat mates. We sat next to each other for the ten years that I was on the city council. We had many similar interests, so we often voted alike and often were the minority on some of the issues before the council. But there was no formal or informal alliance between us. It was just our interests were mutual. We simply voted alike on many issues.

GALM: In the race, the initial race, between Gilbert



Lindsay and--was it [Richard] Tafoya?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Now, had you supported Tafoya in that?

BRADLEY: No.

GALM: Or had you just remained totally neutral?

BRADLEY: Yes. I was neutral in that race. Councilman Lindsay had been appointed in April, just a couple of weeks or so before I was first elected to the city council. Following his appointment he had to run for his full term. (This was two years later.) I was not active in that campaign. This was the one in which he ran against Richard Tafoya.

GALM: Because you had involved yourself in the [Edward] Roybal race for Congress, didn't you?

BRADLEY: Yes, I had. I had worked for Roybal when he was running for the city council and, then, later, when he ran for the Congress. But when he was elected to the Congress, the vacancy was filled by appointment, and the members of the city council appointed Gil Lindsay.

GALM: Was there much cronyism on the city council in those early years?

BRADLEY: Yes, I would say there was. I would even call it cliques that developed. This was before I was elected, and then there was a period after I was elected when there were some well-identified cliques that worked together on many issues.



GALM: What defined the cliques?

BRADLEY: Pretty difficult to say. It was not a matter of philosophy. It was just a matter of convenience. They would work together on voting on issues affecting zoning, affecting a variety of issues. I was never a part of any of the cliques, so I can't say what prompted or motivated them, [laughter] but I know they existed. There were times, for example, when I was on the council, I would find myself on a different side of issues with Councilmen Mills and Lindsay, who pretty much operated with this prevailing clique. It was a majority of the council, a strong majority in the council.

GALM: So you were the minority representative on the council?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes. That's the reason Bernardi and I often were found voting together on the issues and found ourselves outvoted. In many of these cases, they were issues affecting the mayor.





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GALM: Last time we were talking about the minority clique on the city council. Would you explain how this minority clique worked in relationship to Mayor Yorty?

BRADLEY: There was a majority of the council that worked pretty closely with the mayor and under the leadership of Paul Lampert, councilman from the Thirteenth District. The messages or the signals from the mayor were sent in, and the majority would go along with the mayor on many items. There was a very strong minority group that very often would oppose those views. It was not an organized thing, and I don't think we ever consulted with each other on anything. It was just a matter of expressing our own conscience, and it was out of that independent expression that rather strong objection went out to many of the things that were offered on behalf of the mayor.

GALM: Do you recall what some of these issues were?

BRADLEY: They often revolved around the budget. Almost always there was a strong and bitter struggle over budget matters, the minority group attempting to hold down cost, to reduce the tax burden. So we were often in strong disagreement with the majority of the council. Very often on planning matters there was, again, a very strong minority protest to some of the things that were brought



in. On other matters, they would range across the board; it might be on any given issue on a given day.

GALM: During your terms as councilman, what do you think were some of the most significant issues that came before the council?

BRADLEY: I recall one of the major battles that developed was over the proposed site of the [Los Angeles] Convention Center. There was an effort--an expedient effort, I might say--by the mayor and members of the council to place the convention center on land technically owned by the city, therefore reducing the ultimate cost of the convention center. One of the proposals was to place that center up in the Elysian Park area, near the police academy. The idea of placing that on city park land was something that was contrary to my views and [to] a significant number of the members of the council. We fought it bitterly, and ultimately, our views prevailed on the matter. So they were forced to go elsewhere. They looked for several sites and finally wound up with the site at the corner of Pico and Figueroa. This cost more money than the site that the mayor had proposed, but at least it was on land that would not disrupt a major facility in our city.

There was also a considerable debate about the question of whether that convention center could be revenue producing or whether it would always be a burden on the taxpayers.



Most of us argued that it was always going to be a burden on the taxpayers. We had to make the judgment whether, despite that fact, there were certain economic benefits that would come from it, certain indirect benefits, because the convention center existed that would make it a viable option. That finally became the prevailing view: that despite the need for constant and continuing public support, we knew of no convention center in the country that was totally self-sufficient. So our view was that we should minimize the expenditures, but recognize that it was going to be an indirect benefit to the entire city.

GALM: Did you support, then, the idea of a convention center from the beginning?

BRADLEY: Yes, I was in favor of the convention center. It was a question of where it would go. I supported the idea of placing it just adjacent to the [Los Angeles] Sports Arena because there we would have a convenient location as far as parking was concerned. It could have been built at a very modest cost and would have served all of our needs well. I think it would have made a much more efficient and effective use of that entire complex, the [Los Angeles Memorial] Coliseum, the Sports Arena, and this proposed convention center, but our view did not prevail on that issue.

GALM: Did you also feel that it might help to stabilize that area of the city?



BRADLEY: That was one of the strong reasons for my advocacy of that site. It would have served as a strong stimulus to the economy in the area surrounding the Coliseum; that area desperately needed it at that time.

GALM: What about the Bunker Hill development project? Had that been more or less settled by the time you had reached the council?

BRADLEY: Yes. That question of the site had long since been resolved. There were some continuing matters of adopting additional plans and changing the plans for the use, but the site had already been acquired before I came on the council. The Dodger Stadium issue had been settled just prior to my coming on the council. That had been a long and bitter fight, but the issue was resolved by the time I had reached the council.

GALM: And I suppose the [Los Angeles Public] Library [Central branch] building came up after you had left the council, or had that always been a continuing--

BRADLEY: It came up while I was on the council. It seemed to me that the central library had been with us forever. It was debated, I would say, from about 1965 until today. It still has not been resolved.

GALM: What about mass transit?

BRADLEY: There was an issue on the ballot while I was still a member of the city council. I'm trying to recall





the year. It seems to me it may have been in 1968 or thereabouts. It simply did not have strong public support. It practically had no support from the mayor. It had rather an ineffective campaign in support of it, and as a consequence it lost when the voters came to the ballot box.

GALM: But it was an issue that was placed on the ballot through the city council? Or was it a proposition?

BRADLEY: It was a proposition, as I recall, placed there by the [Los Angeles] County Board of Supervisors.

GALM: Were there issues that did not pass in the council that you felt should have and subsequently had a detrimental impact on the city?

BRADLEY: My memory is a bit hazy about that. I cannot recall at the moment any significant issues that--

GALM: Something that you might have supported and lost?

BRADLEY: No, I can't recall any at the moment.

GALM: I guess we've already talked about some of the controversial ones. Are there any others that come to mind besides those that you touched on?

BRADLEY: The Occidental oil-drilling issue is one of the hot issues that came before the council when I was still a member.

GALM: Pacific Palisades.

BRADLEY: Yes, yes. There had been some rather strange activities on the part of the planning department and



members of the mayor's staff in urging that a conditional use permit be granted so that they could drill. We discovered that there was an unstable area on which they wanted to drill, that it was possible that an earthquake could cause a break that would contaminate not only that immediate area around the drill site but might also contaminate the beach area. We were concerned about it being so close to the recreational areas set aside for beach purposes. Finally, the strange way in which a trade of state and city land was negotiated just raised so many questions on my part that I was one of those who strongly fought the issue.

We actually failed in the city council. They were able to secure enough votes to pass it. The homeowners in the area took the issue to court, and there the council action was overturned, so they had to start all over. That was an issue which came up very recently during my tenure as mayor, and the council by a nine to six vote approved the drilling at that site. Once again, on the same kinds of issues on which I had fought before, I vetoed the ordinance, and that oil-drilling proposal went down to, I think, final defeat.

GALM: Final defeat? Something that perhaps is related to that: was it in your tenure as a councilperson that the Department of Environmental Quality was established?



BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Now, were you instrumental in creating or in bringing that idea before the council?

BRADLEY: I was one of the members who supported that issue. It was not mine from the beginning.

GALM: Do you recall whose it was, or about what time--

BRADLEY: No, I don't recall which member of the council first proposed it.

GALM: Do you think it was prior to the Pacific Palisades [issue] or as a result of it perhaps?

BRADLEY: I don't think it was related. It was an issue which simply unfolded at a time when the strong environmental movement in the state and in the city had begun to gather momentum and was making some rather significant strides. With that boom in popularity, it was really not a difficult issue to secure support.

GALM: We've spoken about some of the other issues or motions and so forth that you have brought before the council. There were a couple of other resolutions. [One] had to do with a peace group as a result of the Century Plaza Hotel incident [in 1967].

BRADLEY: Yes. There have been a number of issues that came up during my tenure on the city council in which I proposed a certain view or took a certain position. The first time around, these issues did not pass, and it was only when they



were brought up again that they finally succeeded. I can think of the effort to create a Human Relations Commission. When I first proposed it it was defeated. Some two years later it was approved. I recall proposing the minibus program for downtown Los Angeles, a modest-fare bus that would conveniently take people through the shopping area. When I first proposed that, it was defeated, and, again, less than two years later it was approved; and it's still in operation and serving effectively as a neighborhood, civic center means of transportation. I recall the Consumer Affairs Bureau, the first time I proposed that, could not get enough support to have that agency funded. Once again, we brought that back several months later and were able to get enough support for it, and it finally passed.

GALM: In most cases was this just a case in which events had proven that these measures were necessary or beneficial to the city, or was there a turnover in the council?

BRADLEY: In the case of the Human Relations Commission, the Watts riots had occurred before there was a sufficient change of mind to get the votes necessary to pass it. In the case of the Consumer Affairs Bureau, it was simply a matter of passage of time and the opportunity to secure some federal funds to help support it that we were able to convince other members of the council that it ought to be done. So it was not so much a matter of the turnover in the city





council as it was just an idea whose time had come. The circumstances were right that made it possible to introduce it again and get it passed. [It's] just one indication that you don't give up the battle just because you may have not succeeded on the first time around.

GALM: In '68, you proposed a charter amendment to enlarge the council from fifteen to seventeen members.

BRADLEY: Well, from 1963, when the then Councilman Ed Roybal was elected to the Congress, until this very day, there has not been a Mexican-American representative on the city council. I had felt very strongly that someone from that particular ethnic community ought to be on the council, to represent that point of view that only a person of that particular ethnic background could fully and effectively represent. We had not been able to secure success in the regular election process because there were not enough Mexican-American voters in any given district that they could mount a successful campaign. It was my judgment that if we enlarged the city council by two seats, we could have a district that would be predominantly Mexican-American in makeup and thereby give that community a chance to elect someone. That issue lost on at least two occasions.

GALM: Had someone from the Mexican-American community come to you with the idea asking your support?

BRADLEY: No, no. From time to time, there had been



requests on behalf of the community to gain support for candidates running for the office. Since they had not been successful, I suggested that an alternative would be to enlarge the council and reduce the size of the respective council districts but more importantly create a district in which the population makeup there would make it reasonably possible for a Mexican-American to be elected. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: Mayor Bradley, another resolution that you presented to the council was that the Police, Fire, and Civil Defense Committee conduct an inquiry into the shooting of a black youth, a Gregory Clarke. This was in 1968. Do you recall that incident specifically?

BRADLEY: I don't recall that specific incident. But there were a number of cases in which police officers had been involved in shootings under questionable circumstances. On a number of occasions I, by motion before the council, raised the issue, called for an investigation, called for some changes in the policies of the police department. There was always strong resistance to any such notion. Aside from the motion which I introduced in my independent inquiries, I don't recall being able to get more than three or four votes for any of these proposals.

The police department was a very powerful agency of government, and the council members simply didn't want



to run counter to their interests. The fact that we slowly but surely began to get some changes in policy, I suppose, can be attributed to this constant and continuing public pressure, the inquiries which I and others had raised over the years. While we made some changes in policy, we still are having far too many shootings in which the incidents are subject to considerable public question and some reservation. So we've got a long way to go before we solve that problem, I'm afraid.

GALM: During that period when you were requesting these inquiries, were you getting an antipolice label placed on you?

BRADLEY: Well, yes. There was rather a strong mood on the part of the Fire and Police Protective League, which represented the police department, and by the chief and other officials reacting to these kinds of demands on my part. Out of that came the contention that I was anti-police. I suppose that the strongest reaction to my positions on the city council in which I raised questions about the police department came, amusingly enough, in connection with a proposed pension change. I fought that one bitterly because I saw in it seeds of disaster for the taxpayers. Even though I was going to be the beneficiary of this particular change, because it was going to provide for a fluctuating pension for former retirees, I in good



conscience could not support it, and I spoke out against it, tried to raise those concerns. The measure went on the ballot despite my protests, and it passed because there was a strong and popular tide for the police department. So I got the benefit. But the public two years later, when they got their tax bills, began to feel the pinch, and they've continued to pay for the mistake of that election.

The thing I was going to add: it was that as a result of that vote--and I'm not sure of the year, I think it was 1967--two years later, when I ran for mayor, I was called antipolice primarily because of that particular issue. Not much reference was made to my motions in connection with the police shootings or other charges of police abuse or malpractice. It was primarily the vote and protest that I lodged in connection with that pension measure that created the strong campaign issue that I was antipolice.

GALM: From the beginning, then, from your beginning on the city council, you were a fiscal conservative and continued so?

BRADLEY: Yes, I always have been. [laughter]

GALM: And that was one of the reasons you were one of the minority members of the--

BRADLEY: That's true. There were some who just didn't have any concern for how the money was to be raised or to be spent. I recall the mayor said he didn't care what





happened to the taxes, let them go up. But he was most protective of the police budget. No matter what was asked, he said, "Let 'em have it." There were some of us who simply couldn't go along with that and fought these kinds of efforts very bitterly.

GALM: Now, you did, then, run for city council again in 1967. What were the circumstances of that election?

BRADLEY: [In] 1967, as I recall, that was an election which I had no opposition. I ran unopposed.

GALM: Was your 1971 election also unopposed?

BRADLEY: As I recall, there were at least one or two candidates on the ballot, but essentially it was a nonelection. I didn't even campaign.

GALM: In either case you sort of just watched everybody else out on the huskings.

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: Why don't we then talk about your decision to run for mayor. How did that decision come about?

BRADLEY: About six years after I had been on the city council, a little less than six years in fact, I had met with a group of my friends and supporters, people who met with me from time to time to discuss various issues, to offer advice. I had called them together for the purpose of exploring what my next political move was going to be, what office I should run for. As I recall, we explored all of



the options at that time. One was to run for the state assembly or the board of supervisors or the Congress. Since the mayor's race was going to be a seat for which I might theoretically run, I just threw that one in as a possibility. I did look at one public opinion poll that had been run, showing citywide, kind of favorable response from people. Though I didn't have high name recognition on a citywide basis, there was the evidence that there was a possibility of generating support on a citywide basis. So I decided that, since it was going to be difficult no matter what office I ran for, why not run for the big one?

When I first proposed that to my friends and supporters, they all laughed. They said, "Listen, don't waste your time and our money," you know. "It's not possible for a black man to be elected mayor of this city." And I suppose that it was an audacious thought because in 1963, only five years earlier, we for the first time had elected any black to any public office in this city. But I thought that it was something that offered a challenge. I thought I knew the job and requirements, and I thought I was prepared, qualified to run for that office as well as any other. So I gathered my troops about me, and we began that campaign. GALM: Now, you mentioned that this was a group of advisors that you met with occasionally. Who were some of the members of that group?



BRADLEY: I can recall that Herschel Rosenthal, Maury Weiner, H. H. Brookins, Warren Hollier: these are some whose names I remember at the moment. There were about twelve or fourteen people.

GALM: So some of them were staff members, and others were community leaders?

BRADLEY: Yes, that's right.

GALM: Was this a decision that you made alone, or did you confer with Mrs. Bradley?

BRADLEY: I made the decision alone and then advised her of what I had done. [laughter]

GALM: What was her reaction?

BRADLEY: She was willing to go along with it. She had never questioned or doubted any of the political decisions that I'd made. [She] has always been supportive, and this was true in this case.

GALM: I understand that she is what you might call a private person. Did the idea of an even greater public office, if you were to be elected, and the role that she would have to play: did that have any drawbacks for her?

BRADLEY: No, no. I don't think she had any particular concern or fear about that prospect. She felt then, as she does now, that when I was elected as mayor, the people were electing me and not her. If a speech was called for, it was I who was to give the speech, not her. If there



are public appearances called for, it was I who had been elected and should make those public appearances. So, although she does from time to time enter into some of the public functions, she believes that the role of the mayor is one that I must bear and that she should not be called upon to make that kind of additional sacrifice.

GALM: So how did you go about setting up your campaign strategy?

BRADLEY: We began calling upon friends and supporters that I had known and worked with in the Democratic party over the years and just began a series of public appearances in every section of the city where we could generate a crowd. It was purely a grass-roots movement. We must've had over 5,000 people who were involved in that campaign before it was over. Momentum just started from the outset and continued right through to the election day.

The money was very difficult to come by in the early stages of the campaign for a variety of reasons: the doubt that many people had. So it wasn't until I won the primary with 42 percent of the vote and led the field, leading the incumbent mayor, that the people finally began to sense that there was a chance of winning. Money then began to come in more easily, though not in the amounts necessary to win. So we ran that campaign pretty largely on credit. Many people were willing to lend money or to advance goods





and services on the prospect that if I won I would raise the money after the election and pay them back. If I lost, they knew it was just a gamble they made and lost.

GALM: You were running against quite a field of candidates. There were thirteen. Of course, that covers a lot--

BRADLEY: Yes, it was a large field. I guess the size of the field has been pretty much similar in each election.

GALM: Well, in that particular election, in the primary, one of the other candidates was Tom Rees.

BRADLEY: In the early stages, Tom Rees had indicated he was going to run, and we were drawing from a similar pool of support. He was a liberal Democrat. I was a liberal Democrat. Many of his supporters were my supporters. There was a very strong effort to get one of us to withdraw. I was approached by a number of people, who had been influential in the Democratic party, who tried to persuade me to withdraw. I resisted any such notion. There was a similar group that made the appeal to Tom. When it came down to the crunch, Tom finally withdrew, and I ran.

GALM: What was his reason for withdrawing?

BRADLEY: I'm not altogether sure why he finally was persuaded that he should not run. But there was, I would say, a rather strong effort on the part of some of his strongest supporters to persuade him not to run.

GALM: Was this at a point, then, when your chances appeared



to be better than his as far as drawing the vote?

BRADLEY: I think that my core of support was probably more firm than his at that early stage, and that probably made the difference. There was no clear indication beyond our core of supporters that either one of us had any strong chance of winning. But the evidence was strong enough that he was persuaded that he should not run.

GALM: Who were the power brokers in the Democratic party at that time?

BRADLEY: There was a man by the name of Mark Boyer, who was one of the major fund raisers for the Democratic party, who was very active in the effort to try to persuade me not to run. I recall that. When Rees dropped out, Mark became my supporter and helped very significantly in that election. Gene [Eugene] Wyman was another of the strong party officials. Roz [Rosalind] Wyman was another. I would say these were the major forces because of the amount of money they were able to raise and the general influence which they had over the formal party structure.

GALM: What about Paul Ziffren?

BRADLEY: Paul, as I recall, did not get into that campaign. I know that he did not approach me.

GALM: Was he also someone who in other campaigns--was considered a fund raiser, or was he considered more just a sort of a dean of--



BRADLEY: Paul was not so much a fund raiser as a man who had some influence, a man whose opinion was respected by many. He was one of the supporters in the 1973 campaign, but in '69 he was not involved.

GALM: How was your relationship with Roz Wyman on the city council?

BRADLEY: It was a good relationship. We were friends and generally voted in a similar fashion on most of the issues.

GALM: But at that point, she and her husband were more supporters of Rees than of you.

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: Did they come over or not?

BRADLEY: Yes, they did.

GALM: In the primary or in the runoff or in both?

BRADLEY: They came over in the runoff.

GALM: So was the campaign structure that of a committee again?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Do you recall the members of that committee?

BRADLEY: No, I don't.

GALM: I could refresh your memory.

BRADLEY: [laughter] All right.

GALM: Perhaps because it may bring back some recollections.

I understand that Samuel Williams, William Norris, William King, Stephen Reinhardt, and then, of course, Maury Weiner



were sort of running that campaign. Perhaps you could just comment on how some of these gentlemen came into your political life, at what point, if you recall.

BRADLEY: I think I mentioned Maury Weiner already, because he was there from the outset and the first race for the council. He was a deputy of mine. He was a man who had great political skill and a keen sense of strategy. So he was the principal strategist and a director of the campaign.

Sam Williams was a man whom I'd known for some time, but we had become closely allied when he ran the first campaign for Yvonne Brathwaite [Burke] when she ran for the state assembly. Out of that acquaintance, because we were together on that campaign, we became close friends and he became one of my strong supporters. So he was very heavily involved in the campaign.

Steve Reinhardt was one of the principal activists in the Democratic party. Aside from the fact that we just were thrown into contact with each other because of our respective activities in the party, I don't recall any other circumstance which drew us together. But he came in early into the campaign. He was a very strong and effective voice in strategy development.

Bill Norris was a bright, young lawyer who was one of the liberal forces in the Democratic party, and we'd come to know each other in the CDC movement. Bill just came into





the campaign because he recognized a good political fight and a good campaign, and we just related well.

Bill King was a Republican, who was described as a moderate-progressive Republican, that I'd met. After a number of conversations, he liked what he saw and agreed to come in and help and did. [He] was effective in making some contacts with key Republicans and was instrumental in bringing in some money.

GALM: Did he come in in the runoff?

BRADLEY: That was in the runoff, yes.

GALM: Because Alphonzo Bell had run against you in the primary. Is that right?

BRADLEY: That's right. Yes. As I recall, he was the campaign chairman for Alphonzo Bell.

GALM: What about your persons that you had in charge of media presentations for the campaign? Joe Scott?

BRADLEY: Joe Scott was the press director during the primary. In the runoff we got another firm. It was actually the result of Mark Boyer's involvement that he wanted a woman by the name of Mimi Harris. I've forgotten the other party that worked with her. They became the media directors in that runoff campaign.

GALM: Did Lou Haas come out of that office?

BRADLEY: No. Lou Haas was associated with Alan Cranston at the time. We were able to get him to come over as the press man.



GALM: I see. Was there dissatisfaction with Scott's work in the primary?

BRADLEY: I would just say that here was a feeling that he was not as effective as we had expected and hoped for. So the decision was made to replace him.

GALM: Someone else has suggested that another participation or campaign, a previous campaign participation that perhaps helped you in broadening your political base was the [Los Angeles] Board of Education elections of Julian Nava and Jim Jones. Were there a great number of fellow workers in those campaigns that then worked with your campaign?

BRADLEY: Yes. I supported both of these candidates. There was a coalition that was organized to help run their campaigns and maximize their chance of winning. So through that effort, we were able to broaden the base of my contacts and ultimately support for me. I recall that in that campaign I didn't really have any need to put on a campaign for myself, so I worked on their behalf.

GALM: I see.



TAPE NUMBER: IV, SIDE TWO

SEPTEMBER 6, 1978

GALM: What did you see the issues in the primary to be?

BRADLEY: It doesn't seem like that long ago, but-- My memory is not very sharp on exactly what those issues were.

GALM: Why did you think you'd make a better mayor than Yorty?

BRADLEY: It was a combination of factors: one, my experience and the contrast of the issues in which I had been involved, as opposed to his record. I began to point to the things that I thought he'd failed to do. He was essentially an absentee mayor. He would come to city hall about ten o'clock in the morning; by two o'clock he'd be gone. There was little that we could identify in the way of any constructive programs or effective leadership which he'd offered. His was more of a style of conflict with the council, but no substance to anything that he had actually been involved in. He was essentially interested in the sister-city program and traveling abroad. These were some of the issues.

GALM: How much value do you place on the sister-city program?

BRADLEY: The idea was good--people-to-people exchange that was proposed by Eisenhower--but it required a strong



and effective program. It was just difficult to generate that kind of enthusiasm and constant activity in a city like Los Angeles. We had at that time, as I recall, nine or ten committees. The standards call for one sister-city relationship, and certainly no more than three. Here we had nine or ten. The mayor really didn't want the committees to be effective. It was just a means, an opportunity for him to have some reason to travel to these cities abroad.

GALM: So you felt that most of his travel was unproductive as far as benefiting the city?

BRADLEY: Yes. It was purely a social function as far as he was concerned.

GALM: Any other issues that come to mind?

BRADLEY: No, I can't recall any.

GALM: Well, when it came down to the primary election day, your chances were looking very good.

BRADLEY: Yes. In fact, they continued to improve, and every poll that was run showed me running comfortably ahead of the incumbent mayor. I would say it was not until the last two weeks of that campaign that the constant, vicious campaign of the fear that was waged by the mayor and his supporters finally began to take hold. By that time we simply didn't believe that people would be gullible enough to buy that kind of strategy, but it caught on. By the time





we realized it was being an effective approach, it was too late to do anything about it.

There were literally thousands of people who ordinarily did not vote in a mayoral election who, in fact, came out to vote, came to vote out of fear, out of concern for what the mayor was saying. Their theory was, "We don't really know this guy Bradley. What if some of these things happen?" "What if," as the incumbent mayor was saying, "all of the policemen quit their jobs?" "What if the black militants took over city hall?" "What were the chances that these concerns that had been raised would in fact come true?"

On election night we got the first actual evidence that the thing really had caught on, and he won that election. It was an astounding thing for many people because, based upon every poll that we had done and that others had done, there was no clue whatsoever that he would be able to pull off a reversal of the trend that had been building steadily since the primary election. So on election night as the returns came in, we could see from the first returns, the absentee ballots, and then the continuing election returns for the rest of the evening, it was clear that the campaign of racism, of fear, had indeed paid off.

I decided that night that I was going to run again four years later. I determined that I would work twelve hours a day in every section of the city, so that when the



next campaign came along, he would, if he ran again, not be able to sell the same kind of political strategy. In other words, people were going to get to know me as a person, not as just some name on the ballot. They, therefore, were unlikely to become victims of that kind of campaign strategy again.

GALM: Now, are you talking about primary night or the runoff?

BRADLEY: I'm talking about the runoff night.

GALM: Because even going into the primary you looked like you were going to defeat him at that point.

BRADLEY: Yes, I had 42 percent of the vote. As I recall, he had about 26 percent in the primary.

GALM: It's been suggested that if you had perhaps had a more effective media program during the primary period that you could have won the primary. How do you feel about that?

BRADLEY: I doubt it. I just don't think that we were going to be able to generate a significant increase in that vote. I suppose that if we had had a larger turnout in my strong base of support and the black community on the west side of town, that those two elements might have been able to produce a victory. But that was not so much a matter of the PR strategist or the press person as it was just a matter of generating enough enthusiasm to get people out to vote, because I think if that had been done, if they had



realized, if they had believed that a victory would have been possible, if they just maximized their voter turnout in that primary, we might have done it. But that was a very long shot and one that I think no one could really calculate.

GALM: Did you feel that you did have to win it in the primary?

BRADLEY: No. No.

GALM: Or did you think you still had strong chances of--

BRADLEY: I was very confident that I was going to win it in the runoff after making such a strong showing in the primary. We had a better-organized campaign, considerably more money to spend in the runoff, and there was only one candidate to contend with. So I felt it was going to be possible to win. What we had not anticipated was that people really could be persuaded by a vicious kind of campaign of fear.

GALM: Do you feel that you were perhaps too cool in the runoff period as far as the charges that he was throwing out against you?

BRADLEY: I think we miscalculated. We thought that we could ignore them because they seemed so ridiculous, that we didn't even try to reply or to rebut them. Looking back on it, I think that was a mistake. But it is true that our strategy was to pretty much ignore that kind of campaign



and concentrate on our positive effort.

GALM: What important groups did he capture to succeed in winning?

BRADLEY: Republicans, senior citizens, the San Fernando Valley.

GALM: Why did he run so strong in the Mexican-American community?

BRADLEY: In the runoff that year, he had just a bare majority of the Mexican-American vote, as I recall. That was not that much of a surprise to me. I was not known in that community. Although I had the strong leadership support, the grass-roots people had not been reached. I think we didn't do as effective a job as we could have or should have.

GALM: Was the black militancy issue just as effective in that community as it would have been in the Valley?

BRADLEY: I'm sure it had some impact. I would not say it was as strong and effective as it was in the Valley. There were genuine fears raised that a black, if elected mayor, would cater to the blacks in the city and ignore the Mexican-American community. This was a genuine fear that was generated by that campaign.

GALM: How important do you think the Don Rothenberg issue was?

BRADLEY: I don't think it was that important. It was an





issue that gave some people a rationale for doing what they would have done under any circumstances.

GALM: What was that rationale?

BRADLEY: Well, the theory was that if they were going to vote against me, using Don Rothenberg and his past affiliations was just an excuse for what they were going to do anyway. I don't think that many people were persuaded to change their votes or their position just because of Don Rothenberg.

GALM: Do you feel that the Communist charge was not that different than the militants [charge]?

BRADLEY: No. I think that black militancy was an issue which had much stronger emotional appeal. For example, in the last two weeks of the campaign, on two Sundays prior to the election day, they had people who broke into churches, disrupted services, black militants, frightening the congregations. This hit the news. There were bumper stickers with the black fist, "Bradley Power," that showed up on bumpers on automobiles out in the San Fernando Valley. There were leaflets circulated showing black militants either burning or rioting in various cities. After the election, we traced the order and payment for that printing to the Yorty campaign people. So they did an effective job of scaring the hell out of people.

GALM: Let me just get back to the Rothenberg case for



a little, because some people feel that it was perhaps an important issue. Do you feel that it could have been handled in any other way once the person was on staff? And could he have been asked for his resignation?

BRADLEY: There were many people who suggested that it be done, and I considered that a political expediency that I was not willing to accept.

GALM: Were you upset that he had come on staff in the first place without more of a check of his background?

BRADLEY: I would say that in those days, I don't know if other campaigns did it, but we made no effort to check the background of people who came either as paid staff or volunteers. It didn't cross our minds.

GALM: Would that have been considered naive, or would it have been just sort of the tenor of the times?

BRADLEY: I think it was the tenor of the times. I don't know any campaigns that did it.

GALM: What about the media coverage from the television? I'm not talking about paid coverage, but through the newspapers and so forth. How would you rate it?

BRADLEY: I think in that campaign we got a fair balance of coverage both by the--I know, by the L.A. Times, because they were supporting me. But this was also true of radio and television.

GALM: In other words, if they support you editorially,



can that counteract the damage that is done just by giving space to the charges that Yorty made against you?

BRADLEY: Well, there were charges by Yorty that the Times would attempt to cover up and not print some of the allegations. So I think that they felt a responsibility to report what they considered to be news. You know, without trying to weigh it on a finely tuned scale, I think there was a reasonable balance in the media. The community newspapers were pretty much under the domination and control of the mayor, Sam Yorty. He had developed that connection in his first election and had maintained a good strong relationship with them. So as far as community newspapers were concerned he got the overwhelming bulk of that support and assistance.

GALM: How would you describe your style, your campaign style?

BRADLEY: I would say that in 1969, it was more a low-key approach, nonflamboyant, just typical of my traditional style of operation as a public official.

GALM: You indicate that perhaps it has changed since then to some degree?

BRADLEY: Oh, there is no question in the second campaign, in 1973, I came out swinging, so to speak, and it was a much sharper, attacking kind of campaign than in 1969. I believe that our strategy was that I should not be portrayed as a



strong militant-type black running against this little white guy who was the mayor of the city. I think in the second campaign we had decided that we were just going to take the gloves off. We weren't going to try to, you know, react to or operate on the fear that somebody might think that because of my size or my color that I was going to be viewed as an obnoxious person cast against all of the forces that Sam Yorty tried to identify himself with.

GALM: Did anyone during the '69 campaign try to suggest changes that you might make?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes. There was a constant discussion among the strategists about what ought to be done. So I would say that there's always an element of the campaign people who felt that a sharp reaction to every charge would have been productive. In retrospect, perhaps they were right. My own view is that I think it was fortuitous that the first campaign wound up as it did. I suspect that, had I won by a narrow margin in 1969, there would have been an atmosphere of fear and uneasiness in the community based upon that campaign that would have made it difficult [for me] to govern had I been elected. I think a sense of guilt, perhaps even shame, at having been taken in by that campaign strategy began to get to people thereafter, because I can recall meeting many people: I never met a single individual who admitted that he or she voted for





Sam Yorty in 1969. In '73 it was entirely different.

There were many people who candidly admitted that they had voted for Yorty, but they were pleased with the way in which I was serving as mayor. This was in the early stages of my incumbency.

GALM: Of course the mood of the country had changed a lot from '69.

BRADLEY: We had just come out of some really serious violent uprisings in many cities of the country. So the whole mood, the atmosphere was so different in '69 than it was in '73.

GALM: Do you think that the 1968 Democratic convention was still in people's minds into '69?

BRADLEY: I would say that that spirit of confrontation, the whole experience in the country, was pretty much tied together. It starts back in 1965 with the Watts uprising, the Detroit, and every other city that followed, right into '67, then the Democratic convention, Chicago, in '68 with all of its problems. All of that pretty much tied together.

GALM: You were in attendance at the 1968 convention.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: What was your role in that convention?

BRADLEY: I was just a delegate to the convention.

GALM: Who had you supported in the presidential primary?

BRADLEY: [Eugene] McCarthy.



GALM: Now, I understand that your chief aide, Maury Weiner, supported Robert Kennedy in the primary. Did that cause any problems?

BRADLEY: No. I had never required anybody who worked for me to follow the same line that I did or to vote for or support the same people. So we went our separate ways on various occasions. This was true of various members of my staff.

GALM: What were the qualities that you liked in McCarthy over and above Kennedy?

BRADLEY: I'm trying now to go back and piece this together because it was-- Well, my memory is hazy on this. I had heard McCarthy speak. I was impressed with his grasp of the issues and his position of principle with regard to the war, and just had a good feeling about what I thought he would do if he were elected.

GALM: Had you had any contact with Robert Kennedy during his campaigns out here?

BRADLEY: No.

GALM: What about McCarthy? Did you have any personal contacts with McCarthy?

BRADLEY: No, I really didn't. I had met with him on two or three, maybe four occasions.

GALM: Well, then you went back to the city council. The night or day after the election, you had decided that you



were going to run again in four years. Did you share this idea with your members of the staff or with other people?

BRADLEY: The following morning I made it clear that I was going to run again.

GALM: What efforts did you make during that four-year period to strengthen your position?

BRADLEY: Well, for one thing I worked seven days a week, about twelve hours a day. I made an effort to get into every neighborhood, every section of town. I worked even harder to identify with the issues and with the people in these different communities. It was out of that kind of contact that I came to know the people better, and they came to know me better.

GALM: You say that you began to work seven days a week. What was your working routine before that?

BRADLEY: Five-days-a-week kind of schedule prior to that. Eight to ten hours a day would be the normal working program.

GALM: So when you started in this new seven-day [routine], is that what has continued, then, up to the present?

BRADLEY: Yes. It hasn't changed except that it's become more intense. [laughter] Now it's about fifteen hours a day.

GALM: I understand that you stay later than anybody else.

BRADLEY: And come earlier. [laughter]



GALM: What led up, then, to the campaign of '73? You went out to meet the people and so forth. How did you set up the staff for that campaign?

BRADLEY: We were starting with some of the same people. I was able to get a man by the name of Nelson Rising, who had been instrumental in John Tunney's election, to come on board as one of the chief strategists. I was able to get Max Palevsky, who had been very active in a number of campaigns, who was an outstanding fund raiser and a man who had great wealth and was willing to use his money. In fact, it was through his personal loans that we were able to finance the early stages of that campaign and were able to prompt other people to risk their money.

GALM: Did you approach him personally?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes.

GALM: To get this support?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: Was his response immediately favorable?

BRADLEY: No, it wasn't. [laughter] It took some effort. He was busy. I'm not sure that he was convinced at the outset that things were going to be any different. In fact, I think he was very doubtful that the mood, the attitude of people had changed that significantly. It was only after some continuing discussions and prodding--and I think some prompting by other people--he finally did commit





and came aboard 100 percent.

GALM: Was there another candidate that he had in mind to support other than you?

BRADLEY: No, no.

GALM: He had not committed himself at that point to anybody else. What about Mark Boyer? Had you approached him again?

BRADLEY: Yes, Mark was active again, although not to the extent that he had in the first campaign. In the first campaign he was the finance chairman and was the money raiser.

GALM: Now, what was the reason why he played a lesser role?

BRADLEY: I think he had some reservations about the possibility of success the second time.

GALM: Now, one of the key people that you brought on staff was--or enlisted their services--David Garth. Do you recall how that relationship was established?

BRADLEY: David Garth had worked in the John Tunney campaign, and Nelson Rising was very high on him. So we talked about it. He was very expensive. We brought him out here, I met him and chatted with him. I liked him instantly, and I was impressed with his approach. Though we really could not afford it at that time, we just thought that he was the kind of media expert that we needed, so we



agreed to hire him. We worked very well together. David had the reputation of being very difficult to work with, and many campaign managers as well as politicians had violent disagreements with him in various campaigns in which he was involved. But David and I hit it off very well together. We never had a disagreeable word, never had any differences. It was like a perfect bit of teamwork from beginning to end.

GALM: Why do you think you hit it off so well?

BRADLEY: Well, for one thing, I guess my very personality, my nature, is such that I generally don't spark any hostile or bitter reaction from people; [I'm] an easy-going kind of individual. I was easy to work with, and I just seemed to be able to do naturally and easily everything that David wanted. He found me the perfect kind of candidate as far as he was concerned. So we just hit it off well together.

GALM: Because his personality is rather opposite of yours?

BRADLEY: He was the bombastic, abrasive kind of person. So it was, I guess, a perfect match of different personalities. We meshed.

GALM: Have you found this in other relationships that you've had, political relationships or staff relationships, where you work better with that type of individual?

BRADLEY: Oh, it isn't a matter of working better, but I've



been able to work effectively with most people. One of my attributes is my ability to bring people together, to serve as sort of a mediating or harmonizing force whenever there're conflicts or strong differences between groups or individuals.

GALM: What were some of the ideas that David Garth put forward?

BRADLEY: One of the things tht he believed in strongly was the media approach, the saturation of the media. He didn't take very well to the idea of a strong volunteer campaign. He felt that thousands of people working in a campaign couldn't possibly reach enough people to really make the difference. So it was necessary for him to adjust to that particular style of the Bradley campaign because I had always been identified as a grass-roots type of candidate with thousands of volunteers working. He made that adjustment very well, I think. So we had the best of both worlds. We had an excellent, indeed an outstanding media campaign. But we also had the grass-roots, the door-to-door kind of volunteer movement that also served as a great complement to that media campaign.

GALM: Was it reduced in scope at all, the vounteer effort?

BRADLEY: No, no. It was very expensive to do both, but we didn't minimize either side of that equation.

GALM: What was his tactic as far as the media? You say



it was saturation. As far as content, what was he--

BRADLEY: Well, first of all, he was very scientific in the way in which he identified issues that were of concern to people. He identified the demographic differences that should be appealed to, whether by way of electronic or print media, as well as the direct approach. He was in constant communication, developing strategy, anticipating what the opposition was going to do, and trying to react to that, developing press releases, and the whole mix of the campaign strategy and the implementation of that strategy.

GALM: In that primary race you ran against a couple of strong Democrats: Jesse Unruh-- Was there any effort made for one of you to step aside in that particular race?

BRADLEY: No, none whatsoever. There was simply a matter of two strong candidates, you know, drawing upon, I would say, a different base of support. Jesse had his loyalists, and they were considerably different than the volunteer groups that had worked with me. Jesse had alienated many of the people who worked for me when he was the speaker of the assembly, so there was a natural kind of division in terms of volunteers.

I think the principal strategy of that primary campaign was to demonstrate that Jesse knew little about the local political scene and I did know it. He had been out





of politics for a couple of years, and it was that absence from the immediate limelight that I think helped to erode some of his base of support. There was another strong candidate, the former chief of police [Thomas Reddin], who was a very popular police official. I had that to contend with. There was a member of the city council, Joel Wachs, who ran a very populist-type campaign. That was a very spirited primary.

GALM: Well, you were really sort of dividing up the same constituency or the same support groups that one of you eventually would have to get from the other to win the election.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: The liberal community and the Jewish community and, then, the black community, of course.

BRADLEY: Sure.

GALM: Do you think that Unruh had much success in the black community?

BRADLEY: No, practically none. I think that was one of the miscalculations which had prompted him to run in the first place and was part of his undoing, because he had counted on some of his principal supporters, some of the elected officials who had long been allied with him and had agreed to support him. But that kind of black political leadership, it turned out, simply couldn't produce the votes.



I once again gathered almost all of the vote in the black community.

GALM: Was [Mervyn] Dymally the main person that he hoped to--

BRADLEY: Yes. Merv Dymally and Bill Green, the state senator (well, at that time, I guess he was state assemblyman), Leon Ralph, a state assemblyman, Julian Dixon, Walter Bremond. But either the elected officials or principal activists who had been working with Jesse Unruh over the years were his principal bases for him in the black community.

GALM: Who were your main leaders of support in the black community in '73?

BRADLEY: Same group that had been there in 1968 essentially. Reverend H. H. Brookins was the principal leader in the black community. There was a strong coalition of clergy--they call themselves the Concerned Clergy--who represented a cross section of the black clergymen, and some white clergymen who were my strong base of support in the religious community.

GALM: So Jesse Unruh ran a rather poor third, I believe, in that primary.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Did you find that Yorty's tactics were any dirtier than they had been in the--



BRADLEY: They couldn't get any dirtier. They were the same, but they didn't work. [laughter] The strategy simply didn't deviate at all from what it had been in 1969. He could never quite generate the same momentum. He was constantly on the defensive, largely because of our strategy of going out on the offensive. I think he never quite got on track in that campaign, and he was not able to generate the kind of credibility for the racial campaign that he attempted in 1973. Again, I think it was because of people, having seen me and watched me closely over the four-year period, knew that these things they were attempting to foist on them again simply were not true. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: There were a couple of other allegations that he tried to get media attention in that campaign. One, I think, had to do with a gas station lease that you supposedly had taken money as a result of it. Could you just comment on that?

BRADLEY: Yes. There were a number of such issues in which Yorty, again, would simply manufacture allegations in order, I suppose, not so much to think that they were going to be believable but to try to put me on the defensive. In the '69 campaign, we were constantly reacting to wild allegations that continued to be headlines. So in this case, we simply would slough off any such unfounded



allegations and go on to our own strategy and develop the kind of issues and the kind of allegations that would turn the issue and place him on the defensive. So that gas station issue was just one such incident. When he wasn't able to produce any kind of proof, and our just tossing it off [by] dredging up some dead man--because one of the characters he was referring to had already died--and since we were able to actually undercut any credibility in this kind of issue, pretty quickly it was dissipated as an issue.





TAPE NUMBER: V, SIDE ONE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

GALM: Mayor Bradley, last time when we left off, we were discussing the 1973 campaign. I'd like to ask just a few more questions in relationship to that. We were talking about some of the allegations that then Mayor Yorty had brought up in the campaign. One of the other issues that was brought up was a contribution given to your campaign by Merv [Mervin] Adelson. Could you comment on that?

BRADLEY: Merv Adelson, who is involved in motion pictures and I don't know what else, through a member of our campaign structure had been contacted and asked to make a loan. He agreed to do so. It was some time thereafter that the Yorty camp began making allegations that he was in some way connected with Mafia people from Las Vegas and elsewhere. We finally made the determination that in order to put an end to that discussion, which we thought was distracting attention from the real issues in the campaign, even though there'd been no proof of Mr. Adelson's activity in any way that was illegal, we gave the money back to him.

GALM: Did the press give this a lot of coverage?

BRADLEY: Yes, it got considerable amount of coverage. We were constantly asked during several weeks of the campaign, and when the money was finally returned, that put an end to it.



GALM: Now, you spent a great deal of money on that primary campaign, a much larger figure than Yorty did. Was this seen as a necessity to get the media time that you thought you needed?

BRADLEY: It was deemed necessary by the media consultant, David Garth. The feeling was that we had to have a very strong primary campaign to give us the momentum to not only lead in the primary but then to go into the runoff with a very strong thrust that would produce a victory.

GALM: Were you concerned that your primary vote percentage was less than it had been in 1969?

BRADLEY: No. I don't think any of us were concerned about that. There were a number of very strong and well-known candidates in the 1973 campaign. It was generally assumed that they would each pick up a substantial share of the primary vote, and that turned out to be correct, though I still led substantially in the primary.

GALM: We talked last time about Jesse Unruh's participation in the primary. Did you direct any of your campaigning to directly stop the efforts of [Tom] Reddin and Joel Wachs? Or was it mostly directed towards Yorty?

BRADLEY: In fact, it was a positive campaign, talking about my qualifications and my proposed programs, very little said about any of the other candidates. As I recall, the only time that their names were even mentioned was in connection



with some inquiry or some direct comparison which might be made by someone from the audience.

GALM: What about the other candidates? Did they focus on the idea that they would make a better candidate, say, than you would?

BRADLEY: No. Again, I think just about everybody in that campaign dealt almost entirely with their positive approach to the campaign. I don't remember the specifics, but it was only Yorty who in the closing days of the primary came up with any negative kinds of things that he used.

GALM: Another issue or allegation that was brought up had to do with a family matter of yours connected with your deceased brother [Howard]. Was that brought up through the Yorty camp?

BRADLEY: Yes. But that was in the runoff.

GALM: That was in the runoff. What were the circumstances of that charge?

BRADLEY: There had been an insurance policy that had been written in which I was the beneficiary. Though I was named as the beneficiary, I'd indicated that I felt the money should go to my brother's two boys [Thomas B. Bradley and Howard L. Bradley] and had agreed in conversations with them that that's the way it should be divided. The controversy arose not over the insurance policy but over a piece of property which my brother owned during his lifetime.



Because of some loans that I had made to him, he changed the title on that property so that we owned it in joint tenancy. It was after his death that that also became a matter of some controversy. So until the issue was settled by the-- Actually, a settlement was reached through the lawyers on the thing, and that resolved the whole issue.

GALM: Was that then resolved during that period of time?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes.

GALM: So it then became a nonissue. Or did he try to continue to use it?

BRADLEY: It was actually settled-- I don't recall exactly. It was settled, as far as I can recall, even before the Yorty people began to make an issue of it.

GALM: Another figure on your campaign staff that we haven't spoken about was Richard Bonner. Could you describe his duties with the campaign?

BRADLEY: Yes. Richard Bonner was a lawyer who agreed to take a leave from his law firm and serve as the campaign manager and did so during that 1973 campaign.

GALM: Were there any problems with the way he ran the campaign, dealt with people, that you know of?

BRADLEY: There were personality problems between him and some individuals in the campaign. I must say that's not unusual, because any strong campaign manager typically has some





problems with a number of members of any campaign organization, but it was true in his case as well.

GALM: Do you feel it had any adverse effect on the campaign?

BRADLEY: Didn't dampen the ardor of the people who were involved. Everybody worked just as hard.

GALM: So, then, that brings us up to the election itself, and you were victorious. Can you sort of reminisce about election eve: where you spent it and how the evening went?

BRADLEY: We had taken a suite in a hotel--this was the Los Angeles Hilton--and I just relaxed and watched the early returns come in. I had felt very confident during the course of the day that we had strong momentum, that there was no sign, as there was in 1969, of any erosion of that strength. So I felt very confident that I would win the election, and as the returns continued to come in, I felt even more confident. I suppose by 9:30 or thereabouts, it was pretty clear to me that I was going to be the winner. I don't recall the precise time when I came down to greet my supporters, but there were others on the staff who were more cautious than I. They were the ones who persuaded me that I should hold off until an hour when it was absolutely certain that I had won.

It was a great feeling. The enthusiasm of that audience as I came onto the stage was such that the picture



will forever remain vivid in my mind. I reached out to shake hands with the one person standing below the platform, and instantly the hands from every corner of that room shot up even though they weren't within twenty or thirty feet of the platform and couldn't possibly touch me. It was sort of a symbolic touching that was conveyed by the fact that they were reaching out and I in turn reaching out in their direction. One of the newspapers captured that scene, and it became almost a fullpage story in the newspaper the following morning.

GALM: Were your remarks prepared, or were they totally spontaneous?

BRADLEY: It was an extemporaneous response.

GALM: Did you receive then a call from Mayor Yorty, a call of concession?

BRADLEY: This is 1978, September 22, when we are conducting this interview, and to this day I have not had a statement of concession from him. [laughter] No, I didn't get a call from him. I never have. He left shortly after that campaign for a trip to Alaska and still had not conceded. And he's not publicly conceded that the election is over or that he lost.

GALM: Or that he's no longer mayor of Los Angeles.

BRADLEY: That's right, that's right. [laughter]

GALM: What was your next step then? Was it to appoint



your staff, to make your staff appointments?

BRADLEY: There were so many things that happened that it's hard to recall exactly in what order these things occurred. There were many responses to invitations by the media. I made a trip to Washington to meet with a number of officials in Washington. I met with my advisors, and we talked about staff positions, made some inquiries in other parts of the country seeking interest on the part of potential staff members. I then finally began making the selection of my total staff.

GALM: Could you discuss those people actually named, perhaps starting at the deputy mayor level?

BRADLEY: Well, deputy mayors were Maury Weiner and Manuel Aragon.

GALM: What particular reasons did you have for picking each individual?

BRADLEY: Maury Weiner because he had been a longtime staff member, a man with great political sensitivity, good judgment, and good administrative skills. I wanted someone of Mexican-American ancestry to serve as the other deputy mayor and explored a wide range of names before finally interviewing Manuel Aragon and finding that he was interested in serving. He was a man whom I had known for some time, but we had not worked closely together before. But he had great background, great skills, and experience in management. He was



in the private sector at that time, but he had a great capacity to quickly assimilate facts from diverse areas and to mold them into a decision that quickly made sense and worked. So he was an ideal choice, and I was frankly a bit surprised because he had to make a sacrifice in leaving his private employment to come to work for me. But I was very pleased when he did so.

GALM: How well was he known in the Mexican-American community at that time?

BRADLEY: He was quite well known in the Mexican-American community.

GALM: Had he been active politically?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: In your appointment of Maury Weiner, was there any hesitation in naming him a deputy mayor?

BRADLEY: Not on my part. There were various people who were offering advice as to who should be named to various positions. While there was some difference of opinion as to whether Maury should be named or someone else, it was always my judgment that Maury was the ideal person. So I at no point had any doubt or hesitation about it.

GALM: Had you anyone else in mind, or had other names been put forward to you?

BRADLEY: I listened to advice from many people. I considered many names, but none of them, in my judgment, had better





credentials than Maury.

GALM: What were the arguments that they put forward for perhaps not naming him or preferring another candidate?

BRADLEY: I suppose it was a matter of looking for someone who had a national reputation either in municipal management or someone who had a great national reputation as an administrator.

GALM: Who would have been the individuals who were offering advice at this point?

BRADLEY: There were a variety of people, people who served as advisors during the campaign. I don't recall all of the names. I can recall Nelson Rising, Max Palevsky, Bill Norris, Sam Williams, Steve Reinhardt. These are just some of the names that occur to me.

GALM: In other words, those who had worked very closely on your campaign?

BRADLEY: Yes, yes.

GALM: What other key staff appointments were made at that time?

BRADLEY: All of my first administration staff people were selected. Some of them were people who had worked on my staff before. Wanda Moore I recall being one of the early selections. She had served as executive secretary as a member of the city council, and I selected her as an executive secretary when I became mayor. There were others:



Fred Schnell, for example, who is the regional vice-president of Prudential Insurance Company, whom I approached to come to work for me, primarily as a volunteer, salary paid for by Prudential but on leave from that company. He agreed to come and work for a year. That extended to two years. Finally I persuaded him to take an early retirement from Prudential and come to work for the city, and he did so. He was the economic development consultant who was a bridge to the business community. He had great credibility both by the business community at large and by some of the poverty groups in various parts of the city. So he was an ideal choice for that spot.

GALM: Who did you appoint as chief administrative officer, or was that also a civil service appointment?

BRADLEY: No. That position had been held for about eight years, perhaps even longer, by Dr. C. Erwin Piper, and I continued him in that capacity. The man who was selected to serve as sort of our budget analyst and chief executive assistant was Anton Calleia, who had worked in a number of capacities in city government and had formerly worked as a field deputy for me. But he had great skills in a variety of areas, including budget preparation. His knowledge of the council and internal operations of various city departments equipped him very well to handle that responsibility.



GALM: Had you interviewed other people for that position?

BRADLEY: Yes. There was a man who held that position under the Yorty administration, and I interviewed him. I just felt that Anton was a better choice for me.

GALM: How did you go about the transition of moving into the mayor's office?

BRADLEY: There was a man [Jerome F. (Jerry) Miller] who had formerly worked for the city as manpower director, who at that time was working as a consultant for the National League of Cities, and I wanted him to work on my staff. Eventually, I persuaded him to come back to Los Angeles from Washington and to immediately serve as the director of transition. So he actually worked in former Mayor Yorty's office, but preparing for the transition. That approach worked out very well. The Yorty people were very cooperative, and Jerry Miller worked very effectively in making a smooth transition from the prior administration to my people coming in.

GALM: At what point did you begin to select commissioners?

BRADLEY: Prior to assuming office, I asked a group of people, about forty people, representing many interests in the city and a great breadth of experience, to serve as a screening committee, to interview, and to make recommendations for about 155 commissioners who would be appointed. This committee met for several weeks and



finally narrowed down some 1,200 names that had been recommended to them or that they had proposed to a number-- as I recall, about 400. Then it became my task to go through those 400 and narrow it down to 155 names. It was a very difficult task because there was a need to not only get balance in terms of sex and race and qualifications. There was an attempt to try to get a good balance in terms of where the people lived so that each section of the city would feel that they had a voice in the administration. That was the first time that commissioners had been selected in that fashion. There was no attempt to select people simply because they had supported me or were friends. Though many of them were friends and some had supported me, that was never a question or consideration as new people were chosen.

GALM: Now, were any of the commissioners retained from the Yorty [administration]?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: These were appointees whose terms had expired?

BRADLEY: All of the commissioners who had served under Mayor Yorty were asked to submit their resignations so that I would have a free hand to appoint new members or to reappoint some of them. My recollection is that about thirty of them were reappointed.

GALM: Is that usual protocol or usual procedure?





BRADLEY: It is usual procedure to have all of the commissioners submit their resignations.

GALM: Was there one person on staff who helped you through this appointments process, or was this more working directly with the committee, your working directly with the committee?

BRADLEY: There were about three people on staff who helped with that procedure. I recall that Maury Weiner had primary staff responsibility for it, but he did have some help from other members of staff.

GALM: There must have been key commissions that you took special note of. Can you remember which ones those might have been, the appointments?

BRADLEY: The police commission was probably the most sensitive set of appointments that had to be made, because the police commission is always in the spotlight and in my judgment required the greatest degree of care in the selection. It also is the one that always creates the greatest challenge in terms of getting a balance, seeking a female, seeking someone who had some identification with law enforcement, usually a lawyer, a Mexican-American, a Jew, a Gentile. It was perhaps the most difficult set of choices that I had to make.

GALM: The final selection: did it, then, represent quite a change from the previous commission membership?



BRADLEY: All of the members were brand new.

GALM: No, but I mean, perhaps in makeup.

BRADLEY: I think the primary difference that I recall is that I was looking for strong commissioners in that department, people who would assume their rightful legal authority as head of that department and would have the courage to take on that responsibility and to challenge the police chief and members of his staff if they had any strong disagreements. They were not there to be a rubber stamp, and that had too often been the pattern of former commissioners, especially in the police commission. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: One of the points that you made, or statements that you made, on election night was your support of Chief [Edward] Davis's stand for law and order. Was there a reason why you felt the need to make that statement as part of your election night talk?

BRADLEY: That, I must say was spontaneous. There had been questions raised for five years about how I would relate to the police department. The chief had come to see me after the election and, you know, assured me that he was prepared to work cooperatively with me in the administration of the department, that he recognized the mayor as the chief executive officer and the head of this city, and he was going to do everything he could to do



work with me. I had just felt, without any great thought about the matter, that on the first opportunity that I had that I wanted to give that kind of assurance to the department and the public: that we were not going to have any fulfilling of the prophecies or the statements of doom that the opposition had made, that we were going to work together, and we were going to work in the interest of the city.

GALM: In the transition period did department heads then meet with you individually?

BRADLEY: No. Chief Davis was the first to do so. I then talked with others, without any particular pattern, on an informal basis from time to time. But there was no established procedure for that. The point at which we talked formally was in the first cabinet meeting. They had never met together as a group of department heads, never in the history of the city. I had indicated that was one of the things I wanted to do. So I called them together in a body and laid out my plans and asked for their cooperation, gave them some idea of what it was I expected of them.

GALM: Does that city cabinet: is that a principle that continues?

BRADLEY: Yes. It's a once-a-month meeting.

GALM: On a regular basis or when your schedule can allow it?



BRADLEY: I suppose there have been three, maybe four, months out of the last five years when we've missed.

But aside from that, we've had it on a regular basis.

GALM: We talked about the inauguration itself. Were there particular things that you wanted on the program, the ceremony program?

BRADLEY: The first choice, first decision I made about the inaugural program was the person who would swear me in. I had been on a program at the University of Judaism when we had ground-breaking ceremonies there, and Earl Warren, the former chief justice, had been the principal speaker. It was more hope than anything else when I asked him if he would be willing to come and swear me in. He enthusiastically responded, and we, the following week, set up the arrangements for it. It was one of the highlights of that first inaugural ceremony.

GALM: Had you had any other contact with him prior to that?

BRADLEY: Only on a very casual basis. I had met him, we had chatted, but there had been no prior close friendship.

GALM: Was there anything else that you may have asked as far as the ceremony to make it different than past ceremonies?

BRADLEY: I'm not certain that there had been any such





major involvement as we planned. We had a parade. We had participation of every ethnic group in the city of Los Angeles. We attempted to demonstrate the unique character of this city in its great cosmopolitan complexion. This was true in all that we did during that day. We involved the religious community by having a prayer session in the churches and synagogues that weekend. One of the things that I wanted to sort of carry as the theme was the song that is my favorite, "The Impossible Dream," so that was one of the features. We tried to get, again, a good diversity in terms of people who would be on the platform, who would be speaking or performing, and, once again, just showing the flavor, the total flavor of this city, in everything that we did that day.

GALM: Of course, there are texts of your inaugural address, but in preparing for it, what would you say would be the major theme that you wanted to proclaim?

BRADLEY: My love for the city, what opportunities it had provided for me, what my hopes and aspirations were for the city: to pull it together as a single community, one in which no section of the city would feel like an orphan, would feel like it got less than its appropriate share of attention.

GALM: You seemed to sort of pick out certain-- For instance, the Valley: you seemed to indicate that you were going to



give special attention to it along with other areas of the city. Was this sort of to, again, alleviate any fears among people in the Valley who may not have voted for you?

BRADLEY: It was designed to really give some assurance that I was going to serve as mayor of all of the people, of all of the city. There were two major sections of the city that I wanted to point to to highlight that intention. One was the San Pedro-Wilmington area, the harbor, which had been treated like a stepchild by prior administrations because it was somewhat removed in terms of distance. The other was the San Fernando Valley, almost 40 percent of this city, one which very often had felt that they had not received their fair share of city services or budget allocations. Because it was a community which prior to elections had been pretty much foreign territory for me and I was not that well known there, I wanted to pick that area out as another special focus so that that message would be loud and clear for the people in the Valley as well. Using those two as examples, then I could have the principle applied to every neighborhood, every section of the city.

GALM: I think you also used one of Yorty's favorite programs, and that was sister cities, but in your own context.

BRADLEY: Yes. You know, prior to my election we later reviewed how much we had recieved in the way of federal



funds or state funds. My recollection is that it was something like \$81 million. Today we are up to over \$800 million in federal allocations. So I declared that I was going to select two new sister cities--one was Sacramento and the other was Washington D.C.--and that I was going to go there and travel and seek to get our fair share of federal and state funds.

GALM: Did you have a speech writer on staff at this point?

BRADLEY: No, no. I did call upon a number of people for their ideas. I recall that Jack Tenner made a number of suggestions. Jeff Greenfield, who was a part of the David Garth operation, offered some ideas about style of the speech. But in the end, it was a matter of weaving these thoughts into the major theme and the thoughts and the ideas that I had for what that speech would be like.

GALM: Have you been able to retain this luxury of writing your own speeches?

BRADLEY: No. Well, most of the time I speak extemporaneously. On occasion, when a formal speech is required, once again, I will call upon various people to offer ideas and some input. One of the reasons that I don't like to give a formal speech is that in the end it comes down to my having to write or rewrite it [laughter] so that it's something that I feel comfortable with.

GALM: Is there any other reason other than that? Do you



feel it's more, perhaps, straightforward or more natural?

BRADLEY: Well, I know that when I have had other people make proposals for what might go into a speech, generally they will want to look at other speeches that I've given or listen to them so that they have some idea of my style and the way I approach it, so that guides them in what they may prepare.

GALM: That address differs quite a bit from your later, 1977 address in that in the later one you were able to make more specific areas where you were going to--specific proposals. In the 1973, it seemed to be more in general areas such as growth policy and equal opportunities for city employment. Of course, the major campaign issue had been rapid transit, and you did mention that. At that point, was there any question of whether you could deliver on that promise or not?

BRADLEY: That statement about starting construction of the rapid transit system in eighteen months was more a quirk of faith than anything else. Transportation was one of the major platform issues, but we had not established any timetable for it. The night before I was to deliver that speech in which the eighteen-month statement was made, members of the research staff and the press staff had prepared the material and had presented it to me. When I saw the eighteen-month reference in there, I said,





"No, there's no way we could do that in eighteen months, so take it out." But when I actually made the statement, that had been so firmly embedded in my mind that it popped out almost spontaneously. So I was stuck with it, and from that point on I was never able to get away from it.

GALM: Now, does that mean that the press release of your address differed from what you actually said on that fact?

BRADLEY: No. What I was referring to was that the statement itself contained the eighteen-month statement, but I had scratched it out as something that I did not want to use. It was very difficult to pinpoint the amount of time that it would take. In my judgment that was the reason that immediately stuck out in my mind as something that was a dangerous statement to include. But once having said it, I didn't make any effort to back away from it at that point. We did make an effort to get the thing rolling and, in fact, had an issue on the ballot in 1974, a little less than eighteen months after I took office. As a result of our efforts, not only in preparation but in the campaign that was conducted, I was able to cover the city of Los Angeles, but I couldn't cover the outlying communities.

GALM: I think at another session we'll go into greater detail about that whole Proposition A and the work that you put into it, you and your staff.

Of course, this was also Watergate time. How did that



affect the tenor of your address or the mood of the people?

BRADLEY: In 1973?

GALM: Am I wrong on my dates?

BRADLEY: I'm trying to recall that. I don't have that strong recollection of that at the moment. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: Another thing that you referred to was labor-management problems. Was this in the wind that you saw it as a necessity to include that idea in setting up a committee to deal with potential problems?

BRADLEY: I felt a need to have a labor-management committee that would deal not just with city personnel problems but in the private sector to try to anticipate problems and to avert them; where they developed and resulted in the work stoppage, to have this group serve as an extension of city hall to try to resolve the issue. It was for that reason that I referred to that.



TAPE NUMBER: V, SIDE TWO

OCTOBER 12, 1978

GALM: Mayor Bradley, last time we were discussing your appointments of city commissioners and your creating your staff in the mayor's office. One thing that you asked of the commissioners and of your staff were complete financial disclosures. Was there pressure or was there a feeling that created a reason for this?

BRADLEY: I think at that point we were just going through the Watergate syndrome, and there was a loss of confidence by public officials all over the country. It was my judgment that every elected official had a responsibility to try to restore that sense of confidence. One of the ways of doing that, in my judgment, was to make it very clear that those who were appointed to various political positions would make full financial disclosures. And without any objection on the part of those who were appointed, they were willing to comply with that requirement.

GALM: Did you lose any possible appointees because they didn't want to have financial disclosures?

BRADLEY: I don't recall anyone who declined because of that requirement.

GALM: Was this a decision that you made after becoming mayor, or was this something that you had promised as a campaign--



BRADLEY: This developed after I was elected.

GALM: We talked last time too about the fact that one of the major things that you had promised both in the campaign and in your inaugural address was to work on the transportation problems of Los Angeles, in particular, rapid transit. It seems like that was one of the first things that you also, then, had to start in motion. How did you go about doing that?

BRADLEY: I asked the staff of RTD [Southern California Rapid Transit District] to begin immediately to plan a proposal that we could place before the people for a vote. Feverish work took place between July of 1973 and November of 1974, when the matter was on the ballot. I then campaigned very actively all over the city of Los Angeles. In fact, I went to communities around Los Angeles that were within the county in an attempt to get support. [I] went to Sacramento seeking support there and enabling legislation. It was a very active campaign. In the city of Los Angeles there were actually 57 percent of the people who voted to tax themselves an additional cent on their sales tax in order to provide local financing for that system. Unfortunately, in the smaller cities around Los Angeles the support was not very good, and we lost that issue on a countywide basis.

I began immediately thereafter--I would say within the





next two or three days--on alternatives. Since we couldn't get public support for the entire system--and it was proposed for about 142 miles, as I recall--we then said, Let's take a more modest step. Let's try to develop plans for a starter line, something less than the full system. That work began immediately. We've gone through a series of studies and reviews. We made application. In 1976, December of 1976, we got approval from the Department of Transportation with the full financing for the planning effort for a starter line. Today, October--

GALM: Twelfth.

BRADLEY: --twelfth, we just had approval by the Rapid Transit District board [for] a designation of the Wilshire corridor eighteen-mile system as the starter line chosen out of some eleven alternatives. So we're still pursuing it. We still think that there's a very serious need for a fixed-rail rapid transit system in Los Angeles, and I'm determined to do everything I can until it is a fact.

GALM: In the original proposal, how much did you or your office do to form that original plan, both the plan and then the manner of funding it?

BRADLEY: It was a cooperative effort between the RTD staff and board and the city of Los Angeles. We had our staff from the mayor's office, from the planning department, engineering, traffic: all were involved in the preparation of those



plans and the financial forecast, the economic feasibility studies that were necessary.

GALM: In looking back on that, do you feel that there were any mistakes made in that proposal that caused its defeat?

BRADLEY: Well, I think that the principal reason why it failed-- There were two. One was a lack of enthusiastic support by other leaders throughout the county of Los Angeles; one man simply couldn't do it alone. I went wherever I could to campaign for it, but I couldn't reach enough people. The other thing that caused its defeat, in my judgment, was the fact that people got their tax bills the weekend before the election. With anybody being hit with a big tax bill three days before they are going to vote to tax themselves again, it's just bad timing. I think the combination of those two factors resulted in the defeat.

GALM: Was this something that the staff had neglected to forecast: that the timing between the tax bills and the election would be so close?

BRADLEY: No. There was nothing that could be done about it. That is a traditional time for the delivery of those bills. We did not attempt to manipulate that in any way and couldn't have even if we wanted to. It was just one of those things; there are times when the bills come and they don't have an impact. This time, because there was a big



jump in property taxes for roughly a third of the people in Los Angeles County, it did result in a very negative reaction by many people.

GALM: You'd mentioned last time [that] it was almost a slip of the tongue really that caused you to go ahead with the project in trying to complete it or put it before the people in an eighteen-month period. The shortness of the time: did that contribute at all to this?

BRADLEY: Oh, no, no, not at all. The slip of the tongue that I referred to was the announcement that was made to the press during the campaign that within eighteen months the ground would be broken. There was ample time for us to plan and to promote it. It was just a question-- There were not enough people out promoting when the campaign actually got under way. We had an excellent [Mayor's] Citizens [Advisory] Committee [for Transportation] that raised money to carry on the educational campaign. They reviewed the project and strongly supported it. So there was ample time for the preparation. I think it was a very sound proposal. It [the system] did not go into every neighborhood, and where it did not run in front of somebody's door, they simply were not that enthusiastic about supporting it, especially when their taxes fell due.

GALM: You also met with most of the mayors, or a majority of the mayors, of the incorporated areas. That was a gesture



of trying to seek support from a broader base?

BRADLEY: Yes. It was a countywide proposition, so there was an effort to secure support from other mayors and other elected officials. We got some, but not enough.

GALM: The other area, or item, that you immediately had to take some action on was the budget. You had recommended a \$12 million cutback. Can you review why you felt that this was necessary at that time?

BRADLEY: The budget was inflated. It had just been adopted, but it was not my budget; it was the former mayor's budget. I felt that if we were going to be successful in dealing with the projected deficit the following year, we had to begin immediately to cut back. There was an estimate of \$100 million shortfall in our budget for the following year, so I felt it was necessary to make a 10 percent cut immediately. So I took the unprecedented action of recommending reductions in the budget that had just been adopted and asked for a \$12 million cut. In fact, the council did support almost every item that I recommended for reduction. We got about, as I recall, \$11 million cut off of that budget that had just been put into effect.

GALM: Who was advising you? Was this something that you clearly saw was going to be a problem if you didn't deal with it immediately, or was it brought to your attention?

BRADLEY: Even before I took office, the estimates had been





made by the city administrative officer that we were facing a \$100 million deficit the following year. The press was very skeptical that we would find the means to cut that much and thereby have a balanced budget in the coming year. I pledged then that I was going to do it. But I foresaw the necessity to start immediately because in order to achieve that balanced budget the following year, you needed to start from a lower base. Therefore, you needed to cut back on an inflated budget. Therefore, the call for a 10 percent reduction.

GALM: Of course, one of the areas where you recommended a sizable cut was in the police department. That was almost a \$3 million reduced-budget recommendation.

BRADLEY: Well, whenever you talk about reducing the budget, you have to include the police department because it makes up about a third of our full budget. Unless you cut there, as you do in other departments, you're not going to make much of a dent. So it was necessary to make cuts there as well.

GALM: So you feel that, considering the size of the budget, it was not an extraordinarily large cut for them?

BRADLEY: Oh, not at all. In fact, that represented, I suppose, less than 10 percent of their total budget.

GALM: But this is always then the area that gets restored usually--isn't it?--in the budget once it gets to the city council.



BRADLEY: It's always the one that has the most difficulty being sustained when you get the council to act on it.

GALM: At the end of your first hundred days, a report was made of some of the things that you had accomplished. I thought we could just review some of those, some of the key ones. We've already talked about establishing an advisory committee on rapid transit and financial disclosure and budget cuts and so forth. But you also started setting up the way you were going to try to relate to the city as a whole rather than just downtown Los Angeles or through the mayor's office. I think you began to set up your spending a day in the Valley and such. Could you talk about your plans in that area?

BRADLEY: There were two means of communication with the public. One was the open-house program, where once a month, people were invited to come and see me in city hall on a first-come, first-served basis. That worked very successfully, and I've continued it for every month since I've been in office. There was a complementary program, where instead of having people come into city hall, I actually went out into the community. I do that once a month, and I have since I took office. On those days, in what we call area days, I choose a different section of the city and spend a full day there from, sometimes, seven-thirty, eight o'clock in the morning until late at night, visiting with



people from all walks of life, from neighborhood organizations to senior citizens. I usually include a high school in that tour and answer questions from the students in the auditorium, meet with the chambers of commerce, walk the shopping centers and talk with people just to find out what's on their minds, what they're concerned about, and to give them a sense that city hall is available, is touchable, is reachable. I believe that those two programs running parallel have created a sense of credibility and confidence that could not have been achieved in any other fashion.

GALM: Were these ideas that came from the staff, or were these things that you yourself wanted to do and therefore implemented?

BRADLEY: These were my own ideas. I had tried the idea of an open-house program when I was a member of the city council. It worked fairly well. The idea of a town hall meeting out in my district was something that I initiated as a member of the council. So I knew that it would work. But it was on a larger scale; I was doing it citywide.

GALM: What was the response, the immediate response?

BRADLEY: In the early months, I can recall having as many as 350 people come during a single day and visit in city hall. The only way I could handle crowds of that size was to have them come in groups. Very often an entire class or an entire club would come, not for the purpose of,



necessarily of complaints, but just to see that that system worked, that they could really get to see the mayor. Many times they would come and say, "We don't have a problem. We just want to say hello, take a picture, get an autograph," or something of that nature. The average, I would say, soon was reduced to somewhere in the range of 100, 125 people.

GALM: Over the period of time that you've been having these, have you sensed any change of mood in the people that come? Have there been times when they've been more angry or disturbed with city government than at others?

BRADLEY: No, no. The problems have been similar every month. The attitude of people has been very much the same. No anger, no hostility. I can recall only one man who came in, was very angry. He had tried to come to see me without an appointment two or three days earlier and had been told that I was not in. He created a disturbance, and the officers out front had actually placed him under arrest. He got out and came back on open house about three days later, and I got a chance to see him. He was calmed down then, very peaceful, very friendly. We just have not had any incidents in connection with that open-house program.

GALM: Can you describe some of the actual problems or matters that they bring to your attention?

BRADLEY: Everything imaginable, from jobs--and that's a





constant problem that is raised, probably the most consistent request: trying to get help in getting a job.

Sometimes it's a matter of getting financial assistance for help in a business, suggestions about various matters such as planning, ordinances that are on the books that they think ought to be changed, a complaint about inadequate services or lack of services, whether it be street sweeping, street maintenance, or police services. It covers the whole range of public services that the city offers. In many cases they are problems that are outside of the city's jurisdiction. That may range from health to rapid transit, rather the Rapid Transit District bus system, or it may deal with a private, personal matter between that person and a lending agency or a landlord or tenant or whatever.

GALM: Has anything of a major importance been brought to your attention at these meetings, that you then therefore could act upon or did act upon?

BRADLEY: It's pretty hard to identify something, as you know, major in terms of being earthshaking, but there've been significant matters that've been brought. Ordinances have been amended as a result of these recommendations, and these do have an impact on the lives of individuals as well as entire groups. So I would say that each month, there is something of importance that is recommended or suggested and that I follow up on and get some action.



GALM: Do you sense that there is a pretty good representation of people, both as far as regions, areas of the city, and also social strata of the city?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes. Yes. No question about that. One of the ways of bringing this program closer to where people live: I usually have it in city hall downtown, but periodically I move the open-house program out into one of the district city halls--West L.A. or Van Nuys or in San Pedro--so that it's closer to them, and they get a chance to come where it's more convenient to them.

GALM: That would have been another thing that you would have done, was to set up these district offices. Did any type of offices exist when you became mayor?

BRADLEY: Yes, there was an office in Van Nuys. It was more a matter of form than fact, because there was very little that happened there. I actually put a staff there and put a full-time operation there where people in the San Fernando Valley would have access to the mayor's office in city hall in Van Nuys.

GALM: Was that a major appointment, the head of that office?

BRADLEY: The person who is in charge of that office has a title of area coordinator. There are about six different regions in the entire city, and there's an area coordinator in charge of each of these areas. That's the liaison, the



field person in those communities. So in the San Fernando Valley, Doris Meyer, who lives there and has worked effectively in the community, was selected to set up that office. She has the regular staff that helps her in that assignment.

GALM: Have you always drawn upon someone from the community itself and knows the community?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Then, who do they report to? Do they report directly to you or to someone else on your staff?

BRADLEY: No, there is an executive assistant who is in charge of all of the area coordinators, through whom they report. But they can get to me; I don't set up any inflexible barriers. I believe in informal kinds of relationships so that any member of staff, from secretary to an executive assistant or deputy mayor, can come in to see me if there is a need.

GALM: Do you bring them together on any regular basis?

BRADLEY: There is a regular staff arrangement, and there's a separate group called Policy Committee which meets on a regular basis. Then periodically, I come into the staff meetings and meet with them. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: Another thing that you did to make yourself more available to the public was the TV show [Meet the Mayor]. How long did that continue?

BRADLEY: Almost a year, as I recall.



GALM: What was the format?

BRADLEY: It was a call-in show. I'd make a brief presentation, and the announcer, who was the interviewer, would ask a few questions about some pertinent issues of the day. Then we'd open it up to questions from the audience, and people would call in.

GALM: How much time did you have?

BRADLEY: As I recall, it was a half-hour show.

GALM: Was it a daytime show?

BRADLEY: No, it was in the evening.

GALM: So it did allow for a varied response.

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: Was it more or less the same type of questions that [were asked]?

BRADLEY: The questions there generally dealt with matters that were current and topical, whether it might be under discussion in city hall. They would usually prompt questions from people.

GALM: Another action that you took was, you filed a suit against the state of California to release gas tax funds for the purpose, again, of seeing if they could be utilized for building rapid transit. Was this an initiative that had never been attempted before?

BRADLEY: It was a theory that had not been tested in court. I don't know if anybody had ever proposed it, but it was





the first time it had been tried in court. Actually, I joined in that lawsuit with Councilman [Edmund] Edelman, as I recall. We did not succeed in the lawsuit, but it was interesting that, I think, we set public awareness at a level where in 1974, in June, the people voted overwhelmingly--60 percent of them--to support the use of 25 percent of our gas tax money for rapid transit construction purposes. That law is still on the books today. It's available.

GALM: Had the idea of filing a suit come out of an advisory committee or your staff?

BRADLEY: It came as a result of some staff research. We determined that there was a possibility that we might prevail in court. We had a public-interest law firm\* that was willing to file a suit for us.

GALM: Perhaps one of the major crises that you faced in that first year, or first six months, was the energy crisis. Could you describe--

BRADLEY: In the latter part of 1973, the OPEC companies, which sold oil to the United States, invoked an embargo, cut off all of our oil supply. We were getting over 50 percent of our oil from the Middle East. It resulted in a crisis not only at the gasoline pump but in terms of our

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\* John Knox was the attorney who handled the case--ed.



Department of Water and Power, which relied upon oil to operate their power plants. So the department made a recommendation that we curtail our use of energy through a device that they called rolling blackouts. Some neighborhoods or sections of the city would just be blacked out for a given number of hours a day or week, that there be a limitation on hours of operation, businesses would have to close at night. It would have been devastating to us.

So I made the decision to appoint an Ad Hoc [Citizens] Committee [on Energy Conservation], made up of representatives of the business community, labor, housewives, and governmental representatives. This committee acted very quickly and effectively and came up with some recommendations for how we could actually reduce the use of electricity. [These] ranged all the way from changing the hours of sporting events and starting earlier in the evening, thereby reducing the number of hours they'd have to use lights, requiring that businesses, office buildings in particular, turn off their lights at night, voluntary efforts on the part of homeowners, educational programs in the schools. There was a whole range of strategies that were developed. I made an appeal on radio and television. We carried on quite a campaign. As a consequence, many companies and individuals cut back their use of energy by well over one-third. Our across-the-board average got up to 17 percent.



It was the best achievement of any city in the country. As a result, we got a national award from the federal Department of Energy.

This demonstrated to me that in times of crisis, if people were called upon by a leader who had some credibility, who asked that they make a sacrifice, but that it be made equitably, that no particular segment make a bigger sacrifice than any other segment of the community, that people would respond. They did in magnificent fashion on that occasion. We today are still benefiting from the energy conservation effort that was started in 1973 and '74.

The same principle was applied when we had a shortage of water as a result of over a two-year drought situation. In 1977, we called upon people once again to make that kind of voluntary cutback. We actually enacted ordinances in both these cases but did not have to use the power of the ordinance to get compliance. People voluntarily made these reductions in the use of water and in the use of electricity.

GALM: Do you feel that the ordinance was a necessary part though of the plan?

BRADLEY: The ordinance was necessary just to assure people that we meant business, that it was not a whim, that we really had to do it, and that, if necessary, there was the power and the means to enforce that kind of compliance.

GALM: I think, as the end result, you're saying that the



citizens committee is a fine way to create support in times of crisis. Were you at all concerned that it could work fast enough to accomplish recommendations and [inaudible] a pattern of action?

BRADLEY: I was not at all concerned about that. The committee, in fact, met for such long hours on such a regular basis that, as I recall, it was within two weeks that they came up with their recommendations. It was a very effective and efficient operation.

GALM: You mentioned the type of people. What about the individuals themselves, the person you chose to head that commission?

BRADLEY: Phil [Philip M.] Hawley, who is chief executive of the Broadway department store chain, president of Carter Hawley Hale [Stores] Corporation, was one of the most effective and dynamic leaders that I've ever come across. I had known him for some time. I knew he would be good at this task. I was not sure he would be able to spare the time to do it because he's a very busy executive. But he felt it was important enough that he was willing to give the time and ran that committee with great efficiency and effectiveness.

GALM: So these aren't honorary chairmen.

BRADLEY: Not at all. Everybody has to put in their time.

GALM: You also selected Harold Williams as the energy





coordinator. Had you known Professor Williams prior to that?

BRADLEY: I had known him only by name. I did not have a close relationship with him prior to that time. We had, in fact, called upon him for advice on a number of matters, so that when we got to the point of asking him to serve, he was willing to do so.

GALM: When you went into implementation of the citizens committee recommendations, did you have any knowledge that the public didn't have as to how long this might last?

BRADLEY: No. Nobody had any idea how long it would last. We knew how severe the impact was and would be. We knew that drastic actions had to be taken.

GALM: What kind of information were you getting from Washington?

BRADLEY: We were really not relying upon Washington for any clues as to how long the thing would last. There was no good information coming from that source or anywhere else in terms of the length of the embargo.

GALM: So they were perhaps just as much in the dark as to how severe or how long this would last.

BRADLEY: That's right.

GALM: Was there any thought that it might even get worse?

BRADLEY: We operated on the premise that it was going to be worse, that it was going to last longer. I think we had to



assume the worst in our plans.

GALM: Did you take any steps as far as the gas-purchasing plan for the state, because that created its own problems?

BRADLEY: There were a number of things that we had to do in connection with the plans for limitation of gasoline-rationing ideas that were offered, the amount of gas that would be made available in the Southern California community. We went to Washington to plead the case of Los Angeles and the other communities around it. So we did get some help then, a great deal more flexibility in the federal programs than initially had been a part of the arrangements.

GALM: Did you work at all with Governor [Ronald] Reagan on that as far as a statewide energy program was concerned?

BRADLEY: No. We worked primarily through local officials.

GALM: Another real crisis in that first year or year and a half was the bus strike that occurred the following summer. That created, because of its length, real problems. Can you give me somewhat the background sketch, the background of the attitude you took on that?

BRADLEY: The bus strike in that year, for the first time that I recall, involved both unions: the operators and the mechanics. There came the time when they were attempting to make some major progress in attaining certain levels of salaries and fringe benefits. I think that Los Angeles just happened to come along at a time when we were one of the big



operators in the country and thereby offered a big target. In the early stages we tried a number of strategies that simply didn't work. As I recall, I challenged the union officials to let us take our message to the operators and the mechanics and have them express whether or not the latest offer by management was going to satisfy them. They had all kinds of reasons why that could not be done.

They finally agreed to it, and we set up a meeting in the convention center where they would come and actually cast their ballots. The union leaders said that there was no way that they could reach their membership, therefore they didn't think that they could get a ballot. We had hundreds of volunteers who came in, and over the weekend, by telephoning all of these employees of the Rapid Transit District, in fact, got them out by the thousands to this meeting. I think the one mistake we made--not so much a mistake but simply a matter that we could not persuade the union leaders to permit us to make the appeal and to simply get a secret ballot vote; they weren't going to take a chance on that-- So they not only made contacts with their members prior to the meeting but made very strong and emotional speeches to them and then controlled the actual vote. So it was a show of hands, a voice, rather than a secret ballot. So there was no chance; we simply couldn't



prevail. But at least it gave us some indication of the depth of the feelings and the seriousness of the problem.

Our next step was to take the matter to the state legislature, try to get a bill through that would require binding arbitration or some means of settling the suit. [There were] quite a number of strategies. We got a bill through one house of the legislature, and unfortunately, time ran out. We simply could not get the other house to act before the legislature adjourned, and we failed there.

So we then had to rely upon the federal and state negotiators to work with us in trying to find a common ground for settlement. Ultimately we called upon Governor Reagan. Supervisor [Kenneth] Hahn and I met with Reagan and came up with a formula that we would agree upon and made that proposal to both sides. That ultimately became the basis upon which the settlement was finally reached.

I should add that this particular situation was one of the examples of the frustrations and the difficulties that face a mayor of Los Angeles who has limited power to deal with even those matters which are under his control in the city of Los Angeles because of a strong council-weak mayor form of government. But in so many cases, and the bus strike was one of them, that was totally outside the jurisdiction of the mayor. At that point, with an eleven-member board of trustees of the Rapid Transit District, only





two of whom were appointed by the mayor, there was little leverage that the mayor has in influencing the votes of that board. But you are not permitted to sit by and do nothing. People expect that the mayor, the principal, visible political leader, is going to have to solve these problems, even though he doesn't have the authority to do so. That was one of the examples of trying to respond even in those areas that are beyond the control of the mayor.

There was an earlier incident involving a strike, actually a walkout--it was not a full-fledged strike, but it was a walkout--by a number of drivers, and I had to inject myself into that one. I was able to solve that one by meeting with the driver representatives and making some kind of commitments to them in terms of additional security and other means of solving their complaints and got them back on the buses and solved that strike before it became an extensive one. It's sometimes very difficult, very challenging.



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GALM: Mayor Bradley, we were talking about the 1974 bus strike, but you were also talking about an earlier wild-cat strike in which you did resolve the conflict that existed among the drivers. Do you think that the success of handling the earlier strike: did that mislead you in any way in the manner in which you approached the [1974 strike]?

BRADLEY: No, no. I knew that that strike in 1974 was a much more serious matter because it was a full-fledged strike sanctioned by both unions. The demands of the employees and the offer by the RTD board were so far apart that there was no way that we were going to get out of that one easily. I had not anticipated that it would take as many weeks as it did to solve it, but there's no way to know when both sides are intractable, as they were in that situation. We tried every device that we could think of that was within reason, within the realm of the possibility of feasibility. Only after these kinds of serious labor disputes run their course do you have any possibility, any hope, of solving them.

I can recall that during that strike I had scheduled a trip to Europe, and I consulted with both management and labor leaders to determine whether they felt there was



any possibility in that two-week period that they were going to come close to solving it. If so I was going to cancel that trip. They told me there was no way they were going to solve it; it was just one of those things you had to have time run its course. Ultimately both sides would be more inclined to give a little bit. So I left on the trip and stayed in daily contact by phone. It was weeks after I came back that we finally were able to solve it.

GALM: Do you feel that it was politically or psychologically still a mistake to have made the trip, because there was criticism later about having--

BRADLEY: Oh, yes. There was criticism by some even at that time, and there was criticism later on, I guess, when I ran for the next election. But that didn't concern me. I was confident that what I did was on a sound basis, and if my presence would have solved it, I wouldn't have hesitated for a moment giving up that trip. I was acting on the best advice available from both management and the labor representatives. I was pretty confident about my rationale.

GALM: But it isn't the type of information that you could have had a press release on: that this strike is going to be settled in two weeks anyway so--

BRADLEY: No. There's no way for you to convince 100 percent



of the people on an issue like that. I didn't anticipate that I could, but it didn't bother me, didn't worry me at all.

GALM: What about the Sacramento strategy? Because it came so late in the session, was there any way you could have gotten that going sooner than you had?

BRADLEY: No. We moved on that as quickly as possible. We first had to run out our options locally. Trying to get emergency legislation through Sacramento was obviously a near impossible task, but it was necessary to go through the scenario. So we had to go through all of those steps before we had to go to Sacramento and say we had given our best efforts on all of these things; they simply will not work, have not worked, and we now must call upon you. The legislative leaders up there indicated to us from the onset, it was going to be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish what we wanted. But we thought that there would be some leverage in at least trying it. If we could get the committees of both the assembly and the senate to agree on this bill, we thought that that might persuade the union or the management side that we were serious and that, if they didn't solve the problem, Sacramento was going to step in either at that time to impose a legislative solution or that they might change the law thereafter to the detriment of one side or the other. So it was a worthwhile





exercise even though it was a fruitless one in terms of concrete results, in terms of getting a bill passed.

GALM: Now, there's also a seventy-two-hour moratorium that you--

BRADLEY: Oh, I gave them seventy-two hours in which to respond and offer to agree to a solution. If they didn't, I would then take the next step, which was to go to Sacramento and seek that legislative relief.

GALM: In giving that seventy-two-hour moratorium, did you feel that you would have been successful, that it would have avoided having to go to Sacramento?

BRADLEY: It was fairly clear that it would not work. That was a matter of jawboning, trying to persuade them to act. But it was a necessary step because without that there would have been no way that we could have gotten any speedy action out of the state legislature. They'd say, "Well, you haven't exhausted your remedies locally." So it was a matter of exhausting every possible option that was available to us.

GALM: Even though some of these actions might be an embarrassment to you as mayor because in a sense you were putting your prestige on the line too, weren't you?

BRADLEY: I don't think that you can afford to be so protective of your image or your prestige that you sit back and fail to act just because you think it's going to fail. So I didn't have any concern about that. I've done that all



my life, and though momentarily it may look like there's a setback or there may have been a mistake in doing it, if I've been convinced that that's the proper course of action, I've never hesitated to take the action.

GALM: Was this the same type of action that you took in regard to the Olympics?

BRADLEY: Exactly. [laughter]

GALM: So it does seem to pay off ultimately for you.  
[tape recorder turned off]

In a Times article, an L.A. Times article, a staff writer, in reviewing your first year as mayor, one of his criticism was that it may have appeared that you were trying to pack the city council. The rationale for this was Frances Savitch's running for the Fifth District council office. Could you tell how this came about and what your role was in her campaign?

BRADLEY: In that campaign I had made a decision that I would not endorse, I would not get involved. In fact, I had talked to Fran Savitch before she made a final decision on it and even recommended against her running. I went to a convention-- As I recall, it was a National League of Cities [convention]. During my absence the decision was made that she would run, and never in the course of that campaign did she or her campaign ask for my endorsement. Never did I publicly announce endorsement or give any



public support. I think all of us had concluded that it might be counterproductive. It might give the opposition some issue that would hurt rather than help. So I was carefully avoiding any personal involvement in that campaign. Many members of my staff were involved. She was a friend of people working here, and so it was understandable that they would be involved. So there was constant speculation by the press, but not once did I ever publicly, or in any other way, inject myself into that campaign or endorse.

GALM: Why did you recommend that she not run?

BRADLEY: It was just a question of instinct. I didn't think that it was the kind of bruising campaign that she ought to get into. I knew it was going to be a tough one. She ran a lot better than I thought, did much better than I had thought she might do in the primary of that special election, and in the runoff [she] was overwhelmed by the opposition and did lose it. [She] put up a great campaign. [tape recorder turned off]

GALM: Maury Weiner did act as her campaign cochairman. Did he ask permission from you? Did he seek permission from you to accept this post?

BRADLEY: No. I have always given members of my staff the freedom and flexibility to either run for office or to support anybody they chose without regard to what side I



might be on. I've had staff members who've been supporting candidates that were running against people that I had endorsed. So in that case, Maury Weiner had the approval to do what he could in Fran's campaign, but that was true of other commissioners and staff people.

GALM: At that point what position did she hold on your staff?

BRADLEY: She was administrative coordinator.

GALM: Directly working with--

BRADLEY: She was an assistant to Maury Weiner.

GALM: Something else that entered into that campaign was a man by the name of Terence Matthews, right?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: There was a great deal of animosity there. What was the background?

BRADLEY: Terry Matthews was one of the members of the Harbor Commission that I appointed. There were a half-dozen instances in which I had asked him to either do or not do something that was an administration policy. The uniform salary issue was one of them, as I recall. Terry simply refused to take guidance from this office, and I eventually replaced him when his term came up, put another person on to take his place. He felt very bitter about that. When the campaign in the Fifth District came up, he was one of the supporters for one of the other candidates,





Zev Yaroslavsky, who eventually was elected. But his was more than just an incidental supporter role. He was very vindictive and bitter about the fact that he had been removed as a commissioner.

GALM: He also held a key role within the California Democratic party too, didn't he at that time?

BRADLEY: Not a key role. He was active in the party. He'd been a substantial contributor to a number of campaigns. So he was, you know, well connected in the Democratic party.

GALM: When you had taken office, didn't you institute an audit of the Harbor department too?

BRADLEY: No, there was no special audit. They periodically have an audit. As I recall, every ten years independent departments are required to have an audit. I think that may be the one that you have reference to.

GALM: But this was in the hundred-day report: they make a point of the fact that you initiated audits of independent city departments, such as the harbor department, for the first time.

BRADLEY: I know what you have reference to. I asked the CAO [city administrative officer] to take an independent look. The audits that are usually conducted are by outside firms. I asked our city administrative officer to take an independent look at each of those departments just for the purpose of trying to bring them into the city family. They



were acting not just as legally independent departments but almost as though they were separate and apart from the city family.

GALM: Were there any actions that you took as mayor towards his department that created any animosity upon his part?

BRADLEY: Well, as I indicated, there were about six different occasions in which he was operating contrary to the requests which had been made by my office. The only two that I recall were a difference that we had in connection with the single-salary structure for the city. I had insisted that every city department, the independents as well as council-controlled departments, should pay the same salaries for the same work. Secretaries working in the harbor or airports or Department of Water and Power were getting paid sometimes as much as two hundred dollars more per month doing the same work, and this ran throughout the entire employee organization. So, by executive direction, I tried to bring those into line. With perhaps only two exceptions, the commissioners followed those directions and instructions.

It has always been a practice of mine that the day-to-day operation or decisions of commissions should be left to them. I don't give them instructions or directions on every single issue. I don't periodically tell them, "I think you ought to vote this way or that way on a particular



issue." But if it is a matter of city policy or administration policy, I do very clearly give those kinds of guidelines and I expect them to follow them. The salary structure issue was one of them. I don't recall the others, but there was one in which a new general manager was appointed. While I did not give them directions or make any effort to influence their selection of the new manager, once that selection was made, I wanted every commissioner to fall in line and to work with that manager. Matthews was not willing to do that. He continued to carp at the decision of the other members and at the selection. So it made it difficult for that commission to work harmoniously. Ultimately it resulted in his removal.

GALM: Did the fact that he lent such strong support to her [Savitch's] opponent and, then, the fact that he [Yaroslavsky] eventually became a city council member cause any problems in your relationship with that city council-person?

BRADLEY: No, no. We have had a number of issues on which we have differed, but I don't know that that's a matter of difference on the basis of the fact that Matthews was involved in this campaign or that Fran ran against him. There was some speculation about that in the early stages, but we have worked together fairly well in the last two years or more. So I don't think, even if there might have



been that kind of vestige of doubt or suspicion or reluctance to work cooperatively, I don't think that exists anymore.

GALM: There is also comment in the newspapers about Maury Weiner's and William Norris's involvement in the Art Snyder state senate race of that year. Is this another example where they were given freedom to act, to take their own political action, whatever direction that might take?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes. That has been true, I think, of other cases: Mas [Masamori] Kojima, who endorsed and supported George Takei, who was running for the Tenth District in the city council race when I was supporting David Cunningham, another example. My staff has always had that flexibility. In the case of Snyder, both Maury Weiner and Bill Norris and others saw that as an opportunity to help make possible the election of a Mexican-American to the city council. If Snyder were elevated to the state senate, that would open up that race. Roughly 60 percent of the community was Mexican-American, yet they didn't have a single representative of the Mexican-American community serving on the council. So that was their motivation.

GALM: As mayor of a large metropolitan city, are you unique in this freedom that you do give to your staff as far as political activities?

BRADLEY: I think so. I think so. Most people think that





that's a rather unusual policy. I've been criticized by some who disagree with that approach. But yes. Once again, I feel that it's right, so--

GALM: What are the benefits? Is it just that it creates better feeling among the staff of being a free staff?

BRADLEY: It's just my commitment to the principle of freedom of speech and democracy. [laughter]

GALM: Something else that you initiated in 1974 was the Office of Small Business Assistance. How did that come about? Do you recall?

BRADLEY: Yes. There was an obvious need for city assistance in terms of assistance, guidance, resources to help small-business people in the city to deal with the city in getting contracts. There are millions of dollars handed out every year to companies or individuals who contract, do business with the city. But the small-business people don't have the expertise to either bid or successfully compete for those contracts. Creating an office where that kind of assistance would be made available, I thought was important. I went to the federal government and got them to agree to finance the creation of that staff and office. They have funded it since then.

GALM: Another area that you evidently got some federal money was in the area of housing projects. About that same time, there was a housing project in Watts, the Rodia



Homes, that were built. Was this, again, a case of looking or going to Washington to secure the funding?

BRADLEY: Yes. In the case of the Simon Rodia Homes, there had been a number of hang-ups: the developers having difficulty getting financing, having obstacles of one kind or another thrown in their paths, not being able to complete the planning and implementation of the housing program in the Watts community. So I intervened, got some help from Washington, and we got those first sixty-odd homes built. It was the first such construction since 1965. So it was a major breakthrough in the Watts community. Since then we've been able to develop, as I recall, some six different housing projects there along the whole stretch of the Watts community running from Central Avenue over to Wilmington.

GALM: Have there been other areas of the city that you've been able to also initiate the programs, or did you see this as an area which required special interest or focus?

BRADLEY: There've been a number of such programs, a number of such cases in which special effort was necessary. The Pico-Union area was one case in point. The harbor area where the Beacon Street redevelopment project had serious difficulties and had been dragging for years: I had to make some special efforts there. So wherever we've had a program that needed a boost from Washington, I've been eager



to go out and get it.

The more recent examples are the produce market, where for thirty years we've been talking about it, and finally, with my efforts, we were able to get two grants, one for \$8 million and the other for over \$3 million, a total of almost \$12 million, that served as leverage to get another \$40 million in private financing. As a consequence, now we're going to rebuild the entire wholesale produce market. It'll be the largest such complex in the world. We kept that business in the city, and it saved some sixty-five hundred jobs.

The same thing was true with our wholesale flower market. They were literally falling down over there, at Seventh and Wall. I was able to get \$3 million in an economic development administration grant for that project. Recently, I got a \$4.7 million housing development grant to build a jewelry mart at Sixth and Hill Street to save that industry for downtown Los Angeles; it was threatening to move outside. We recently had a proposal on Spring Street to revitalize that area, and some developers came along who had an option to buy three buildings and needed some help. I was successful in getting some help for them to not only purchase the buildings but to revitalize them.



TAPE NUMBER: VI, SIDE TWO

APRIL 13, 1979

GALM: Mayor Bradley, last time, which was back in October, we were discussing issues and events that had come up during the years 1974 and 1975. The last thing that we had discussed at that time was such things as Proposition A, which was the rapid transit resolution that had come up in the November 1974 election. Then moving into 1975-- There was something else that I wanted to bring up, in 1974, in August, that was having to do with the offshore oil leases. This was something that had come to [federal] attention. There was a federal interest in this.

BRADLEY: There was a proposal for a very extensive issuance of leases to drill offshore and very close to the Los Angeles and San Pedro and Long Beach coastline. A number of locally elected officials were concerned about that issue for a variety of reasons. I was one of the leaders in the effort to protest, to try to prevent the arbitrary and, we thought, capricious issuance of these leases without very sound and careful preparation for it. Not only were we concerned about the extent of the leases but the fact that there was no real opportunity for local input and that there was no protection for the taxpayers or the citizens at large. It was a very lucrative arrangement for the oil companies with no benefits, no protection, no





guarantees for the general public. There was inadequate protection against the possibility of blowouts or damage to the environment should there be some accident or oil spill.

We finally were able to get the Department of the Interior to send a number of high-ranking officials out to the Los Angeles area to conduct hearings, and we were able to offer some input. Despite all of our efforts, we thought that the hearings were rather perfunctory and were really not intended to respond to our concerns, because as soon as the hearings were over, they practically proceeded with their original plan for the issuance of these leases.

We were able to get the Congress interested to try to set up some long-term guidelines that would apply nationwide whenever there was oil drilling: one, to determine the need for this oil resource; secondly, to provide some protective measure to protect the environment; and, thirdly, to set up some guidelines that would guarantee reasonable monetary benefit to the government.

Here we are in 1979, and much of our efforts have borne fruit because those leases were stopped. We were able to get the succeeding administration to set up certain of these protective measures, and the extent of the leases has been drastically reduced. They have now decided to proceed with the issuance of leases, but under much more stringent terms and much better protective provisions as



far as the people are concerned.

GALM: So after those meetings, what were your immediate actions to try to slow down the movement? Was it to go to Congress or to seek support of Congress?

BRADLEY: Our first administrative relief that we sought was to get the Department of the Interior to respond. Having failed in that effort, we then got the Congress involved, and we received some help there. Thirdly, there was a lawsuit that was developed in connection with the case. So we went at it in a variety of ways.

GALM: Was there any attempt, or did you have to treat it just as a local situation? Was there any attempt to get support from other coastal areas in the United States that might be facing the same type--

BRADLEY: Coastal communities from Ventura all the way to San Diego were involved. We had tremendous response and involvement by cities both on the coast and inland because they were all concerned about the threat to the cities which did border the Pacific Ocean.

GALM: Did this type of activity and, then, perhaps the earlier activity in trying to stop oil drilling in Pacific Palisades [give you] sort of an antioil image among the oil corporations?

BRADLEY: Yes, I would say that is true. I don't think it created any great animosity. There was simply a sharp



difference in the approach and the position of myself and members of the oil industry. I don't believe that any of them reacted bitterly to it; they simply disagreed with me. I think the title of being antioil was something that was attached to my name. In large measure, I think that it was not simply a blind opposition to large oil companies, but it was simply a matter of being opposed to the particular issues that were involved, whether it was the drilling in the Pacific Palisades or the offshore oil drilling. We tried to make it very clear: we were not opposed to the concept or the principle of drilling offshore. We simply wanted some protection for our communities and for the people of this country.

GALM: Well, at the time of the energy crisis or at the time when you have to focus in on energy problems, does this stance cause you problems in dealing with--say, when you want to get the cooperation of oil companies?

BRADLEY: No, I have never had any difficulty in working with the oil companies.

GALM: They have also on occasion served in capacities, haven't they?

BRADLEY: That's right, that's right. I think it was a matter of respecting the fact that we differed on a given issue. But there was no personal issue involved; it was not a matter of being blindly opposed to the oil interests.



GALM: Then in March of 1975 there was a design grant awarded for a people-mover, for a transit system in the L.A. International Airport area. How did that develop?

BRADLEY: That issue has pretty much been placed on the shelf at this point. It was going to be a very expensive project, and we've not been able to line up sufficient money to carry out the concept. There is a plan afoot, even at this point, of providing some additional transportation access to the international airport. But that particular people-mover concept is not yet something which has reached the point of design or even preliminary engineering.

GALM: Was the idea of a people-mover: did that have great appeal to you at that time? What was your feeling about that?

BRADLEY: Oh, I think that's going to be essential at some point to provide convenient and very quick access to the airport from peripheral parking lots because we simply won't be able to accommodate surface transportation by automobile into the airport area.

GALM: But then this concept was also applied to a people-mover in the downtown area too, wasn't it?

BRADLEY: No, that was a different proposal. The people-mover system for downtown Los Angeles was a concept that was developed by the Department of Transportation in





Washington. They wanted to try the idea in four cities in the country where there was heavy congestion in the heart of the city. They opened up the bidding to cities all over the country. Los Angeles was selected as one of four cities in the country that would be funded, over 85 percent of the funds to come from the Department of Transportation. We are ahead of the other cities in terms of our planning. We're right on schedule, and it is anticipated that within the next several weeks or months we will have full funding for that project.

GALM: So the other one, the airport one, was really a city council enterprise, and this other more federal.

BRADLEY: The one at the airport was going to be financed by the airport out of their revenues and through their bonding capacity.

GALM: Then, in that July, you made a progress report to the city council. Was that a standard practice for all the mayors? Had they always made a--this would have been mid-term in your--

BRADLEY: No. To my knowledge, it had never been done before. But I had promised, when I was first elected, that I would report regularly to the council, that I would come to the council from time to time with proposals or projects of interest or to report on matters that we were involved in on a mutual basis. This particular report was



the first of what would be a series of reports to the council.

GALM: Do they continue on a set schedule?

BRADLEY: No. At one point, I had hoped to do this annually and tried to fix a target date for it. It hasn't worked out that way; there's been a slippage. Sometimes it's more than a year that passes before I am able to get back to the council with such a report. But I think it's important to report from time on that kind of effort.

GALM: So you have that type of report which would be directed to the city council, and whatever you might mention would be proliferated through the media. Is the inaugural address-- Is that your main instrument of speaking to the city public?

BRADLEY: No. There are a variety of areas in which you report people. The report, about which we have just talked, was directed formally to the city council; but informally and indirectly, it was directed to all of the people in the city. It was carried by the media. The message was designed for the public at large as much as it was the city council. From time to time, through formal press conferences or reports or newsletters, you have an opportunity; and that's the means that I've used to carry on a continuing communication with the public at large.

GALM: But there's no state of the city speech done on an annual basis?



BRADLEY: No, no. This report to the council is along the lines of a state of the city report.

GALM: Some of the things that were brought up in that '75 report: you addressed yourself to the troubled economy of the time. I'm sure that that has-- It's just a different type of troubled economy that we have today?

BRADLEY: Yes. We're still suffering from very high inflation, and it remains one of the nagging problems facing the American people. At the time of that report, as I recall, we were faced with double-digit inflation, and at the same time double-digit unemployment. So it was doubly aggravated.

GALM: You spoke about the absence of racial unrest and the serious signs of tension or conflict. Do you think that that still stands?

BRADLEY: Yes, I think so.

GALM: I know that in recent days the black community is concerned about police action or police relationships in the community. There was even some question that, perhaps upon the chief of police's part, that this isn't a real problem. How would you respond to that?

BRADLEY: The complaints about police misconduct is something which is perennial. As long as I can remember we've had such complaints. There are times when they escalate, as they have recently with a number of incidents in which



police officers have been involved in the use of their guns. The shooting and killing of a woman by the name of Eulia Love has dramatized this issue all over again. It was out of that context that a group of ministers came to the city council committee to protest the activities of the police department. The chief of police [Daryl Gates], who was sitting in the room and was the target of much of this criticism, later, in responding to the press, said, that he disagreed with those ministers, that he felt that they didn't represent the black community. On that issue, I disagreed with him and told him so. In response to the inquiries of the press, I likewise indicated to them that I thought that those ministers did, in fact, represent the voice of the community, not that this was a unanimous view of the community, but it certainly represented a substantial proportion of the community; and that it was important that we deal with that issue, because I think we failed to do so in 1965.

I, along with some other people, raised that very issue in January of '65. The chief of police [William Parker] then said, "Well, there's no problem. Whatever unrest there might be, the police department's capable of handling it." And in August of 1965, the Watts riots erupted. It was obvious that the police department, first of all, didn't have a feel for what was going on and certainly





was ill equipped to handle the situation. I would not like to see that happen again. It is for that reason that I raised the issue and have on occasions when I felt that there was some unrest developing and I thought we ought to deal with it.

GALM: Have there been moves to perhaps at least examine if there is a legitimate criticism of police activity?

BRADLEY: Yes. The police commission has, in fact, made some changes in the shooting policy, has reduced the number of deaths involving police officers using their guns. They have now involved the district attorney in the investigation of every case in which someone meets his death by a law enforcement officer. So I think that these things are beneficial, and I think that they help to establish the truth or falsity of claims and remove certain doubts that might exist on the part of the public. So I think much has been done; the attitude of the department at large, I think, has changed considerably since 1965. That doesn't mean that things are perfect and nothing more needs to be done. That's the point I've tried to make over and over again: we've still got a long way to go in improving performance.

GALM: Is there a change that has taken place in the individual officers? Or is his sense of--that in a situation like that he responds so quickly to violence to, you know,



cause a shooting incident? Has a change occurred?

BRADLEY: That change comes about largely through training and through supervision and through the policies set down by the chief of police and the police commission. So I think there has been a change in performance based upon these three major elements.

GALM: Are you able to affect changes in those as far as the chief of police is concerned?

BRADLEY: Yes. I work either directly with the chief or through the police commission, which I appoint.

GALM: Did the fact that this was sort of brought up in the media, both the criticism perhaps of the ministers, and so forth, and then your defense of them: has that caused problems in your relationship with the chief?

BRADLEY: Not at all, not at all.

GALM: Is it somehow expected that there might be friction at times among city officials?

BRADLEY: Well, I think sometimes the media tries to develop a conflict between the mayor and other city officials or employees. I don't deal with matters where there are differences in that fashion. I work them out in private, behind-the-scenes discussions, and don't engage in that kind of public dispute or debate with either the chief of police or anybody else.

GALM: Is there a certain procedure or policy that you take



when a situation like this occurs? Do you try to diffuse it immediately? Has there been some sort of a way that you have developed of dealing with this before it will get out of hand?

BRADLEY: It's a matter of dealing with each incident or each major problem on an individual basis. You can't have a hard and fast policy that's going to apply to everything. So as these things come up or as you anticipate them, you try to react based upon those facts and those circumstances.

GALM: In December of 1975, you participated in the Pacem in Terris [IV] conference in Washington D.C. Could you sort of detail how you came to be invited to participate in that conference?

BRADLEY: As with so many conferences, I was invited to attend and to speak, and I accepted. This is just one of literally hundreds of examples where people asked for my involvement based upon my availability, the amount of time I can spare. I try to respond if it's an area in which I have an interest or may have something of importance to offer.

GALM: Did you consider that this was an important conference? I've read the speech that was prepared for it. Now, was this something that you prepared yourself, or was this something that would have been more prepared by staff?

BRADLEY: It was something that my staff and I jointly



prepared. We sat and talked about it, developed the outline for it. Various persons would offer input, and the final draft was prepared. I reviewed it.

GALM: It just seemed that it sort of touched on things of such a broader nature than perhaps other speeches and involvements that you've had in that you're talking about-- like you had put forward the idea of, perhaps, a Marshall Plan for the cities.

BRADLEY: Well, that was a repeat of a proposal which I had made in a number of speeches dating back as far as 1967, when I was still on the city council.

GALM: Had you actually referred to it as a Marshall Plan?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: So that was just the first time you had taken it sort of nationally or internationally?

BRADLEY: I had used that in speeches that had a national cross section audience. I think this particular speech probably got more national media attention than some of the other speeches.

GALM: Are we making any progress in this area of urban recovery of cities?

BRADLEY: We've made some progress. For the first time in the history of this country there has been an announcement by the president of a national urban policy. We have been pleading for this kind of policy for years. And for the





first time, last year, President Carter actually announced his national urban policy. Much of that is in line with these very things that I had raised in connection with that speech and the other statements dealing with the Marshall Plan.

GALM: I've taken some notes from that speech, and I've written them down. One of them was, you sort of had a shopping list, about a five-point shopping list, of things that you had hoped for. Maybe that would sort of refresh your memories too, some of the main points that you were making in that particular speech. I suppose they're not anything new.

BRADLEY: They're really not. They're things that have been said by me and by others on a number of occasions. Certainly at that time there was a critical need for a national policy of full employment. The Humphrey-Hawkins bill was later introduced, and last year it finally was passed by the Congress. So full employment is not a new concept, but we've finally committed ourselves as a nation to that principle.

New methods of controlling crime and administering justice is not a new idea. It's something that has demanded, cried out for our attention. Though we've spent a lot of money in the so-called Safe Streets Act, we really haven't done a very good job of effectively dealing with that



problem of crime. I think that part of the problem lies in the fact that very often it's approached in a tunnel-visioned manner instead of realizing that the entire justice system must be involved in, must work in cooperation in attacking the problem, from the arresting officers to prosecutors to the judges in the courts and the probation officers and the parole authorities. All of that side of the justice system has to work together in a coordinated element.

We can't divorce from that whole process the need for a good, sound education program and a full-employment program, because if a person is poorly educated, if he's a dropout or a "pushout" of school, there's little that that person can do to gain an employment opportunity to support himself or his family. There is a much greater likelihood that the person will turn to crime. I think that unless there is a job opportunity, you, again, force people into stealing to survive, to support themselves. So all of these elements have to be brought together. We haven't done a very good job of it.

GALM: There's even an increase in unemployment among young blacks. It's up to--what now?--37 percent.

BRADLEY: Yes, it's close to 40 percent among minority youths, black and Mexican-American, sixteen to twenty-four [years of age].



GALM: Are you optimistic in any way of lowering that?

BRADLEY: I am not very optimistic about it. I think it's traceable to failure in the educational system. We've not reached these youngsters in school. Either they're dropouts, or even when they're pushed along to graduation from high school, there are far too many cases where they can't compete in the job market. They don't have the skills, can't read instructions, can't hope to get a job or to hold one. So we've simply got to do a better job in that area. And providing job opportunities is the other critical element.

GALM: There have been some comments that the gulf, or the spread, between the haves and the have-nots is increasing. Would you agree with that?

BRADLEY: I suppose that there are statistics that tend to indicate that this is happening.

GALM: Is it something that you sense in your contact with people in the city?

BRADLEY: I would say it's more by observation than it is someone reporting it.

GALM: In that [speech]--I had made some points, down there-- I picked up at the bottom what was sort of your credo, or what you believed in: I wonder if there are elements in there that you think are sort of unique to yourself than to perhaps some other city officials, government officials.



BRADLEY: I think we have a responsibility to speak and act honestly and openly with people. I think we have a responsibility, when we have failed, to say so. I think that part of our problem at this point in the history of our country is a loss of confidence of the public in their elected leadership. And it doesn't stop there, because I think it then moves it beyond to apply to various professions and business leaders. Ultimately, when that runs its full course, people lose confidence in themselves. I think that's very threatening to the concept of our whole system of government.

So I have been concerned about how you create that climate of confidence and faith, how you restore it in the wake of serious problems that have developed, especially highlighted by Watergate and the events that have followed it, where some public officials have, in fact, abused their authority and their offices. The public, hearing and seeing this kind of publicity, not only lose faith in those particular individuals, but they then include all, literally all of the elected leaders in this process.

GALM: You had used the phrase there, "a dialectic democracy." Was this a phrase that you had coined?

BRADLEY: No. Again, it was not a new phrase, not something that was original: a number of people have used the term.





GALM: You had mentioned--and this is bringing us more to the present--[re] the recent primary election, you'd expressed a concern at the poor turnout there. Would that relate to this?

BRADLEY: Yes, I think so. The apathy on the part of the electorate is something which has always been a problem. We have never had the kind of turnout at the polls that some countries have achieved. More recently it was dramatized by the fact that less than 15 percent of the people in a citywide election even bothered to go to the polls and vote. I think it's in part attributable to an apathy on the part of the people, in part the fact that in that particular election, there was no major officeholder, no major office being contested for, and there were no burning issues of a citywide basis that were involved in the election. But I think that we cannot escape the fact that there is just a sense that a person's vote really doesn't matter, doesn't count, so why bother to go and vote. That, I think, is the thing that I trace to some of the negative things that are coming out of the press. The press isn't solely responsible; I think all of these things have to be taken into account. I think that when there is a distortion of the facts by the media focusing or reporting almost exclusively the negative things that happen, as far as officeholders are concerned, you're bound to get that



kind of aggravation of the whole erosion of public confidence. And that's what I was referring to. Once again, it isn't something that's said for the first time. I've been saying this for several years now.

GALM: But it seems to be a trend that is on the increase rather than on the decrease.

BRADLEY: That's true.

GALM: I think at one point it seemed like, well, with Watergate behind us, that it would be just a matter of time, and that feeling, the feeling of confidence, would be restored to the people. But do you really feel that we're any closer now than we were?

BRADLEY: It's a personal reaction: I don't think we are any closer.

GALM: We'd had an interview scheduled last fall, right after the election, and I wanted to talk to you about it then while it was still fresh, but perhaps we could still talk about it today, and that was your reaction to the November [1978] election, because the November election saw a lot of black candidates defeated in election. Do you have any thoughts about that, perhaps individual thoughts?

BRADLEY: Well, I assume you're talking about the California election?

GALM: California and also nationally, of course.

BRADLEY: Well, in California, the lieutenant governor



[Mervyn Dymally] was defeated, and Yvonne Burke, who was running for attorney general, lost her election. In the case of lieutenant governor, I think that there was an accumulation of negative stories that were plaguing him for a number of years. I think that was a principal factor in his loss, and an attractive candidate [Mike Curb] running against him who had a great deal of money to spend. So I think that not so much a matter of race made the difference in that campaign.

In the case of the race for attorney general, there was no mention of race, as I can recall, by [George] Deukmejian or his followers. So race was not a principal issue in that campaign. People were aware of Yvonne's racial background, but, again, I don't think that it was a matter where people tried to make some political capital out of the fact that she was black. In the primary, I think she did an excellent job of demonstrating her strength in the field of fighting crime. I think in the runoff election, as we look back on it now, that was a failure. While she covered all of the issues that were the responsibility of the attorney general, fighting crime was very low in that whole scheme of things. She was trying to be candid and honest about it. The public at large still perceives that office as being a law enforcement office and one which deals primarily with crime. You can't ignore



that fact. I think that not enough was done to zero in on what really was on the minds of people, and that was crime. So, again, in that case, I don't think it was a matter of race that really made the difference. Had she preempted the field in the runoff, as she did in the primary, by coming out hard on the question of crime--or "law and order" as it is often phrased--I think she might have done much better.

I'm not suggesting that some people, in the confines of the voting booth, were not motivated by the racial differences. That's always a possibility. But it was not a public kind of thing as it has been on so many occasions when elections are held.

The same thing, I think, was true in Massachusetts where Ed Brooke, the senator, was running and lost. Here was a man running in a predominantly Democratic state, had won consistently. But in this particular election, he had a number of things go against him publicly: the divorce issue, the charges of misconduct with regard to his testimony, and claims made in connection with the divorce case I think hurt him very badly. He simply didn't recover from them.

GALM: In the case of Dymally and the case of Brooke and the case of the congressman from Michigan, [Charles C.] Diggs, [Jr.], do you feel that there is greater focus on





these people because they're black officials, or do you feel that it's just an interest in the media in anyone [where] there might be a question of misconduct?

BRADLEY: Well, in the case of Charles Diggs, I think that the allegations and the ultimate conviction in court focused on misconduct, abuse of office. I think the evidence was overwhelming. There was no difference there than the case of the congressmen from Louisiana or Pennsylvania in terms of their being prosecuted. In his case, he was unfortunate enough to be convicted. In the other two cases: one there was a hung jury, and in the other, finding him innocent. But I don't think that either of those cases could be attributed to race.

I don't think the defeat, or the failure to achieve election, in a few cases around the country represents any change in a trend, that I think is a very healthy development, of more blacks being elected to various offices. From 1965 until that election in 1978, the number of blacks who hold public office in the country has risen from about five hundred to well over four thousand, and these represent offices of every kind at every level of government.

GALM: So maybe we just have to expect to see some old faces leave the scene and some new faces come on.

BRADLEY: I think the trend has been set where blacks more and more are being elected on the basis of their



competence and their qualifications. The irrelevant issue of race is becoming less important in elections. Despite the fact that they are black, they are being elected, and continue to be elected in very large numbers.



TAPE NUMBER: VII, SIDE ONE

APRIL 13, 1979

GALM: Mayor Bradley, we're now into 1976. [tape recorder turned off]

One of the other elements centered around a report on affirmative action to the city council; that took place in February of 1976. Could you talk about the Task Force on Affirmative Action that you had established earlier? That would have been in April 1975.

BRADLEY: Let me go back a bit beyond that, because the first executive order which I issued upon taking office in 1973 was one outlining the city's program and policies with regard to affirmative action. Following that, a number of things have taken place, and we have now put into ordinance form the official policy of the department with regard to affirmative action. Essentially, in working out the policy of employment and of contractual arrangement with people who do business with the city of Los Angeles, it was important to set some concepts into place that would not only be something which was a policy in form but something which had meaning and substance and would be followed and would be supported willingly by the public at large, because there was a great deal of concern at that time about quotas as opposed to goals. We wanted to make it very clear that what we were driving at was moving



toward effective implementation of the concept of equality of opportunity in employment and contractual arrangements. Setting down goals and timetables, I thought, was important. I thought that if you set these kinds of targets and move aggressively to try to achieve them, that would be much more productive than setting a hard and fast quota that first of all would antagonize and set off resistance by many people, but might be difficult of achievement in the second place.

So we brought together a group of people to try to reach consensus about what kind of goals, what kind of targets we should propose and adopt. So in both these areas, this was the approach which was taken. In one case, we brought in a large number of people who represented various organizations, who had an interest in the field of affirmative action but also had some very strong feelings about quotas. Once they realized we were talking about goals and timetables, they worked with us in developing the structure for our city ordinances.

GALM: Have most of those timetables been attained now, or do you still have ongoing--

BRADLEY: Oh, they're ongoing. For example, with regard to contractual arrangements, we set up some guidelines that we applied as far as the city is concerned. We required anybody who does business with the city to





agree to a similar kind of affirmative-action program and to sign a contract agreeing to these principles. Essentially, it was attempting to reach the proportion of women and minorities in their companies as would be found in the general employment market.

I guess the best example of the struggle that we've gone through and the success which we have achieved is that we had a controversy with General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler automobile makers, who refused to sign an affirmative-action agreement with the city because they said that we were demanding too much, that our demands were more stringent than the federal government. We said, "We will not buy your automobiles." The chief of police said he had a critical need for emergency vehicles and went to the city council to ask them to adopt a resolution of urgency that would permit us to override the ordinance and to buy the automobiles anyway. The catch in the whole thing was that the charter requires that the mayor must concur in such a resolution. So despite the fact that it was adopted by the council after months of unsuccessful negotiation with these companies, I immediately called the chairman of the board of each of these companies and told them that I would not sign or concur in the resolution, that I felt our ordinance was fair, and I thought it was something that they could live with just as thousands of other companies had already



agreed to do. [I] asked them if they would send their representatives out, and let's sit down and negotiate it. The first of these was General Motors, and they sent representatives out. Within a matter of two hours we settled the issue. I think it was a matter of them knowing that we were not going to nullify the very ordinance that we had worked so painstakingly to put into effect by approving that resolution.

Once that was done, I then called Chrysler, and they sent representatives out. In less than two hours we settled that one. The Ford people didn't even have to be called. They had heard what happened in the other two cases, and they quickly sent their negotiators out, and the matter was quickly wrapped up.

I think it set a principle that if we could take on the biggest corporations in the country on affirmative action and win and preserve our ordinances, they were going to be secure against any attack by any other companies. We later had similar attack by the [Eastman] Kodak Company, and once again, we won by persevering on the very principles that I just enunciated. That was, I think, the major breakthrough. It was important not only to Los Angeles but to other cities that had similar kinds of affirmative-action ordinances. As a consequence, now every company willingly and quickly agrees to this approach. I



think that as we follow up on them, we find that they are acting in good faith and attempting to reach their goals that they have established.

As far as the affirmative-action program in our hiring policies here in this city, we have an internal committee that continues to work on and to monitor our progress on affirmative-action hiring goals. We require each department to submit its plan of action and then to monitor itself, and our task force monitors them to see what progress they're making. Now, again, we are not satisfied with what we've done. We think we've still got a long way to go. But at least we're on our way. We've adopted this approach.

I would say that there is some concern that many of us share, because with the passage of Proposition 13, instead of continuing our hiring programs, we've had to freeze hiring and cut back on the number of employees. As they leave the job through attrition, we've lost almost three thousand job slots in the last year. So that's going to be a matter of some concern to us because it's going to be more difficult to maintain the momentum which we had generated in pushing through our affirmative-action programs. But it's something that I would say the city is committed to, firmly committed to, and I think that it will continue to move forward in this field.



GALM: Something else that might be tied into this, certainly in the area of bringing people into employment within the city government, and that was the CETA [Comprehensive Employment and Training Act] employees. They first came into the city government when the act was first established and allowed for it?

BRADLEY: Yes. I don't remember the date when that program was first adopted by the Congress, but it did come at a time when there was double-digit unemployment all over the country. There was a need for a priming of the pump, a creation of jobs by the governmental agencies, and that was done through this federal Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, adopted by the Congress. We hired thousands of people to work for the city of Los Angeles. We were also the prime sponsor and had subcontractors in public agencies and private nonprofit agencies where we also allocated, I suppose, two-thirds of the job slots made available to us. People went to work under these programs. They were doing and are doing useful work. In many cases, they've made a transition from this federally funded program into full-term, city-funded or governmentally funded programs. In some cases, they've found jobs in the private sector.

The program has come under some criticism in various parts of the country and indeed by the Congress because





there have been examples of certain abuses. Locally, there was some criticism which was reported in the media--and I think unfairly so--because a number of employees, almost two hundred, were employed in the council offices, and it was determined in December or January, I guess, 1978, that the federal regulations prohibited the employment of these people in these positions. The fact is that two years earlier, we had negotiated with the Department of Labor, and they had concurred in every one of those people being appropriately employed in the council offices. In December of 1978 new regulations were put into effect. Without our knowledge, they did, in fact, prohibit the employment of any CETA employee in the local-elected officeholders' staffs. So it was clear at that point that those people were illegally employed. In order to avoid a drastic impact in the firing of a couple of hundred people, the Department of Labor gave us an extension of time to make a transition; they gave us until April 1. So they've all been transitioned now, and they are in other departments where they can appropriately be hired.

I would say that in this city, there has been no significant abuse as has occurred in some cities. Certainly those examples which, again, I think by the unfortunate circumstance that after the regulations went into effect, no one notified our local offices that these regulations



were now in effect and that the people could no longer be hired, people got the impression that there was some abuse there, but I would have to say no, that was not so. To my knowledge, they have not found any actual abuse of the employment authority. People are doing effective jobs, necessary jobs. Though it's possible, I'm not aware that any of this was patronage kind of thing. Most of the people that I know of weren't even known by their employers, the council or the city attorney or my office, prior to the time they were hired. They were just people in need, identified through the regular job applications, and placed into positions to perform certain functions.

GALM: Do you feel that the media had thought that there was perhaps a larger case of irregularity here or of abuse than what actually existed?

BRADLEY: Oh, yes, yes. In some cases I think they, either without sufficient knowledge, reported it as such and made it look as though there was, in fact, a large-scale abuse when the facts simply would not support that contention at all. I think that arose partly because in one office there was an allegation by one of the employees that there was something improper being done. The council representative had in fact hired more CETA employees than he had regularly city-funded positions. He was attempting to save the city money, but he got caught up in the public reporting on that incident.



GALM: But here, again, seems to be a case where, you know, what will the public remember? Will they remember that nothing really came of the charges, or will they remember that the charges were made?

BRADLEY: Most of the public is going to remember that there was some allegation of abuse and improper hiring. They're never going to either get or understand the actual facts which later come out. This is unfortunate. Again, I think that this is one of the things about which I raise some question about the reporting by the media. With a little bit more effort, all of the facts, a balanced story could have come out in the first place. But it's a lot easier to take bits and pieces and to weave that together into a dramatic story. It's certainly a lot easier to attack an easy target, a public official, than it is to praise one. It's a lot easier to report a story, one sided as it may be, than it is to dig to take the time to get all of the facts and to present all sides of the story.

GALM: Do you feel that in any of the events that you've been part of there is a real almost urgency upon the media people to create a new angle on this--in other words, for the five o'clock news, and they have to have a new angle on it for the eleven o'clock. Does this in itself sort of fabricate--

BRADLEY: I think that with the disclosures that came out



of Watergate, great publicity that came to newsmen who developed that story, that it became almost a fad with some members of the media. This certainly doesn't apply to all--I would say perhaps not even to a large number--but some members of the media try to follow that same kind of slashing, so-called investigative-style reporting without really investigating. There was a temptation to hype the negative. This is the thing that gets the ink; this is the thing that gets the public's attention on radio or television. So I think that there was an inducement to use this kind of technique and to build a story. What a few members of the media may do in this regard, I think, does unfairly set a picture that we sometimes may over-react to and may attribute it to a larger number of the media than deserve to be included. But it is a fact, and I think that the media has a responsibility to recognize this as much as anybody else.

GALM: There were just a couple of other items in 1975 that you might want to comment on. One was that there was a Mayor's Task Force on Redlining.

BRADLEY: I think Los Angeles was ahead of most governmental agencies in the country in getting the financial institutions to join with us in city government to develop a voluntary program to fight redlining. This was done without criticizing, without digging up history. We were simply





interested in the issue and how we could fight it. We got great support from the banks and savings and loan institutions in Los Angeles, and they worked with us in developing this concept. Since that time, by regulation, either the federal regulatory agencies or at the state level, and now by a state law, redlining has been forbidden by regulation and by legislative act in a number of places. I think we were fortunate in being able to get the support and the cooperation of representatives, key representatives, in the lending institutions in Los Angeles.

GALM: Also in the fall of 1975, there was a visit to Los Angeles by the emperor [Hirohito] and empress [Nagako] of Japan. Could you perhaps speak about that particular visit and then perhaps speak in general about the visit of dignitaries and how this might have an effect on the city?

BRADLEY: The emperor and empress of Japan have great symbolic importance not only to the people of Japan but to the people of Japanese ancestry who live here in our community and in our country. When they made a decision to visit Los Angeles, it was important to receive them well, to accord them the kind of Los Angeles hospitality for which we've become known. We're really one of the principal places where foreign dignitaries either wish to stop or are directed to visit when they come to this country. With the Japanese population in our city, this was a natural place



for the emperor and empress to come. They had a great welcome, and they were well received. I continually received reports from people who were here at the time, who have gone back to Japan, remembering the highlights of that visit and the reception which was accorded to them.

The president, the White House, the State Department regularly call upon us to entertain foreign dignitaries when they come to our country. When they go beyond Washington, D.C., they most often will come to Los Angeles as a part of that tour in our country. The private sector as well as the governmental agencies and representatives have been very helpful in creating a spirit of hospitality that identifies this city as one of the premier cities in the country for foreign visitors.

It also helps in creating a climate for trade relations between our communities. The whole of Southern California, I think, benefits by that. We have now become the gateway to the Pacific nations. Trade has increased tremendously over the last few years.

GALM: Are there any cases of dignitaries that you welcomed here and then you were in turn invited to and actually did go to their country?

BRADLEY: Yes. I would say that in practically every case where the foreign visitor, high-placed public official, has come to this city, they have extended an invitation,



informally at first and then formally at a later time, for me to visit their countries. I have gone to a number of places: Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand. I was the guest of the New Zealand people as a John F. Kennedy Fellow in 1978. I spent ten days there speaking and visiting with people. I've been invited to Africa. Three presidents who visited Los Angeles--the president of the Ivory Coast, of Zambia, and Tanzania--invited me to come there, and this past January I was fortunate enough to be able to return their visit, and I was very warmly received. I've been invited to Denmark, to Sweden, to France, and England and Germany. I've been able to return a number of those visits. I went to Mexico.

GALM: Among these visits, are there any specific accomplishments that you can point to as a result of the visit or as a result of their visit here?

BRADLEY: Well, the increase in trade is evident. The port of Los Angeles is the number one port of the whole Pacific Coast in terms of gross tonnage, in terms of gross revenue and net revenue. We have the number one port in the whole Pacific Coast. The entire region has multibillion-dollar economic impact as a result of the trade relations between these countries and the Southern California community. We as a community represent, in terms of gross national product, probably the tenth-largest trading region



in the whole world. If we were a nation, we would be the tenth in size in terms of our total trade activities. So these are the kinds of specifics that one can point to.

I suppose it would be difficult to say that we can trace that directly to the visit of the emperor or a prime minister or governor or some other official, but all of these things create a climate, a spirit of friendship, and an interest to engage in business. So I think it is very beneficial.

GALM: Well, this is an area in which you have on occasion received criticism. I guess Mayor Yorty was criticized also in the area of traveling, of being out of the city too much. But you see it as a necessary part of your role?

BRADLEY: Well, I think in my case the travels are quite distinct and different than those of the former mayor. My travels, though they have been extensive, have been principally in this country and principally to Washington and Sacramento, either in efforts to develop grants or programs where we get additional dollars. That has paid off, because when I took office in 1973 we were getting about \$81 million a year. We're now getting almost \$900 million a year in federal grants. So that kind of activity has been very beneficial to this city. Beyond that, I'm involved in leadership positions in various associations, either at the state or national level,





working with other elected officials in lobbying for programs affecting the cities. I'm called upon by the president to serve on a variety of commissions and programs, and it does take time, does require travel, but I think it's important.

All of that results in a certain influence which I have been able to develop in working on the interests of this city and the entire Los Angeles region when we are seeking help in Washington or elsewhere. So it's something that is sometimes not understood by the public at large, sometimes not understood by the media, but it's something that is so important that I don't mind the criticism which may come.

GALM: But it is an easy target for perhaps a would-be candidate for mayor?

BRADLEY: I suppose that someone who sought to run against me might raise that issue. But as I travel about the city, the public at large doesn't seem to react to those kinds of news stories. I rarely get a question about it.

GALM: It seems that Ira Reiner tends to make a fuss about your traveling and such. Do you see that as coming from a possible candidate for mayor?

BRADLEY: Oh, there's no question about his motivation. The one trip which he criticized and refused to sign a check for a reimbursement of my expenses, he had not a



shred of evidence to support his position. The city attorney ruled that his action was illegal. When he was asked to present any further evidence to support his contention that it was not a proper trip, he produced nothing. On the contrary, I produced a ream of documentation an inch thick. So the council quickly approved the reimbursement. But it's clear that his motivation was to attempt to attack me, either to gain publicity for himself should he seek another office or perhaps the possibility that he might run against me at some future date.

GALM: We could talk about the 1976--it would have been--the Democratic national convention. That took place in July, right, of that year?

BRADLEY: Yes.

GALM: You did participate in that?

BRADLEY: Yes. I served as one of the cochairmen of the convention.

GALM: What did that involve?

BRADLEY: Presiding over part of the proceedings.

GALM: Did you also then serve as a delegate from California?

BRADLEY: Well, I was a delegate from California but because of my position as one of the cochairmen, the actual designation as delegate was more incidental than anything.

GALM: Did you involve yourself in anybody's favor, in anybody's campaign?



BRADLEY: No. Because of my position as one of the cochairman, it was inappropriate to get involved in supporting one or more candidates. So I was therefore neutral in the campaigning that went on.

GALM: The actual appointment or the recommendation that you be appointed as a cochairperson had occurred in the summer or the late summer of '75. Before that recommendation had come up, had you really given much thought about who you might support as far as a national office for the presidency?

BRADLEY: During the actual campaign itself, I had supported Governor [Edmund G.] Brown, [Jr.]. But at the convention I was not involved in any way in promoting either the governor or any other candidate.

GALM: What did you know of Jimmy Carter at that time?

BRADLEY: I had met him on three or four occasions. [I] knew him only on a casual basis. ✓ - 100 Follow up.

GALM: Since he has become president, have you had many occasions on which to speak with him?

BRADLEY: Yes, quite a number. Following his election in 1976, he invited me to serve as a member of his cabinet. I indicated that I had already made a commitment to run for reelection and therefore declined that invitation. Since then I've been called upon on a number of occasions, have been appointed to several national commissions. I'm often



called upon for consultation and advice on issues. So we have established a very good working relationship.

GALM: At the time of the possible cabinet position did you actually go back to Washington?

BRADLEY: No. In fact, he called me and asked if I would be willing to come back to see him in Atlanta, where he was at that time interviewing candidates for various appointments. [He] indicated what it was he wanted to see me about, and I simply declined the invitation and thanked him.

GALM: So you had already made up your mind that quickly.

BRADLEY: Yes. I had made up my mind about the reelection campaign, because that was coming up the following year. This was in December, so by that time I had made a firm decision to run. It would have been unfair to my supporters for me to back off at that point. So it was an easy decision, having made that prior commitment to run for reelection. The president understood that.

GALM: His, of course, is a very difficult job. Do you feel that he's doing an effective job?

BRADLEY: I think he has lived up to his promises and his commitments that he made to those of us who were mayors of the country. We had met with him in Georgia as well as in Minneapolis when he was campaigning. He has, in my judgment, come through on the various promises that he made to us.





This is not to say that he has been able to achieve success in every one, but at least he's tried. He's proposed the programs that he promised. He's tried to push hard for their adoption. In some cases they've been adopted; in some they haven't. By and large, I give him a good rating on his efforts and his sincerity and his commitment. He has faced some almost overwhelming obstacles. He has not had a good working relationship with the Congress, and that's been a key to his inability to achieve success on a number of his programs. I don't know to what one can attribute that, whether it's staff or just a natural antagonism between him and the Congress, or what it is. That's been the major failure as far as I'm concerned.

GALM: You're both public officials who have also a strong religious faith. How do you see his style being different from yours?

BRADLEY: I don't quite understand what you mean by his style.

GALM: I guess what I'm saying is, does that have an effect on a particular type of style, of leadership style?

BRADLEY: I don't think so. He is a man who is deeply committed in terms of moral and religious principles, but I don't think that has affected his style so much. This is a personality trait that I think is very much something



that has developed over the years. It's different than many other politicians that we know. But I don't think that it's attributable to his religious faith or his religious activity.

GALM: You had mentioned that you had made the decision to run for reelection. Could you sort of speak about how you went about making that decision.

BRADLEY: It was very easy. I had from the outset planned to run for reelection. It was simply a matter of getting together with some of my supporters and declaring that I would run again. At that point I was in the middle of a number of important efforts and felt that it was desirable to continue. I was getting good support from the entire city, so I felt that it was proper for me to run, to try to continue the programs./

GALM: Was there any change in the people that you were going to for advice and support at this time than previously?

BRADLEY: They were generally the same people. I would say that there may have been very few, and I can't even recall now specific names of people who may not have been involved in 1977 as they were in 1973, with one exception, and that was Max Palevsky, who was principal financial backer and was campaign manager in 1973. [He was] very heavily involved, very important in the campaign. But aside from that one individual, I can't even think of any others who were not involved in 1977.



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